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ABSTRACT 
 
This doctoral submission represents over ten years of focused research that has 
resulted in a unique collection of academic and professional articles.  The epithet 
"unique" is adopted to reflect that over those years this area of study has been 
relatively untouched by other academic researchers. 
 
This submission presents a total of eight academic and seven professional journal 
publications that chronicle the major output of numerous research projects 
undertaken between 1992 and 2002.  The publications adhere to a central aim - to 
investigate the practical use and complex interactions between stakeholders of the 
individual insolvency rescue vehicle the Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA). 
 
The research projects employed a variety of relevant methodologies to populate an 
emerging conceptual model of the prime factors affecting the incidence, usage and 
outcomes of IVA cases. 
 
The first five articles report and develop the data collected during the various 
projects.  The articles build on each other, analysing results and comparing these 
with previous studies to underline reliability in the data.  The final three articles draw 
threads from the research data and develop the conceptual model further. 
 
As a research progression this submission contains all of the necessary ingredients of 
a doctoral thesis.  It focuses on a discrete body of knowledge, builds on a conceptual 
model, gathers valuable data and tests it, draws strong conclusions and, finally, 
establishes and contributes new theory in this area of study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OVERVIEW, RATIONALE, CONTEXT AND CONFIGURATION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Fifteen years have passed since I first began to undertake research in the area of 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVAs).  Those years have witnessed a series of 
planned and opportunistic projects designed around a common aim to investigate the 
IVA phenomenon. 
 
My overall macrostructure has been aimed at investigating the IVAs progress as an 
alternative to bankruptcy for insolvent debtors.  I have also charted its changing 
incidence and nature.  The microstructure within the individual articles presented has 
been involved with the motives and reactions of IVA "stakeholders".  My research, 
overall, has shown the successes and pitfalls that the IVA can bring. 
 
The various projects undertaken have adopted different methodologies both as the 
most suitable way to research a particular area and as a means of triangulation of 
findings.  More than once the findings from research have been tested during the 
research process itself for validity and reliability. 
 
My research publication philosophy has been to inform a mainly practitioner audience 
of the use of the IVA.  Latterly I have augmented this by seeking to share research 
data and IVA modelling with a wider academic audience. 
 
This doctoral submission represents a unique progression of research.  Few academic 
researchers have ventured into this area of law and practice and few publishing outlets 
were available in the academic press initially.  In this regard I am indebted to 
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Professor Harry Rajak, former editor of Insolvency Law & Practice, who encouraged 
further effort by publishing a number of early articles. 
 
Nor has my interest in this area ended or diminished.  Further opportunities to chart 
changes in the law and their impact on decision making are in train and further 
research in this area is certain. 
 
Rationale 
 
As a practising banker (Midland Bank plc 1978 - 1991) I had often encountered 
instances of personal bankruptcy and business failure.  The nature of the banking 
business is to take risks and on occasion insolvency aids bankers in quantifying that 
risk, as money is lost.  My training helped me see bankruptcy or liquidation as a 
failure, often due to circumstances outside the banker's control, as customers were lost 
and borrowing was only partially recovered. 
 
The bank introduced me to an alternative strategy, however, when I took up an 
appointment in Midland's "Lending Services Department" (1982-1984).  This 
appointment was to prove to be seminal in my career.  Within my LSD team I worked 
to support and rescue large corporate clients and to minimise bank exposure and 
potential loss by restructuring and turnaround management.  The work of my team 
was described in a rare contemporary article written by my manager, David Wheatley 
(Wheatley, 1983), and proof read and delivered to the publishers by me.  My time at 
LSD showed me that rescue and rehabilitation of corporate debtors was beneficial to 
the debtor, the bank, other creditors and to the economy as a whole.  My personal and 
professional experience was reflected in a wider way in the Cork report (Cork, 1982) 
that ushered in the most influential change in UK insolvency law that century. 
 
Two seemingly unconnected events in 1986 combined to conceive the work presented 
in this submission and in my MPhil thesis (Pond, 1989a).  These events were the 
passage of the 1986 Insolvency Act (coming into force on 31 December 1986) and my 
secondment as Midland Group Visiting Fellow at Loughborough University Banking 
Centre in July 1986. 
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The former event provided the legislative change that bankers, creditors, debt 
counsellors, insolvency practitioners and lawyers, amongst others, would need to 
come to terms with - the IVA.  The latter event gave me the time, resources and 
opportunity to chart the development of the IVA from its inception. 
 
I have learned, as a researcher, not only to take an objective view of data but also a 
very subjective view of what interests me in order to motivate my efforts.  The 
resultant work, now submitted, represents an abiding interest. 
 
 
Arrangement of sections 
 
This submission is arranged into THREE main areas: 
 
Chapter 1 Overview, rationale, context and configuration 
 
In this section I bring together the key aims of the research 
reported in the eight articles (Chapters 2-9).  I present the 
research projects and publications as a coherent whole.  I 
describe and discuss the various research methodologies used 
and position each article in the research chronology. 
 
Finally I draw key conclusions and look forward to new 
research challenges ahead that the present work has identified. 
 
Chapters 2 - 9 The articles 
 
Each article is reproduced in turn.  Each carries its own set of 
references and footnotes.  Where possible the journal style 
relating to structure, headings and references has been retained. 
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Appendices Appendix A 
 
Here I reproduce supporting research materials.  The material 
has never been published in this format since academic journals 
typically avoid a thesis style approach. 
 
The materials expand, amplify and illustrate points made in the 
last four papers in particular and give good evidence of the 
rigour of the research process. 
 
Appendix B 
 
In accordance with my wish to make my research accessible to 
academics and practitioners alike I reproduce here a number of 
professional journal articles often written alongside the 
academic output. 
 
These are reproduced as photocopies of the original pages of the 
individual journals. 
 
Appendix C 
 
Glossary of Insolvency terms 
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The three-factor approach to insolvency research design 
 
This approach emerged as a conceptual model following my MPhil research (Pond, 
1989a) and my follow-up studies in 1992 and 1997 presented in Chapters 2 and 4 
respectively. 
 
Whilst not wishing to engage in too much reductionism the model illustrates and 
simplifies the multi-faceted nature of this area of knowledge.  My initial literature 
review, conducted to support early research projects, was concentrated in the area of 
legislation rather than the users of the legislation.  My more practical approach saw 
the key stakeholders, the insolvency practitioner (as a proxy for the debtor) and the 
creditor as interpreters of the legislation.  Important decisions would flow from their 
knowledge and experience of this area of law and practice.  Such decisions, however, 
would not generate large numbers of IVAs unless the general commercial atmosphere 
was ready for this to happen. 
 
My overall approach to model building can be illustrated by reference to the Venn 
diagram shown in Figure 1.  The approach provides three separate bases from which 
to review the observed dispositions of various stakeholders to individual insolvency. 
 
These bases are: 
 
• Competition in the market for credit 
• Societal norms 
• The framework of insolvency law 
 
Each base (set in Venn diagram terms) intersects with the other two showing their 
more complex inter-linkages and suggesting areas where research could investigate 
inter-dependencies. 
 
As my research projects developed over the years 1992 - 2002 I focused attention on 
one part of the model or another.  This focus is reflected in the introductions to the 
various articles in this chapter. 
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Figure 1: The Three Factor Approach to insolvency research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Creditor priority 
•Creditor rights 
•Legislation reflects society’s view 
•Legislation designed to promote 
enterprise 
•Institutional trust 
relationship
•Attitudes to 
credit and debt 
•Stigma of 
bankruptcy
•Historic 
framework 
•Case Law 
•EU harmonisation 
• Market structure 
• Market maturity 
• Macro-economic conditions
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Research methodologies 
 
My research methodologies fall into three broad categories: 
 
• Survey (1988, 1989, 1992 and 1997) 
• Case Study (1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) 
• Interview (1997) 
 
These methodologies were deployed both to investigate an aspect of the study area in 
the most relevant manner and to assist in triangulation of study findings.  This would 
inform the reliability and validity of the data.  The various projects that form the basis 
of articles in this submission are summarised in Table 1. 
 
In my MPhil study I initially used court documentation to scope out the data required 
and then survey questionnaire.  The former was an expensive and time-consuming 
methodology but did have the advantage of offering raw data, unadulterated by 
comment from a particular stakeholder.  This allowed me to design a survey 
questionnaire that asked relevant questions and where responses could be verified 
against objective records. 
 
The survey method was used again in 1992 and 1997 to good effect, especially as the 
answers on the fate of IVAs were not readily available from court records.  At this 
stage my template and conceptual model was more of a “Flowchart” (Miles & 
Huberman, 1984) and then a series of "Learning Loops" (Kolb, 1984) but would soon 
develop into Woolcott's "Zoom Lens" (Woolcott, 1990) as individual aspects of the 
IVA model were investigated using the case method. 
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Table 1: Insolvency research projects undertaken 
 
Date Subject 
 
Methodology 
1988 Pilot study of early IVAs 
 
Review of court records 
1988 / 1989 Empirical study of IVAs and 
legal review (MPhil) 
 
Review of court records and 
survey questionnaire 
1993 Debt Counselling 
 
Case based 
1992 Long term study of IVA 
outcomes 
 
Survey questionnaire 
1993 Mortgage Arrears 
 
Case based 
1994 Expert System analysis of IVAs 
 
Case based 
1995 Pitfalls and problems of IVAs 
 
Case based 
1997 Empirical review of IVA cases 
(SSH Faculty funded) 
Survey and interview 
1998 / 1999 Empirical review of database of 
IVA and Bankruptcy cases 
relating to a major creditor 
Data interrogation and interview
1999 Management of IVAs by 
creditors 
Case based 
 
Case based research was then used to look at discrete parts of the emerging picture.  
Cases can limit review to a particular set of interactions (Silverman, 2000) but often 
provide detailed analysis via the gift of anecdotes and examples.  The generalisability 
of cases is uncertain (Bryman, 1988, Arber 1993) but does have the advantage of 
purposive sampling, clearly illustrating the features that the research is interested in. 
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The procedural nature of the IVA lent itself very well to the “Flowchart” method of 
research design.  My 1988/89, 1992 and 1997 projects collected data from various 
parts of the flowchart – up to the point of the creditors’ meeting in the earliest study 
and in 1992 and 1997 adding the post acceptance phase. 
 
A basic flowchart of the IVA procedure, showing the points of interest for different 
stakeholders is shown in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Flowchart approach to research focus 
 
 IP  KEY STAGES  COURT  CREDITOR 
 Debtor selection      Independent 
debt  
   Pre-    collection 
action 
 Pre-meeting 
research 
 application     
   stages    Possible 
 Proposal design      discussion 
       with 
 Interim Order  Pre-  Interim Order 
application 
 IP 
   meeting     
 Nominee 
investigation 
     Receipt of 
proposal /  
   stage    review 
 Nominee report  (14 - 28 days)  Nominee 
report 
  
        
 Creditors' 
meeting 
 Creditors' 
meeting 
   Creditors' 
meeting vote 
and 
amendments 
     Creditors' 
meeting report 
  
Variation        
     Appeals 
(possible) 
 Appeal 
(possible) 
        
 Implementation  Implementation  Variations / 
Directions / 
Supervisor 
annual reports. 
 Monitor / 
decisions on 
variations 
   (no fixed 
duration) 
    
 Final report and 
distribution 
     Receipt of 
dividend 
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This figure clearly illustrates the points at which features of the IVA could be 
inspected.  The initial 1988 pilot study used actual court records whilst subsequent 
studies used the IP records – this proved to be particularly important since no clear 
records were kept by the authorities of final payments or reasons for IVA failures. 
 
Following the 1997 research it was clear that IPs, the courts and creditors (especially 
the larger ones) were learning from their experience of early IVAs and were using 
their greater familiarity with the legislation to intervene in the IVA process more 
often.  This approximated, in my mind, to Kolb’s “Learning Loop”, an example of 
learning is illustrated in figure 3 and forms the basis of some of the more theoretical 
papers. 
 
Figure 3: Learning from IVA experience (with creditor’s viewpoint) 
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(Using 
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The example shown in figure 3 is only one of many instances of learning seen in the 
progress of the IVA research.  The courts too have learned from the experience and 
have streamlined procedures (see chapter 2) and IPs have become adept at 
anticipating creditor demands.  The debtor, by the very nature of the event, cannot 
learn from the experience and so any “institutional learning” undertaken on behalf of 
debtors is passed on to future generations by the IP or by debt advisers. 
 
The focused case methodologies used informal interview and feedback methods and 
exemplified the “Zoom Lens” approach as discrete parts of the IVA picture were 
investigated.  In the expert system work, for example, much case data was gathered 
by demonstrating the system to sample constituents (Citizens Advice Bureaux, major 
mortgage creditors and a Money Advice centre) and receiving feedback on their own 
methodologies as well as constructive views on the system displayed. 
 
Table 2 overleaf indicates where the “Zoom Lens” was pointed at different times: 
 
In 1998/ 1999 the case investigation via informal interviews followed, in the case of 
one bank, a very detailed analysis of its own database of IVA and bankruptcy cases.  
In this instance only very generalised findings could be published. 
 
In 1997 a purer form of interview was used to aid explanation of the findings from 
survey material.  Appendix A contains some examples of significant findings from the 
survey research together with sample interview transcripts.  The anecdotal material 
gained was also used in the more qualitative review of IVA interactions underpinning 
the "theory" based articles. 
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Table 2: The "Zoom Lens" approach 
 
 KEY STAGES  1988/89 1992 1993/94 1995 1997 1998/99 
  Focus IP IP Creditor IP Creditor Creditor 
         
         
 Pre-        
 application  ?  ? ? ?  
 stages        
         
         
 Pre-        
 meeting        
   ?    ? ? 
 stage        
 (14 - 28 days)        
         
 Creditors' 
meeting 
 ?    ? ? 
         
         
         
         
 Implementation        
 (no fixed 
duration) 
  ?  ? ? ? 
         
 
Note: Descriptions of projects undertaken in the years indicated are shown in Table 1. 
 
Overall, the collection of methodologies aggregates into a long-term ethnographic 
study.  Relevant methodologies were used to address individual research questions 
contributing to the whole.  The different methodologies address the key issues of 
validity of data and reliability of interpretation. 
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The refereed articles 
 
Pond, K., ''The Individual Voluntary Arrangement Experience'', Journal of 
Business Law, 1st March 1995, pp 118-130, ISSN 0021 9460. 
 
The Journal of Business Law (JBL) is targeted at academic and professional lawyers 
and in this first article there was a need to introduce and contextualise IVAs since 
research had shown low awareness was prevalent (Pond, 1989a).  The general 
background helped to position the article as a review of law and practice 10 years 
after Cork (Cork, 1982) and five years after introduction of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
 
The articles describe the IVA procedure, enabling statutory references and case law to 
be introduced to augment particular points.  Summary findings from the 1989 and 
1992 research studies (Pond, 1989a; Pond 1993) are introduced to show the practical 
impact of the legislation and to compare IVAs with the more familiar bankruptcy 
procedure. 
 
By combining both research projects the full chronicles of early IVA cases could be 
tracked for the first time.  This methodology would be used again in 1997. 
 
The article built on my MPhil thesis (Pond, 1989b) that reported only the 1989 
research but did include some tentative observations about the areas of conflict and 
interpretation in IVA design that had been shared by interviewees in the research.  
The 1989 thesis had not been used as a basis for academic articles due to the hiatus in 
my academic career when I went back to work for Midland Bank (1989-1991).  This 
article therefore represented the first external publication of my use of IVA 
categorisation (by income and assets) and the concept of risk for creditors in 
accepting IVAs. 
 
The article concludes with a review of legal cases and a Practice Direction that had 
amplified the Insolvency Act and Rules provisions, especially in the area of creditor 
appeals.  It also notes the inclusion of specific contractual clauses in IVA proposals - 
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an early portent of the standardisation of IVA documentation proposed by the 
insolvency profession itself 10 years later (R3, 2001) 
 
The conclusion of the article supports the view that IVAs have been successful in 
achieving their aims but that further use of this insolvency vehicle is needed before a 
better picture can be drawn. 
 
 
Doherty, N.F. and Pond, K., ''Intelligent Support for Individual Voluntary 
Arrangements'', Insolvency Law and Practice, 10(6), 1994, pp 169-172, ISSN 0267 
0771. (50%/50% contribution) 
 
In order to explore the 1989 and 1992 research further the opportunity was taken, in 
1994, to collaborate with a Business School colleague to review IVA law and practice 
from a systems engineering point of view. 
 
The research was highly practical and built on earlier collaboration to design and 
build an expert computer system to describe and support more general debt-
counselling work (Doherty, 1993).  The article introduces IVAs and summarises 
research to date for a largely practitioner oriented audience.  By 1994 IVAs were well 
established and had been the subject of a number of descriptive articles in the 
professional press and so a detailed description of the legislation was not needed for 
this audience. 
 
The strong conclusion from the research was that that client selection and IVA design 
were knowledge-intensive procedures, well suited to exploration via a rule-based 
expert computer system. 
 
The article goes on to describe expert computer systems in general and to show their 
importance to the achievement of organisational goals.  A brief description of the 
expert computer system (PISCES) follows as the component parts of the IVA 
selection and design processes are broken down and reviewed.  Whilst this rule-based 
approach appears mechanistic it does introduce the concept that IVAs are a 
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knowledge-based procedure and that much of the subjective knowledge has still to be 
captured. 
 
 
Pond, K. and Evans, D., ''Debtor Non-Co-operation in Individual Voluntary 
Arrangements'', Insolvency Law & Practice, 11(4), 1st September 1995, pp 82-85. 
(90%/10% contribution) 
 
This is one of two articles showing joint authorship with David Evans, insolvency 
manager at Pannel Kerr Forster, Leicester (see Appendix B).  Whilst David co-
operated with the research and offered some advice on the draft articles it remains, 
essentially, my own work. 
 
The article draws on a unique research opportunity in 1995 extended by Leicester 
based insolvency practitioners Pannel Kerr Forster.  The opportunity was given for 
me to spend a week with a busy insolvency manager who had responsibility for day-to 
day management of IVA cases.  This interview and case based methodology 
supported the present article and gave insight not apparent from normal survey 
methods.  A further professional article was also published following this project and 
is reproduced at Appendix B (Pond, 1995b) 
 
The 1992 research on the fate of some early IVA cases had shown that many had 
failed due to debtor non-co-operation.  This research attempted to provide a clearer 
explanation of what this phrase actually meant in a practical way. 
 
Findings from the research were also used to inform the design of the 1997 research 
project, particularly the interview stage. 
 
The article is fairly brief and summarises the rationale for the research, reporting 
various reasons for non-co-operation.  The article also offers possible remedies for 
some non-co-operation problems; further populating the "knowledge base" built up by 
insolvency practitioners to support the IVA selection and design process. 
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The article aimed to provide detailed discussion for practitioners on the causes of IVA 
failure. 
 
 
Pond, K., ''A Decade of Change for Individual Voluntary Arrangements'', 
Insolvency Law & Practice, 14(6), December 1998, pp 332-336. 
 
The "Decade of Change" article was again aimed at a practitioner audience.  Its style 
was largely descriptive as it reports findings from my major research study in 1997.  
The "decade" refers to the fact that IVAs had been available under the Insolvency Act 
1986 for 10 years. 
 
The research broadly replicated the studies in 1989 and 1992 (Pond, 1989 and 1993) 
by identifying a number of cases commenced in 1994/95 and reviewing their 
outcomes or progress in 1997. 
 
The research learned from and built on the earlier studies, drawing its initial sample 
from the Insolvency Service public register.  The research also drew on the regular 
surveys undertaken by the insolvency professional body R3 (then SPI) (SPI, 1992-97) 
that tended to reflect major trends but failed to look at areas of practical detail.  
Survey results (30% response rate) were carefully coded and analysed (see Appendix 
A) and tentative conclusions were shared with a small number of insolvency 
professionals to aid interpretation of the data.  Transcripts of selected interviews are 
included in Appendix A. 
 
The conclusions of the research were that the nature of IVA proposals had changed 
over the 10 years.  Greater awareness and acceptance by creditors and debtors, 
together with the changed economic conditions, especially relating to domestic 
property prices, contributed to this change. 
 
IVA terms had lengthened to the now standard five years whilst IVA dividends had 
fallen and average 17p in the £ (32p for larger cases).  Benefits over bankruptcy were 
remarkably consistent over the 10 years at roughly double the dividend available in 
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bankruptcy.  This suggests that economic conditions, rather than debtor or creditor 
strategies were responsible for this change.  Table 3 extends the analysis of the IVA 
vs., bankruptcy returns in the article. 
 
Table 3: Comparing dividends in IVA and bankruptcy 
 
Case 
IVA  Bankruptcy  IVA v. 
Bankruptcy 
IVA as % of 
Bankty. 
10 year 
difference 
 87/88 94/95  87/88 94/95  87/88 94/95  87/88 94/95  IVA BKPT 
 
under 
10k 
32.11 5.02  8.24 4.65  23.87 0.37  389.68 107.96  -27.09 -3.59 
10 to 
20k 
43.17 42.2  18.6 17.75  24.57 24.45  232.10 237.75  -0.97 -0.85 
20 to 
50k 
49.71 31.76  36.79 10.4  12.92 21.36  135.12 305.38  -17.95 -26.39 
over 
50k 
71.07 39.46  56.69 18.65  14.38 20.81  125.37 211.58  -31.61 -38.04 
               
w.av. 47.62 30.69  22.06 14.35  25.56 16.34  215.87 213.87  -16.93 -7.71 
 
The 1998 research also showed that Cork's determination to provide an insolvency 
vehicle relevant to the needs of professionals and managers was coming to pass 
(Cork, 1982). 
 
Success rates over the 10 years do fall from 77% to 67% due largely to the poorer 
economic conditions.  Failure of IVAs through debtor non-co-operation was further 
investigated in the interview phase of this research.  This helped to introduce the 
concepts of IVA risk and moral hazard.  This theme would be echoed in future papers. 
 
 
Pond, K., ''Administration of Recoveries in Individual Insolvency: Case Studies 
of Two UK Banks'', The European Journal of Finance, 8(2), 2002, pp 206-221, 
ISSN 1351-847X. 
 
Although it was published in 2002 this article was researched in 1998 / 99, 
progressing via the academic conference route (Pond, 1999) before being selected for 
the European Journal of Finance. 
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As for many researchers serendipity played a large part in this project.  A chance 
enquiry from a major retail bank about IVA research resulted in a long-term 
relationship whereby advice on IVA design points and monitoring was exchanged for 
unique access to a full database of that bank's IVA and bankruptcy cases.  The 
strategy that bank had adopted, to "out-source" the management of formal insolvency 
cases (individuals), was largely cost driven but resulted in a detailed database of cases 
for research purposes.  The relationship also offered an insight into the impact of 
creditor power in the insolvency process. 
 
This unique insight was compared and contrasted with the strategy adopted by another 
major retail bank that had chosen to centralise management of its IVA cases within its 
own organisation.  The second bank allowed some access to its staff and its records at 
its Midlands based unit.  Both banks were able to "sign-off" the article before 
publication. 
 
By the time that this article was written the data gathering phase of this research 
progression was nearing completion and the model-building phase had begun.  The 
article bases itself firmly in the retail banking and debt recovery literature and 
introduces my three-factor approach to insolvency research design (see Figure 1). 
 
The two banks reviewed in this article offered generous access to managers, opinions 
and records.  They helped to present a convincing canvas against which research 
conclusions from previous projects could be tested and compared. 
 
The cases also showed the asymmetric bargaining power of well-organised creditors 
and practical amendment of IVAs in the light of experience. 
 
The article combines case study insights with new and existing data on the IVA 
experience.  It concludes that these creditors are risk averse and alert to the moral 
hazard that IVA acceptance delivers. 
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Pond, K., ''The Value of the Banker Customer Relationship: Experience of 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements'', Journal of Financial Services Marketing, 
5(1), September 2000, pp 32-39. 
 
Published in 2000 this article was drawn from the same basic research as the previous 
article published in 2002 (such are the vagaries of academic publication).  The article 
reviews my IVA research and further develops parts of the Three-Factor Approach 
from the focused standpoint of the retail banker and the relationship with the 
consumer debtor.  As such it represents the first "theoretical" article in this 
progression. 
 
The article looks mainly at the inter-face between competition in the retail banking 
market place and the social and ethical considerations emanating from an awareness 
of consumer interactions. 
 
The timeliness of the article ensured that it reflected the growing need for banks to 
develop relationships with their customers and see them as having "life-time value". 
 
 
Pond, K., ''Creditor Strategy in Individual Insolvency'', Managerial Finance, 
28(6), June 2002, pp 46-60. 
 
The penultimate article in this progression had a lengthy gestation.  It draws heavily 
on an academic conference submission in Stockholm in 1999 (Pond, 1999) prepared 
during my six-month study leave period.  The full publication was part of a special 
edition of Managerial Finance on UK Insolvency that General Editor Rick Dobbins1 
asked me to edit.  My editorial, introducing this and other related articles submitted by 
a wide range of academic authors, is reproduced at Appendix B. 
 
                                                          
1 Dr Rick Dobbins was a lecturer in Accounting at Bradford University Management Centre during my 
1975-1978 first-degree course.  His subject area introduced me, for the first time, to insolvency law and 
practice.  How fitting for him to re-enter my professional career at this stage. 
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This major article is the second fully theoretical article in this progression.  It 
reviewed and developed the Three-Factor Approach and focused on the interface 
between retail bank competition and the framework of insolvency law.  The article 
further develops the concept of IVA risk and places the IVA procedure with a basic 
game theory setting. 
 
Some time and space is spent in the article outlining and explaining the game based 
model and then seeks to explore the various responses to the classic Prisoners' 
Dilemma that the IVA decision represents. 
 
Key areas of my IVA research that the proposed model draws on include: 
 
• The concept of debtor non-co-operation 
• The concept of moral hazard in IVAs 
• The measurement of IVA risk 
• Data relating to IVA failure / success 
• Data relating to IVA modifications 
 
The article concludes that IVA stakeholders and their professional advisers have 
learned crucial lessons about IVAs over the years since 1987.  These lessons, 
however, will change as factors such as IVA risk and social attitudes change. 
 
 
Pond, K., ''New Rules and New Roles for the Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement'', Insolvency Law & Practice, 18(1), January 2002, pp 9-13. 
 
The final article in this progression uses the opportunity provided by legislative 
changes to review the part of the Three-Factor Approach concerned with the legal 
framework and its interface with the marketplace and with society. 
 
The legislative changes highlighted were those provided under The Insolvency Act 
2000 namely: 
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• The duty of the Nominee to give an opinion as to whether the IVA has a 
"reasonable prospect" of being implemented.  (This extends the duty under the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and Insolvency Rules 1986 that sought the Nominee's 
opinion on the likelihood of acceptance of the proposal by creditors). 
• The introduction of criminal liability for debtors making false representations at 
the proposal stage. 
• The enfranchisement of unlicensed persons to supervise Voluntary Arrangements. 
 
The article offers evidence to support opinion on the likely impact of these reforms. 
 
The Insolvency Act 2000 also amends the law with relation to the nature of the 
creditors' meeting decision, making it binding on all creditors, whether or not they had 
notice of it.  This amendment is reviewed with reference to case law. 
 
A further change under the Insolvency Act 2000 was to make the creditors' meeting 
decision under a Voluntary Arrangement binding on all creditors, whether or not they 
had notice of it.  This amendment is discussed in the light of recent post IVA cases. 
 
The further legal changes heralded by the Enterprise Act 2002 (at the time that the 
article was written this was at discussion paper stage) do not affect IVAs directly.  In 
an indirect way, however, they could see the demise of the IVA.  The proposals, that 
are likely to come into force in summer 2004, are to make the alternative of 
bankruptcy less burdensome and the discharge period shorter.  The current three year 
discharge period is to be reduced to one year and many of the penalties and 
restrictions faced by the bankrupt diluted or withdrawn.  Changes to bankruptcy fee 
structures, hitherto a substantial advantage of the IVA over bankruptcy for creditors, 
also feature in the Act, together with the abolition of Crown Preference. 
 
Whilst the reforms can be reviewed against the accumulated knowledge of IVAs held 
by professionals and academics their true test will follow implementation.  This will 
also offer fresh opportunities for research. 
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Analysing the contribution of the research 
 
Although publication in academic research is often seen as an end in itself I always 
wanted my research contribution to have a further aim.  That I achieved publication in 
some very eminent journals is testament to the quality of the work undertaken.  That I 
helped to disseminate knowledge about the IVA experience to academics, 
practitioners and professionals is the achievement of my primary goal. 
 
In this opening chapter I have described a progression of research projects and 
publications with a common theme.  I have shown that the separate projects are bound 
together by a coherent conceptual model.  I have also offered conclusions that aid 
interpretation of existing and proposed legislation in this area. 
 
Key contributions to date include: 
 
• Empiricism in an area where anecdote and experience were the only guides. 
• Proof that IVAs were viable and that most were successfully completed. 
• Evidence of the different attitudes and approaches of creditors and 
professional advisers. 
• Evidence of the changing nature of IVA proposal design. 
• Discussion of the concept of IVA risk. 
• Discussion of the wider societal drivers of IVA success. 
 
Yet this is still a work in progress.  As the law changes (Enterprise Act 2002) new 
opportunities open up.  What will be the impact on the IVA of a foreshortened 
bankruptcy period?  Will IVAs be an automatic exit route from bankruptcy?  How 
will the design of IVAs react to changing economic conditions?  Will creditors 
standardise their responses to IVA proposals?  Will practitioners standardise 
proposals to reduce costs and fees? 
 
There is also scope for detailed legal research into the procedural issues surrounding 
IVAs in the court process, the "reasonableness" test - how much "better" than 
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bankruptcy must the proposal be?  What will be the creditors' reaction to negligent 
statements on implementation by nominees? 
 
In addition to this the current work is incomplete in a number of areas.  Principal 
amongst these is the factor relating to society.  What are the views of debtors to 
IVAs?  Is bankruptcy stigma a thing of the past and if so what impact does this have 
on attitudes to credit and debt? 
 
Overall this research has been a major contribution to knowledge and understanding 
in this discrete area of study.  Few other academic authors or researchers have 
investigated the IVA as thoroughly over a sustained period of time. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) has been available to insolvent debtors since 1987 as 
an alternative to bankruptcy.  Statistically popular over the last six years IVAs have provided the 
courts with a number of opportunities to interpret the IVA legislation, embodied in the Insolvency 
Act 1986. 
 
Research into the practical success of the IVA scheme, together with guidance from the courts, 
combines to give debtors, creditors, insolvency practitioners and lawyers a better understanding of 
how IVAs operate and how bankruptcy can be avoided by Cork's "innocent debtors". 
 
This article discusses a number of significant research findings and legal developments regarding 
IVAs and concludes that the IVA scheme has proved to be a sensible and workable part of 
insolvency legislation. 
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THE INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT EXPERIENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
"The single most fundamental innovation under the (1986 Insolvency) Act as regards 
individuals is the concept of the individual voluntary arrangement."1 (brackets 
added)" 
 
Unlike the equally innovative Corporate Voluntary Arrangement, however, which has 
recorded fewer than 400 cases between 1987 and 1992, the Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement (IVA) is far from being a dead letter2. 
 
Despite the slow uptake of IVAs during 1987 this "fundamental innovation" has 
enjoyed a marked increase in usage as the general economic climate has worsened.  
Poor publicity for IVAs, despite their advantages to a cost cutting government, 
creditor inertia, lack of awareness amongst insolvency practitioners, solicitors and 
professional advisers combined with the high initial cost of an IVA and the lack of 
"suitable" debtors to make 1987 a disappointing year for IVA supporters with only 
404 cases recorded3. 
 
IVA numbers and the IVA share of the individual insolvency "market" grew steadily 
until 1990 when 1,927 cases (almost 14% of formal insolvencies) were dealt with in 
this way.  In 1991 this share dropped to 11.71% (3,002 cases), perhaps due to the 
huge increase in bankruptcy numbers in that year4, but rose again in 1992 to 12.74% 
(4,686 cases).  In 1990 it was suggested that the "novelty" of IVAs had "worn thin"5 
but recent statistics indicate a revival. 
 
This article reviews the IVA procedure and the practical experience of IVAs over the 
past six years, as revealed by empirical research.  The interpretation of new (1986) 
legislation by the courts has also added to the fund of knowledge now available to 
debtors and their professional advisers when formal insolvency proceedings are 
considered. 
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Whilst the procedure of the IVA may be innovative the principle is not.  IVAs are 
private "contracts" entered into by debtors and their creditors for the satisfaction of 
debts.  In this court supervised and protected procedure the debtor proposes how the 
debts are to be satisfied, under the guidance of a licensed insolvency practitioner, and 
the creditors are given the opportunity of accepting or rejecting the proposal.  The 
private nature of the procedure makes it particularly suitable for professionals and 
public figures where bankruptcy would rob them of their professional status or 
preclude their continuation in public office. 
 
Compositions in satisfaction of debts and Deeds of Arrangement are very similar 
concepts to the IVA and have been available under various Bankruptcy Acts since the 
eighteenth century6.  In reviewing UK insolvency law and practice in the late 1970's, 
however, Cork7 noted that the disuse of these earlier alternatives to bankruptcy was 
largely due to the existence of legal impediments and the strictures of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1914 and the Deeds of Arrangement Act 1914, especially where the agreement of 
creditors was concerned. 
 
In finding a procedure for dealing with insolvent debtors, other than through 
bankruptcy, Cork felt that an important social need would be filled in addition to 
relieving the burden of work on the courts and Official Receivers8.  The general 
advice given by many insolvency practitioners can now be summarised as: 
 
"An individual voluntary arrangement should always be considered before 
bankruptcy"9. 
 
IVAs have now completely replaced Deeds of Arrangement in practice although 
Deeds are still available and now have fewer disadvantages and impediments10. 
 
In 1987 the statistics on the use of the IVA procedure were affected significantly by 
the activities of a small number of insolvency practitioners. Although few insolvency 
practitioners could have been fully geared up to implement IVAs in the first half of 
1987 some independent firms, notably in the North West of England, "championed" 
the IVA cause.  The North West saw 32.3% of IVAs in 1987 but only 15.4% of 
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bankruptcies.  London and the South East, on the other hand, saw 12.4% of IVAs in 
1987 and 25.8% of bankruptcies11. 
 
Recent statistics indicate, however, that this position has changed.  Now London and 
the South East account for 45% of IVAs and 37.8% of bankruptcies.  Each of the 
Eastern, South Western and West Midlands areas see, proportionately, more 
bankruptcies than IVAs whilst the North West is still "championing" IVAs, albeit in a 
less noticeable way12. 
 
 
 
 
THE INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT PROCEDURE 
 
The Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) gives great prominence to the legislation covering 
IVAs.  The basic procedure is addressed in Part VIII of the Act (Sections 252 to 263), 
before the bankruptcy procedure, and the more detailed workings of the scheme are 
embodied in Part 5 of the Insolvency Rules. 
 
The legislation also gives encouragement, or at least the opportunity, for IVAs to be 
considered at three distinct times in the bankruptcy procedure: 
 
A Direct application by debtor before a petition. (S.253 IA 1986) 
 
B On court discretion following a debtor's bankruptcy petition (Ss.273/4) 
 
C Following a bankruptcy order (S.253(3)(a)) 
 
Acceptance of the IVA proposal by creditors will give the court the opportunity to 
annul the bankruptcy order (S.261(1)(a)). 
 
Although the three "routes" appear to cover all types of debtor proceeding through the 
courts the practical impact of the legislation has been less than remarkable.  The 
uptake of IVAs following the second and third routes described above have been low.  
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The willingness of the debtor is often apparent but the funds to finance an IVA and 
the lack of advice available within courts are considerable barriers. 
 
Whichever "route" is taken the IVA will proceed as follows: 
 
1. Application and Proposal (S.253) 
 
Normally in conjunction with an insolvency practitioner, but sometimes alone, the 
insolvent debtor will prepare a detailed proposal for a composition in satisfaction of 
his debts.  The Insolvency Rules 1986 (R.5.3) detail the information required in the 
proposal and rely on a full disclosure of assets and liabilities by the debtor.  The 
proposal will provide for an insolvency practitioner to act as "nominee" to report on 
the scheme and become the scheme's "supervisor" in due course. 
 
2. Interim Orders (Ss.252, 254-255) 
 
The nominee is given 14 days in which to report to the court, at which the debtor's 
proposal has been presented, on the viability of the scheme.  During the 14 days court 
protection in the form of an "Interim Order" is given.  This prevents any legal 
processes, including bankruptcy petitions, being commenced or continued against the 
debtor or his property. 
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3. The nominee's report (S.256) 
 
Details of the debtors proposal, a Statement of Affairs and the nominee's objective 
comments on the scheme are submitted to the court two days before the Interim Order 
expires.  If the nominee considers that a meeting of creditors should be called to 
consider the proposal the Interim Order will be extended by up to 28 days to cover 
this period.  The courts have insisted on the objectivity of the nominee at this stage as 
in Re A Debtor (No.222 of 1990)13. 
 
4. The meeting of creditors (SS.257-258) 
 
The meeting must take place within 28 days of the nominee's report to court and 
creditors must be given 14 days notice to attend and the option of voting by proxy.  
Details of the proposal are circulated to creditors at this stage. 
 
A majority, by value, of over 75% of creditors attending the meeting or voting by 
proxy is required to accept the proposal, provided that no more than 50% of creditors, 
excluding associates (business partners or relatives), vote against the proposal.  The 
debtors plans may be modified by creditors but only with the debtor's approval.  The 
rights of secured creditors, who do not have their votes counted at the meeting, and 
preferential creditors, are protected by statute although these creditors may indicate 
their willingness to have such rights diluted. 
 
Few creditors' meetings are well attended and often IVA proposals are accepted by 
the votes of only a handful of creditors.  In one extreme case from 1987 an IVA was 
accepted on the single vote of a trade creditor representing only 1.3% of unsecured 
debts outstanding.  In this case banks, owed in excess of £60,000, were not 
represented at the creditors' meeting14.  Subsequent research showed that this case was 
successfully concluded. 
 
Court relief is available to any debtor, nominee, creditor, trustee in bankruptcy or the 
Official Receiver who considers their rights prejudiced by the decision at the meeting.  
Such objection must be made within 28 days of the meeting (S.262). 
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5. Implementation of the scheme (SS.259-263) 
 
If the scheme is accepted by creditors the nominee becomes the "supervisor" of the 
proposal and will put the debtor's plans into action.  Rejection of the proposal will re-
establish the legal rights of the creditors as the Interim Order expires. 
 
Acceptance of the proposal by the required majority will bind all creditors having 
notice of the meeting whether they attended or not and whether they voted in favour 
or not.  Apart from the court proceedings the only public acknowledgement that an 
IVA has been accepted and is in force is its registration with the Insolvency Service 
(R.5.23). 
 
Implementation of the proposal now takes place and the supervisor has delivered to 
him the assets included in the proposal and any income pledged by the debtor.  Again 
the total cooperation of the debtor is essential although the supervisor may use the 
threat of bankruptcy to focus the mind of any erring client (S.264(1)(c)). 
 
The supervisor must further report to creditors, the court and the Insolvency Service 
every 12 months on the progress of the IVA and within 28 days of its completion 
(R.5.26 and 5.29). 
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THE PRACTICAL SUCCESS OF IVAs 
 
In 1989 Loughborough University Banking Centre (LUBC) undertook a study of 100 
IVA proposals from 1987 and 198815.  Using questionnaires addressed to IVA 
supervisors and visits to the register of IVAs maintained by the Insolvency Service a 
further study in 1992 was designed as a follow - up survey of 78 of those IVAs which 
had been accepted by creditors16.  The questionnaire survey achieved a creditable 
69.2% response rate. 
 
The study looked at problems encountered with accepted IVAs, the ultimate fate of 
individual cases and creditor expectations regarding the more measurable features of 
IVAs, especially the eventual dividend.  Not only do IVAs forecast better dividends 
than could be achieved by the bankruptcy of the particular debtor but, generally 
speaking, they also deliver them. 
 
Study findings 
 
The IVA cases studied were all from 1987 and 1988 and among the earliest IVAs 
proposed under the 1986 Insolvency Act.  The detailed analysis of the study was 
based on a small sample of cases but, nevertheless, revealed strong indications that a 
number of factors affecting the IVA can be associated with success rather than failure. 
 
In the study supervisors were asked to indicate whether the IVA they had 
administered actually achieved its detailed aims, whether the IVA proposal had to be 
amended and the nature of problems encountered whilst attempting to implement the 
proposal. 
 
An estimated 76.7% of study cases achieved their aims, according to supervisors, and 
were successful.  Of the 32.9% of cases which hit trouble through falling asset prices, 
rising unemployment and a generally poor economic situation, over two thirds 
eventually failed.  The remainder were amended and successfully concluded under a 
revised proposal. 
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Failed cases were more likely to include an element of income from the debtor and, 
consequently, be longer in proposed duration than successful cases.  Debtor fatigue, 
lack of interest in the IVA by the debtor and creditors (especially banks) and non-
cooperation feature high in the failed cases. 
 
As many insolvency practitioners find: 
 
"Too many debtors find that their enthusiasm for keeping up payments under 
voluntary arrangements wanes not long after the heat of the creditors' meeting is 
off"17. 
 
There is also an indication that IVAs of employees are more prone to failure than 
those of self - employed traders.  In the context of the economic conditions during the 
lives of these IVAs this is not really surprising. 
 
Supporting the indication that debtor fatigue sets in if the IVA is too long is the 
finding that some debtors curtailed their own IVAs by accelerating voluntary 
contributions or remortgaging to satisfy creditors. 
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Comparison with bankruptcy 
 
The automatic discharge period for bankruptcy of three years (S.279(1) IA 1986)  
remains an important benchmark for IVAs.  Of the cases reviewed only 18% were 
designed to last for more than three years.  In the event all but one of the failed cases 
had ended in under three years and only one successful case was still running after the 
three years had elapsed. 
 
In theory, the sanction for non-cooperation with the supervisor of an IVA and, indeed, 
failure to comply with the terms of the IVA is bankruptcy.  This is far from automatic, 
however, as the courts' power is discretionary in these cases and relies on the extent of 
the failure to comply and the reasonableness of the requests with which the debtor has 
failed to cooperate18.  Clearly longer term cooperation is more material to the success 
of an IVA where contributions from continuance to trade or from employment are 
envisaged in the proposal.  These are, of course, the very cases which have proved 
vulnerable to the external constraints over the period of this study. 
 
Of the cases that failed 60% promised income over a period to creditors.  In all of 
these cases supervisors reported that payments had been erratic or non existent, finally 
drying up altogether. 
 
Whilst bankruptcy does not always follow the failure of an IVA (even when debtors 
fail to cooperate with the supervisor) the likelihood is strong that the failed IVA 
debtor will be forced to move home.  Thus, the privations of bankruptcy, if not the 
legal penalties, are visited upon debtors whose IVAs fail.  Supervisors reported 
grounds for petitioning for bankruptcy in 12 cases in the study but only four petitions 
were granted.  In a further case bankruptcy petitions were rejected on three separate 
occasions as the court preferred to see alternative IVA proposals presented. 
 
Actual outcomes of the study sample IVAs showed that, whilst expected durations 
stated in IVA proposals were misleading and asset realisations optimistic, in a number 
of cases, the proportion of realisations required to cover costs was much as expected.  
Moreover, actual cost levels were demonstrably lower than the costs of bankruptcy 
would have been. 
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For a case with £50,000 of assets and/or income available for distribution the 
bankruptcy costs, according to the 1986 Insolvency Fees Order, would have been 33% 
of realisations (£16,500).  Actual supervisor costs for a similarly sized IVA in the 
study sample would have been 18.35% of realisations (£9,175).  To both these figures 
essential legal costs and disbursements of between 2% and 8% of realisations must be 
added.  The key cost element in bankruptcy which does not apply to IVAs is the 
"audit fee" charged by the Insolvency Service.  This fee can amount to 15% of 
realisations and is a major source of funding for the Insolvency Service. 
 
IVA costs were also lower for cases involving income generation than expected from 
the IVA proposals.  The cost comparison shown in Table 1 is made using the 
information available from the original IVA proposal which should include the basis 
on which the supervisor will calculate his own fees.  Total fees include legal 
disbursements 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Consequently, dividends were higher for unsecured creditors than in bankruptcy and, 
generally, at or in excess of the level that could have been anticipated based on the 
debtor's original Statement of Affairs. 
 
It is interesting to note that the riskier "income only" IVAs return significantly better 
dividends to creditors than achievable in bankruptcy.  This was mainly due to the fact 
that those debtors who proposed "income only" IVAs had few, if any, assets to offer 
creditors in bankruptcy.  If the alternative to an IVA is bankruptcy then "income only" 
IVAs of a reasonable duration appear to offer creditors a better chance of a return, 
albeit at a higher risk of the IVA failing. 
 
Table 2 shows the comparison between the actual dividends achieved in the IVAs 
studied and the bankruptcy dividends in those same cases, generated using a contra - 
factual hypothesis. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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In 1987 and 1988 creditors were more likely to accept IVA proposals which contained 
a good level of saleable assets.  The study supports their logic in finding that 
successful cases are more likely to contain assets and be shorter in proposed duration 
than failed cases. 
 
Successful cases are also more associated with the positive support given by secured 
lenders.  This often underpins the exclusion of the home, under the terms of the IVA 
proposal, and its ultimate retention.  This gives the debtor a stable basis from which to 
launch or relaunch a business or career.  Support from secured lenders was also 
shown to encourage unsecured creditors to accept the IVA proposal in the first place.  
The findings of this study again support the logic of the creditors' prescience. 
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LEGAL CLARIFICATION 
 
With over 12,000 IVAs registered between 1987 and 1992 it is not surprising that 
some have been contentious and have required court scrutiny.  Although the 
Insolvency Act and Rules were carefully drafted it was inevitable, as with any new 
legislation, that clarification of certain parts of the legislation would be required. 
 
The Insolvency Act also gave creditors and supervisors the opportunity to bring 
uncertain or disputed matters to the attention of the court.  This has resulted in a 
number of cases, involving IVAs, where High Court and Court of Appeal judgements 
on the interpretation of particular parts of the legislation have been handed down. 
 
Most of these cases have dealt with procedural matters relating to the period up to the 
appointment of a supervisor rather than on the implementation of the proposal itself. 
 
 
Procedural enhancements 
 
The detailed IVA procedures contained in the Insolvency Rules received a major 
amendment in 1991 with the issue of a Practice Direction by the Chief Bankruptcy 
Registrar allowing the "concertina order"19.  A "concertina order" can be used in 
suitably straightforward, fully documented and non-contentious IVAs to grant an 
Interim Order and a Final Order on consideration of the chairman's report of the 
creditors' meeting without the necessity of a hearing.  The purpose of the order is to 
save time and costs as, previously, an obligation for the court to hear all IVA 
applications existed. 
 
As the LUBC study has shown, the costs argument in favour of IVAs is strong and 
can be substantiated in most cases.  The "concertina order" gives further credence to 
the claim incorporated in many IVA proposals that an IVA would cost less and realise 
assets faster than the bankruptcy of the debtor. 
 
Another use of curtailed procedures was seen in Re Cove (a debtor) 198920.  In this 
case the court felt that a creditors' meeting would serve no useful purpose and 
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discontinued the Interim Order.  In this case the nominee could not show that the 
creditors would agree to an IVA.  The court's swift action may well have secured 
some benefit for creditors, as IVAs which subsequently fail may have already 
exhausted available assets, making bankruptcy almost pointless. 
 
In freezing all legal action against the debtor whilst an IVA proposal is investigated 
by the nominee by the use of an Interim Order the IVA procedure protects the debtor 
against creditors.  Most creditors are stronger and better equipped to mount court 
proceedings for repayment of debt than the debtor is to defend them.  In a further 
case, however, the court decided that the appointment of a receiver under The Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986 was not prohibited by the Interim Order Re M 
(restraint order)(1991)21. 
 
In this way the courts have shown their understanding of Cork's wish to see 
"innocent" debtors treated fairly and expeditiously whilst guarding against an abuse of 
the IVA scheme by those wishing to evade their creditors.  Reliance is also placed on 
the insolvency practitioner licensing system in this regard.  The Insolvency Act 1986 
introduced a system of licensing insolvency practitioners and according to the 
Insolvency Service22 licenses issued by the seven licensing authorities, including The 
Law Society, The Institute of Chartered Accountants and The Insolvency Practitioners 
Association, are held by 1,988 authorised practitioners from 961 different firms.  It is 
estimated that around 600 of these licensed practitioners are fully bonded to undertake 
insolvency appointments.  Failure to adhere to the relevant codes of conduct relating 
to insolvency appointments can lead to revocation of a license and loss of the 
practitioner's livelihood. 
 
Interpretation of the Act and Rules 
 
By giving creditors the power to challenge the result of a meeting of creditors in an 
IVA (S.262) the legislation placed a further check on recalcitrant and dishonest 
debtors and negligent insolvency practitioners. 
 
Creditors have not been slow to exercise their right to challenge decisions on the 
grounds: 
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"(a) that a voluntary arrangement approved by a creditors' meeting summoned under 
section 257 unfairly prejudices the interests of a creditor of the debtor; 
 
(b) that there has been some material irregularity at or in relation to such a meeting." 
(IA 1986) 
 
Section 262 gives the court the power to revoke or suspend the decision at the 
disputed meeting or give directions for the meeting to be re-convened, provided that 
the challenge is made within 28 days of the chairman's report of the meeting to the 
court. 
 
In Re a debtor (No 259 of 1990)23 the court decided that the phrase "unfairly 
prejudices" related to the treatment of creditors under the terms of the IVA proposal, 
such as the dilution of secured or preferential creditor rights, rather than the allegedly 
"unfair" interpretation of the validity of debts used to vote in the creditors' meeting by 
the meeting chairman. 
 
This finding is similar to Re a debtor (No 222 of 1990)24 in which three large banks 
and two other creditors, owed over £53 millions in total, challenged the chairman's 
decision to disallow their votes.  The court ordered that all creditors attending the 
meeting were eligible to vote (unless debts were for unliquidated or unascertained 
amounts (Rule 5.17(3))) but if the chairman is in doubt over the validity of a claim 
reference should be made to the court (Rule 5.17(6)).  The danger of the chairman 
disallowing votes, for whatever reason, is that the creditors so disenfranchised would 
not be bound by the decision of the meeting and, ultimately, by the IVA. 
 
This touches on a key area of the IVA legislation - the contractual binding of all 
creditors having notice of the creditors' meeting provided a 75% majority of creditors 
attending the meeting agree to the IVA.  Under Deed of Arrangement legislation 
dissenting creditors could still petition for bankruptcy. 
 
The result of the creditors' meeting was also scrutinised in Re a debtor (No 2389 of 
1989)25  where the debtor challenged a bankruptcy petition on the grounds that the 
rejection of an IVA proposal was an unreasonable refusal to compromise the debt on 
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which the petition was based (s.271(3)).  The court refused to accept the argument put 
forward by the debtor.  This judgement would appear to spike the guns of those IVA 
supporters who urged debtors to use IVAs to defeat bankruptcy petitions in precisely 
this way26. 
 
Room for improvement? 
 
Having worked with the IVA legislation for over five years insolvency practitioners 
and solicitors are now fairly familiar with its interpretation and its usefulness. 
 
Many of the early procedural and practical problems with IVAs have been overcome 
in the past five years.  Criticisms in 1988 regarding the lack of standardised court 
forms relating to IVAs27 have been remedied and the "concertina order" has 
effectively curtailed the procedure in appropriately straightforward cases, thus 
answering the criticism that the IVA needed to be swifter if debtors were to be 
protected. 
 
Although few of the cases studied in the LUBC research included a detailed financial 
comparison of the outcome of the IVA and of the bankruptcy of the debtor, despite 
70.59% of cases being put forward on the basis of a "better realisation of assets than 
in bankruptcy"28 this has now become common practice.  The Insolvency Rules do 
not call for such a comparison to form part of the proposal but: 
 
"This is necessary for two reasons: first, so that the creditors can have the fullest 
possible information to enable them to form a reasoned judgement as to whether or 
not to support the proposal; and, secondly, the creditors must be satisfied that their 
position is no worse than it would be in bankruptcy"29. 
 
Other matters, such as the supervisor's power to amend faltering IVAs, are generally 
dealt with by adding relevant clauses to the proposal.  Already Rule 5.3(2)(o) allows 
for proposals to state the functions which are to be undertaken by the supervisor of the 
IVA, without limiting the proper scope of these functions.  Without wide powers 
being granted by the proposal the supervisor would need to seek court directions or 
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summon a new creditors' meeting each time amendments to the proposal were 
required. 
 
In this way IVA procedures have worked well in a practical sense yet two major areas 
of contention remain: The appropriateness (or otherwise) of the referral limits under 
s.273 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the lack of investigatory powers of the nominee 
and supervisor. 
 
Referral limits 
 
Court referral of a bankruptcy petition to an insolvency practitioner under S.273 is 
limited to debtors petitions where the Statement of Affairs reveals unsecured 
bankruptcy debts less than £20,000 and assets equal to or more than £2,000.  In 
addition the debtor must not have been subject to a bankruptcy order or a composition 
within the previous five years and the court must consider it appropriate to appoint an 
insolvency practitioner for this purpose.  All four conditions must be met if a referral 
is to be made. 
 
The court is assisted in deciding whether cases falling within these limited guide-lines 
are "appropriate" (S.273(1)(d)) by the debtors answers to questions 5 and 6 of Part F 
of the Statement of Affairs (Debtors Petition) (Form 6.28) which elicit details of 
previous failed compositions and the debtors ideas for an IVA including, vitally, 
whether the debtor considers that the creditors would agree to an IVA. 
 
Of the cases included in this study only a small number would have qualified for 
referral based on the above criteria had they commenced as debtor's bankruptcy 
petitions30.  IVAs have, however, been shown to be successful where liabilities 
exceed £20,000, thus supporting the argument that the £20,000 limit should be 
removed31 and, perhaps, that the referral mechanism should be available under 
creditor's bankruptcy petitions too rather than leaving the possibility of an IVA in the 
hands of the Official Receiver or the debtor.  The Coopers & Lybrand Annual Review 
does, however qualify its support for the removal of this referral limit, by suggesting 
that the lower limit of £2,000 worth of available assets be increased to at least £7,000, 
since meaningful IVAs cannot be generated on lower levels of assets.  This view 
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appears to ignore those IVAs which the LUBC research has shown to be successful 
yet are based on the provision of income alone as the debtor has no assets to realise. 
 
The powerless supervisor 
 
In a number of recent court cases, including one cited above, where creditors have 
challenged the decision of the creditors' meeting, judgements have suggested that 
where a thorough investigation of the debtor's affairs is required bankruptcy is the 
correct procedure to use and not the forum of the creditors' meeting. 
 
This does not reflect "real life" outlined in Coopers & Lybrand's Annual Review for 
199232 which proposes that: 
 
"The Official Receiver should exercise his discretion as to whether or not an 
investigation should be undertaken in any particular case, which is what in fact takes 
place now". 
 
The failure to order a referral to an insolvency practitioner on creditors' petitions and 
debtors' petitions where liabilities exceed £20,000 may, therefore, be linked to the 
belief that such cases should first be investigated by the Official Receiver. 
 
Anecdotal evidence abounds regarding the attitude of the Inland Revenue to IVAs 
when they were first introduced.  Clearly the Revenue will consider the debtor's 
payment history and will vote against IVAs where tax investigations are underway or 
are warranted33. 
 
Thus the IVA procedure is not viewed, officially, as an appropriate vehicle for 
investigation.  Rather, the duty of disclosure is placed on the debtor with the nominee 
being given only a short time to review the proposal objectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
During the six years that the IVA legislation has been available the legislation has 
proved to be robust, workable and fairly popular.  Little evidence is offered to 
substantiate the fear that IVAs can be used by unscrupulous debtors attempting to 
avoid their creditors and it is clear that the courts have not allowed the detailed Rules 
to be ignored. 
 
An estimated 9,000 debtors have avoided bankruptcy during 1987 to 1992 by using 
the IVA scheme.  Many have continued to trade or to be employed and have 
contributed to the economy rather than becoming a drain upon it. 
 
Research has shown that the basic aims of the IVA legislation have been achieved for 
debtors, through avoiding the penalties of bankruptcy; creditors, through receiving 
better dividends; insolvency practitioners, through increased activity and experience 
and the government, through the increased privatisation of insolvency appointments. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Comparison of expected and actual supervisor costs from study sample cases 
 
 
Type of   Expected costs Actual costs  Total IVA costs 
case    as % of  as % of actual  as % of actual 
   estimated  realisations  realisations 
   realisations 
 
Assets only  19.02%  21.56%  33.06% 
 
Assets and Income 20.52%  24.73%  31.53% 
 
Income only  26.37%  19.75%  23.87% 
 
(Average)  (20.86%)  (22.63%)  (30.18%) 
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TABLE 2 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Comparison of expected bankruptcy and actual IVA dividends from study 
sample cases 
 
 
Type of   Expected   Actual    Actual IVA  
case    bankruptcy  IVA   divs as % of  
   dividends  dividends  bankruptcy 
   (p in £)  (p in £)  estimate 
 
Assets only  51.0p   64.25p   125.98% 
 
Assets and Income 4.5p   22.88p   508.44% 
 
Income only  6.0p   44.67p   744.5% 
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IVAs pass the test 
 
As the post - recession reviews of insolvency activity get underway and insolvency professionals 
ruminate on the lessons of the past five years they may notice that one part of the 1986 Insolvency 
Act has avoided calls for major reform - the Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) procedure.  
According to the Society for Practitioners of Insolvency: 
 
'The recession of the last few years has been its (sic) first important test and it has clearly passed, 
both in terms of usability and productivity.' [SPI, 1994] 
 
This article briefly examines the growth in IVA numbers which supports the contention that the 
IVA procedure has been a 'success' since its introduction in 1986 [James, 1993].  The article aims 
to describe the range of expertise and knowledge developed by insolvency practitioners who have 
handled IVAs and further suggests how the important, and often expensive, lessons of recession 
can be capitalised upon, for the future benefit of insolvency practitioners, creditors and debtors 
alike, through the medium of expert systems. 
 
IVA numbers and the IVA share of the individual insolvency 'market' rose significantly until 1990 
when almost 14% of formal insolvencies were dealt with in this way.  In 1991 this share dropped to 
11.71%, perhaps as the initial 'novelty' wore off [Mayner, 1990], but rose again in 1992 to 12.74% 
and reached over 15% in 1993 as shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In finding a court supervised and protected procedure for dealing with insolvent debtors, other than 
through bankruptcy, Cork [Cork Committee, 1982] felt that an important social need would be 
filled in addition to relieving the burden of work on the courts and Official Receivers. 
 
Significantly, IVAs have remained statistically popular and available to an increasing number of 
individuals during the recession.  IVAs have the potential to capture an even greater share of the 
personal insolvency 'market' too as courts continue to refer debtors presenting their own bankruptcy 
petitions, under S.273 of the 1986 Insolvency Act.  In the county courts, in particular, the 
proportion of petitions originated by debtors has risen from 32.7% in 1990 to 46.7% in 1993 (it 
reached 47.8% in 1992) [Lord Chancellor's Department, 1991 - 1993]. 
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Some research has been undertaken into the reasons for success or failure of individual cases 
[Pond, 1993] and individual successes have undoubtedly played a part in making IVAs more 
acceptable to creditors, another key factor in the continuation of this growth. 
 
 
Accumulated IVA wisdom 
 
Research being undertaken at Loughborough University Banking Centre (LUBC) hopes to distil the 
'expertise' of the insolvency practitioner in selecting successful IVA candidates, in designing 
acceptable and workable IVA proposals and in successfully managing accepted proposals.  A 
variety of data gathering methods are being used to obtain the information needed to program an 
expert system for IVAs which forms part of a more holistic debt counselling system [Doherty & 
Pond, 1993]. 
 
Although little can be drawn from a review of relevant literature, which concentrates on legal 
procedures, earlier research at LUBC [Pond, 1989 and 1993] has proved useful.  Interviews have 
also been conducted with a number of local (East Midlands) insolvency managers in conjunction 
with a 'case based' approach to data gathering. 
 
Preliminary findings on the reasons for the steady growth in the popularity of IVAs provide strong 
indications that IVAs are set for even greater success.  These include: 
 
• Better awareness of IVAs amongst debt advisers, the courts, professional advisers and 
insolvency practitioners. 
 
• Good experience amongst creditors, who often receive better dividends than they would in 
bankruptcy, and insolvency practitioners, who recognise the fee earning potential of IVAs. 
 
• The flexibility of the IVA procedure and the growing importance of the generation of 
income for distribution to creditors. 
 
• Greater concentration of 'expertise' amongst creditors and amongst insolvency practitioners. 
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Despite the large numbers of IVAs that have been accepted since 1986 it is fairly clear that only a 
minority of insolvency firms have become involved with them.  Cork Gully remain strong 
'champions' of IVAs [Pond, 1993] [Coopers & Lybrand, 1994] amongst the larger firms.  Evidence 
from the Insolvency Service's public register of IVAs suggests that the larger national firms account 
for around 25% of all IVA appointments whilst a further 25% are accounted for by a small number 
of independent firms. 
 
 
Key criteria for success 
 
The research described in this article looks particularly closely at the key criteria used by one East 
Midlands based insolvency practitioner in the three IVA 'stages' of Selection, Design and 
Management described earlier.  Anecdotal evidence and comment in other insolvency journals 
would suggest that their experience is not untypical. 
 
The key criteria can be split into two parts: Objective and Subjective, with the latter often having a 
bearing on the acceptability of the former. 
 
Objective criteria include: 
 
• Amount of unencumbered assets.  'Asset only' IVAs are shorter, less reliant on debtor 
cooperation and less prone to failure. 
 
• Amount of 'free' income.  Meaningful proposals need at least £300 to £500 per month. 
 
• Amount of 'third party' funding.  A lump sum or the promise of income from relatives 
can often make a marginal IVA acceptable.  Third parties can also cover the costs of the 
IVA.  Cork Gully's experience is that costs can be around £5,000 from start to finish 
[Coopers & Lybrand, 1994]. 
 
• Number and value of creditors.  An IVA should aim to deliver a better dividend than in 
bankruptcy with a minimum of around 10p in the pound over a reasonable period.  Many 
IVAs run for three years, mirroring the period to discharge for the bankrupt. 
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Although IVA proposals often appear standardised the nature of the legislation is that they are 
flexible and should be tailored to the requirements of individual cases.  Just how the objective data 
is used will be determined by the subjective 'feel' that the insolvency manager interviewing the 
debtor develops. 
 
Subjective criteria include: 
 
• The source of the introduction.  Good referrals are often made by local debt advisors.  
Insolvency practitioners are aware which advisers can be relied upon to spot likely IVA 
candidates. 
 
• The stability of the income stream.  The bankruptcy of a professional person can have 
serious implications for income availability.  An example of this is that The Law Society 
will withdraw a license to practice from a bankrupt solicitor but not from a solicitor with an 
accepted IVA (although conditions may be imposed) [Wilmot, 1994]. 
 
• Reliability and trustworthiness of the debtor.  Most of the information provided to the 
practitioner at initial interview is, necessarily, provided by the debtor.  Often no 
independent valuations or investigations are carried out before the application for an Interim 
Order starts the IVA procedure rolling. 
 
• The attitudes of the major creditors.  A frustrated building society can jeopardise the 
acceptance of an IVA just as certainly as an unsympathetic attitude from the Inland 
Revenue. 
 
These lists are not, of course, exhaustive.  Invariably the insolvency practitioner's subjective 
judgement is developed over time.  This can be a short period if, for example, initial valuations 
prove to be hopelessly misleading or the debtor fails to supply information in a timely manner or it 
can be a longer period if the debtor's enthusiasm for the IVA ebbs slowly away following the 
creditors' meeting. 
 
It is this 'feel' for a case, however, that is often the best indicator of time consuming and expensive 
remedial action ahead or even the failure of the IVA.  Problematical IVAs will also, very often, fail 
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to cover professional fees and can leave the supervisor with the difficult decision to re-engineer the 
IVA or to petition for the bankruptcy of the debtor, possibly at the creditors' own expense.  Either 
way there could be serious implications for the practitioner's reputation amongst the creditors who 
fail to receive what they had expected. 
 
Traditional computer systems in use in insolvency practitioners offices often fail to capture this 
subjective data.  Such systems work well in triggering periodic reviews of each case on a diary 
basis so that payment receipts can be checked, or monitoring time charges to enable fees to be 
calculated and invoices despatched.  Much of the routine but complex information about the design 
of the IVA proposal or the vital communication with the debtor is still held on manual files.  Even 
the best designed IVAs can fail due to the poor management of this key information. 
 
Much of the available evidence suggests that the IVA is a 'knowledge intensive' procedure.  An 
IVA can involve senior and experienced staff at each stage of the process. 
 
Successful IVA selection, design and management is a fusion of the expertise involved in gathering 
basic data about a debtor, the subjective assessment of the debtor's past and current behaviour and 
an appreciation of the changing environmental factors such as house prices and creditor attitudes.  
This intensive use of expertise within the fairly well defined structure of insolvency legislation is a 
strong justification for exploring the expert system option for IVAs. 
 
 
Expert system technology 
 
Knowledge, both individual and collective, resides in organisations in many forms.  Some of these 
are tangible and readily accessible, such as manuals, procedures and computer software, others, 
such as the experience and expertise of its employees, are far less tangible. Many management 
specialists now recognise that the long term success of an organisation is greatly dependent upon its 
ability to harness and effectively utilise such knowledge.  Michael Porter [Porter, 1993], the widely 
published American management writer, for example, views knowledge as being one of the key 
national and corporate resources which needs to be carefully managed and applied. Another highly 
influential American management writer Tom Peters [Peters, 1992], states bluntly: 
 
'Knowledge is all-important. Bringing knowledge to bear, quickly, is critical.' 
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Whilst both of the above writers are clear on the importance of corporate knowledge, it is not 
obvious how it can best be captured, automated and disseminated throughout an organisation to 
contribute to corporate effectiveness. Given this critical nature of this knowledge, it is essential that 
organisations identify strategies for its management. One highly promising strategy is to develop 
computer-based systems which can store and process expert knowledge and hence facilitate the 
decision-making process. Such systems, commonly called expert systems, can be defined as: 
'intelligent computer programs that use knowledge and inference procedures to solve problems that 
are difficult enough to require significant human expertise for their solution'  
 
By capturing and utilising corporate knowledge, expert systems have the potential to provide a 
wide range of commercial benefits, such as cost, permanence, transference, consistency, output and 
response time advantages over their human counterparts. This list of benefits is given credibility 
because it is based upon a large number of well documented success stories [Dutta, 1993].  Despite 
this impressive list of benefits, however, it should be noted that expert systems do suffer from a 
number of limitations, such as; having a very narrow focus; providing inadequate explanation; and 
generally being unable to adapt to new experiences. Consequently, because of these potential 
limitations, benefits can only be assured if the application area is selected with great care. 
 
A wide range of highly successful applications of expert systems have already been developed and 
implemented in sectors such as manufacturing, computing, medicine and financial services. This 
last sector has been particularly enthusiastic with regard to harnessing the power of expert system 
technology, with a long list of successful applications, including credit authorisation, advice on 
buying shares, financial planning and insurance claims processing. One recent addition to this list 
has been the development of an expert system, known as PISCES (Personal Insolvency Strategy 
Counselling Expert System), to provide advice and guidance on the management of personal debt. 
It has been shown that much of the knowledge and expertise of experienced debt counsellors can be 
captured and made available, within a computer-based system [Doherty and Pond, 1993]. The latest 
enhancement to this system has been the development of a module which is specifically focussed 
upon the task of identifying clients who would profit from an I.V.A., and managing its 
implementation. 
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The IVA module 
 
The IVA module has been developed to function, at least initially, as an integral component of the 
PISCES debt counselling system. In order to be successful in providing expert advice to 
individuals, who are facing insolvency problems, PISCES was originally subdivided into four 
distinct modules.  Each of these modules, which supports a major phase of the insolvency 
counselling process, is briefly described as follows: 
 
• Data Capture: The data capture module is primarily responsible for interrogating the client 
and constructing a detailed picture of their current financial status, and personal 
circumstances, using a computer-based, pro forma, questionnaire. 
 
• Data Validation: Having successfully captured the client-related data some basic validation 
functions are initiated to ensure that there are no obvious oversights or inconsistencies. 
 
• Budgetary Adviser: Budgetary advice to the client is presented to the client both in a 
summary form to present a clear picture of their current and projected financial status, and 
also in the form of a comparative analysis with normative budgets, to identify potential 
savings. 
 
• Strategy Adviser: PISCES contains a strategy rule-base which helps to determine which is 
the most appropriate remedial strategy for a specific client to adopt. 
 
PISCES, in common with most expert systems, utilises rule-based technology. The principle 
components of such systems are a knowledge-base, containing IF <condition> THEN <action> 
rules, and an inference engine which manipulates the rules in order to derive one or more solution 
to a specific problem. The condition component of a set of rules can be matched with facts, either 
stored in the knowledge-base or supplied by the user. Whenever a match between the two is made, 
the rule is said to have been fired or executed and the action component of that rule can be inferred. 
The process of matching and firing continues until a set of solutions has been generated. 
 
PISCES operates in a sequential manner moving through each of the four phases in order, although 
back tracking, through the phases, is often necessary in order to determine the most appropriate 
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strategy. The new IVA module is now situated between the data validation and budgetary adviser 
modules. Relevant aspects of the data are passed to the IVA module, in order that a preliminary 
analysis can be undertaken to determine whether further exploration of an IVA is warranted. This 
preliminary analysis is based primarily upon the more objective criteria such as the client's level of 
income and overall level of indebtedness, and the more subjective criteria such as their own 
assessment of the seriousness of their situation. 
 
If the full IVA analysis is warranted then the module's rule-based procedure is activated to 
determine firstly whether an IVA is appropriate, and if so what form it should take. The example 
summary rule shown in Figure 1. illustrates one route that the procedure can take. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Each individual clause of this summary rule is in turn composed of a number of specific rules. For 
example, when determining whether the clause 'At least 10p dividend to unsecured creditors is 
estimated', can be confirmed or not, a large number of rules are used to take account of; the overall 
level of secured debt; the possible actions of secured creditors; the estimated level of costs; and the 
budgeted level of reasonable outgoings. In addition to the knowledge explicitly described in Figure 
1, the knowledge-base also contains rules which help to make an assessment of subjective factors, 
such as the attitudes of the creditors, and the likely behaviour of the client.  It should be noted that 
in addition to the example shown in Figure 1 there will be other summary rules to help determine 
the most appropriate strategy or alternative strategies in the given circumstances. 
 
The IVA module has now been developed in a relatively simple prototype form. The system 
contains a wide variety of both procedural and experiential knowledge which has been derived not 
only from books and other publications, but also through detailed interviews with insolvency 
professionals. Because the system is in its infancy a range of future, potential development 
strategies still exist. The IVA module could, for example be used primarily for training purposes, or 
it could be used directly by insolvency practitioners for confirming the appropriateness of such an 
arrangement and supervising its implementation, or it could be further developed within the 
PISCES framework to help general debt counsellors spot IVA opportunities.  
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Conclusion 
 
Knowledge is a valuable institutional asset but it never appears on a balance sheet.  Knowledge can 
be lost far more easily than it can be gained as retirement, redundancy, ill health or pastures new 
beckon to key staff.  Expert systems provide a permanent and flexible repository for knowledge and 
have the advantage of being based on proven technology.  Working applications of expert systems 
in the Financial sector are now entering the mainstream and are already providing a wide range of 
commercial benefits. 
 
IVAs are an important and growing part of personal insolvency work and now represent a 
thoroughly tested part of the 1986 legislation.  The selection, design and management stages of the 
IVA are 'knowledge intensive' and use 'expertise' alongside routine data gathering.  This article has 
shown that elements of the insolvency practitioner's 'expertise' can be captured by an expert system 
and that the benefits of consistency, continuity and efficiency can be brought to the field of IVAs.  
Whilst it is not envisaged that an expert system could ever completely replace the experienced 
practitioner it could be used very effectively in a training or technical support rôle. 
 
The PISCES IVA module is at the early prototype stage and the authors of this article would 
welcome any comment or support that could make it a working reality. 
 
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Pannell Kerr Forster, Leicester office, during 
the research stage of this project.  The views expressed in this article, however, are the authors' 
alone and do not, necessarily, reflect the views of Pannell Kerr Forster. 
 
 
 
N.F.Doherty & K.Pond 
Loughborough University Business School 
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TABLE 1:    INDIVIDUAL INSOLVENCY STATISTICS 1987 - 1993 
 
 
Year  Bankrup- IVAs  Deeds of Total  IVAs as % 
  tcies    Arrangement   of Total 
 
 
1987  6,994  404  29  7,427  5.44% 
 
1988  7,717  779  11  8,507  9.16% 
 
1989  8,138  1,224  3  9,365  13.07% 
 
1990  12,058  1,927  2  13,987  13.78% 
 
1991  22,632  3,002  6  25,640  11.71% 
 
1992  32,106  4,686  2  36,794  12.74% 
 
1993  31,025  5,679  8  36,712  15.47% 
 
 
Source: The Insolvency Service (1994) 
 63
 
Figure 1: Example Summary Rule for determining IVA Strategy 
 
 IF   No free assets 
 AND   Monthly disposable income > £300* 
 AND  Level of indebtedness > £2000* 
 AND  Disposable monthly income < Monthly debt repayments 
 AND  Introductory source is appropriate 
 AND  Professional status / earnings capability at risk through 
   bankruptcy 
 AND  At least 10p* dividend to unsecured creditors is 
   estimated 
 THEN  Recommend IVA of three* year duration 
 
* PISCES also has the functionality to allow key 'triggers' such as 'level of free income' to be 
determined locally and amended to reflect the requirements of the user. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the Society for Practitioners of Insolvency the Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement (IVA) procedure passed the "test" of the recession with flying colours [SPI, 
1994]. 
 
This article briefly examines the growth in numbers and acceptability of IVAs since they 
were made available in the 1986 Insolvency Act and further suggests how some of the 
practical lessons of dealing with IVAs during the recession can be used to help select 
"successful" IVAs at the outset and to "manage" them effectively. 
 
IVA GROWTH 
 
IVA numbers and the IVA share of the individual insolvency "market" rose significantly 
until 1990 when almost 14% of formal insolvencies were dealt with in this way.  In 1991 
this share dropped to 11.71%, perhaps as the initial "novelty" wore off [Mayner, 1990] or 
the sudden halt in house price appreciation made many IVA proposals more marginal.  
Numbers rose again in 1992 to 12.74% and are now established at around 17% of 
insolvencies as shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
IVAs were the "single most fundamental innovation under the Act (sic)" according to 
Stephen Lawson in his guide to IVAs [Lawson, 1992].  IVAs provide a realistic 
alternative to bankruptcy allowing debtors to settle with their creditors.  Among the 
advantages of the IVA are that: the debtor avoids the stigma and penalties of bankruptcy, 
the Insolvency Service avoids further drain on its meagre resources, the efficient 
insolvency practitioner can enjoy a profitable relationship and the creditor can often 
receive enhanced dividends. 
 
IVAs have remained statistically popular and available to an increasing number of 
individuals despite their "novelty" and the massively increased workload of the 
insolvency profession during the recession.  IVAs have the potential to capture an even 
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greater share of the personal insolvency "market" too due, in part, to increased awareness 
of this alternative to bankruptcy, good experience of successful IVAs in the past and the 
opportunity given to debtors petitioning for their own bankruptcy of being referred to an 
insolvency practitioner under S.273 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to investigate the 
possibility of an IVA.  It is unclear, at present how many IVAs are proposed following a 
court referral but numbers are thought to be small. 
 
There is one major potential threat to this growth however, the damage to the confidence 
of creditors and to the reputations and profitability of insolvency professionals from IVAs 
that do not deliver what was expected and IVAs that fail due to debtor non - co-operation.  
Of the estimated 33% of accepted IVAs that hit trouble in a long term study of some early 
IVAs, over two thirds eventually failed [Pond, 1993].  The main reason for failure offered 
by insolvency practitioners was debtor non - co-operation.  Other reasons for failure exist 
too including circumstances beyond the debtor's control such as sudden loss of earnings 
or the continuing depression of house prices. 
 
THE NATURE OF NON - CO-OPERATION 
 
The research described in this article looks particularly closely at the types of non - co-
operation experienced by insolvency practitioners.  Interviews were conducted with a 
number of insolvency managers from a leading East Midlands firm in conjunction with a 
"case based" approach to data gathering.  The findings have been coupled with a number 
of practical measures that can be taken either to give "early warning" of non - co-
operation or to avoid its effects and make more IVAs end successfully. 
 
Most practitioners with experience of IVAs will have their own criteria by which they 
judge the "best" offer that a debtor can make in the given circumstances.  This could 
mean the timely disposal of assets or the generation of income over a period or a 
combination of both to provide an acceptable proposal to creditors.  Very often, however, 
choice is limited due to the nature of the problems that have precipitated insolvency. 
 
Over and above these objective measures of an IVAs likelihood of success comes the 
practitioner's subjective judgement, borne of experience and coloured by, at best, a few 
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meetings with the stress filled debtor.  Much of the subjective judgement will centre 
around the willingness of the debtor to see the IVA succeed and the grasp the debtor has 
of the fact that an IVA is only a damage limitation exercise, not a panacea for all ills and 
definitely not an "easy way out". 
 
Non - co-operation comes in a number of forms.  Individually they may make little 
impact but together they could lead to IVA failure: 
 
• Misleading valuations.  These can range from the simply optimistic to the 
concealment of assets. 
 
• Provision of basic information.  The speed and completeness of a debtor's response 
to requests for information may say much about the willingness to persevere with an 
IVA. 
 
• Attendance at meetings.  Failure to attend scheduled meetings prior to the Interim 
Order or to attend the Creditors' meeting will leave a negative impression with the 
practitioner and the creditors respectively.  Debtors who fail to attend their own 
Creditors' meeting will invariably see it rejected. 
 
• Proposals prepared by agents.  This is a worrying development.  Debtors may be 
introduced by an unlicensed advisor with a proposal already prepared.  One 
occasional exception is that of proposals prepared by solicitors under Legal Aid 
cover.  Practitioners who fail to investigate these cases fully could be dealing with 
individuals who have no serious intention to go through with the proposal.  At the 
very least the proposal will probably not reflect the debtor's "best offer" to creditors in 
the circumstances. 
 
• Lack of will to satisfy creditor demands.  Two schools of thought exist here.  Are 
IVAs the least a debtor can get away with? or are they the best deal for creditors in 
the given circumstances?  Whilst debtors will often incline towards the former, 
creditors, with their often superior knowledge of the debtor's payment history and 
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personal assets, will seek the better deal.  Most creditors will accept a reasonable offer 
but will reject a dishonest one. 
 
• Failure to adhere to arrangement.  Perhaps the clearest indicator to the Supervisor 
that something is wrong is when regular payments under an IVA do not arrive on time 
or assets included in the IVA are not released by the debtor.  It is a weakness of the 
position of the Supervisor that the IVA assets do not vest in the appointee as they do 
in bankruptcy.  In a very real sense this happens too late for remedial action to be 
taken and often the legal protection of a charge on the debtor's home is complicated 
by joint ownership. 
 
 
• Withdrawal of Third Party income.  Where family members, friends or even 
employers, have offered to include cash or assets in the debtor's IVA, a feature which 
nearly always helps the IVA to forecast a better dividend than in bankruptcy, 
withdrawal of these can be fatal.  In some cases Third Party cash remains outside the 
IVA and is used to cover fees.  Again, non payment of fees is likely to be noticed very 
quickly by the practitioner. 
 
• Emergence of post meeting creditors.  Such creditors are not bound by the vote at 
the Creditors' meeting since they did not have notice of it in the first place.  Post 
meeting creditors can still proceed against a debtor and, if they are large enough, 
cause the IVA to fail. 
 
• Circumstances beyond the debtor's control.  Many IVAs fail through redundancy, 
accident and matrimonial breakdown.  There is little that the Supervisor can do to 
avoid this type of problem. 
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MINIMISING PROBLEMS 
 
There are two types of Insolvency Practitioner: Those who have had an IVA fail through 
non - co-operation and those that will have an IVA fail through non - co-operation. 
 
Much can be done, however, to design systems and procedures to minimise the effects of 
threatened IVA failure and, perhaps, to pre - select those debtors who are unlikely to see 
an IVA through. 
 
The suggestions below are not offered as a panacea but as a starting point for discussion, 
and perhaps, further research.  Some of the ideas will cost money to implement, either 
through training or use of outside agencies, but these costs need to be weighed against the 
potential longer term losses that IVA failure could bring: 
 
• Character of introducer.  Practitioners with good working relationships with local 
debt counsellors, banks, accountants and solicitors can often gauge the quality of the 
proposal from the source of the introduction.  Care does still need to be exercised, 
however, as a debtor's behaviour can be very unpredictable when faced with financial 
problems. 
 
• Comprehensive interview checklist.  One of these needs to be completed in every 
case and gaps or omissions completed at an early stage.  If checklists are completed 
systematically follow up requests for information can be made easier by drawing out 
"action points" from the interview notes. 
 
• Professional valuation.  Practitioners should always ensure that they are covered by 
a professional valuation of major assets. 
 
• Credit Register search.  Many agencies offer on - line or updated CD Rom search 
packages covering individuals and companies.  Using only a name and a post code or 
partial address details of previous insolvencies or court judgements can be obtained.  
Credit Register and Voters Roll searches are used daily by the credit industry as part 
of the credit assessment process.  For an Insolvency Practitioner this information can 
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be used to fill the gaps in the information provided by the debtor and to help judge the 
completeness of the information offered by the debtor. 
 
• Subjective judgement of character.  This is more difficult and requires much 
experience and insight on the part of the interviewer.  Helpful training can be given to 
less experienced staff.  In exceptional cases the Nominees report stage of the IVA can 
also be used to signal to the court and the creditors any evidence of non-co-operation 
or any doubt in the Practitioners mind over the debtor’s motives. 
 
• Checking up with creditors.  Creditors often know a great deal about the debtor 
through having dealt with him or her over a long period.  Inland Revenue policy on 
IVAs appears to be influenced by previous payment history.  Major creditors, too, 
will have done some homework and may be a willing source of information.  The 
search for creditors is important as post meeting creditors can jeopardise success.  It is 
made difficult, however, by the absence of any requirement to advertise the IVA in 
the current legislation. 
 
• Selection of realistic proposals.  Again based on experience and research.  What will 
creditors accept? What level of income generation is possible?  Experienced 
practitioners will want to anticipate the likely amendments put forward by Crown 
creditors in particular and so avoid confusion or rejection at the Creditors' meeting 
stage.  This, however, is easier said than done since the Crown regularly reviews its 
policy towards IVAs and does not discuss the rationale for its decisions in detail. 
 
• Contractual agreements with Third Parties.  To avoid the early withdrawal of 
Third Party moneys or the non delivery of assets the Insolvency Practitioner should 
consider entering into a formal binding arrangement with Third Parties. 
 
• Adherence to SPI guidelines.  SPI guidelines on IVAs address the need for the 
practitioner to remain independent and professional at all times.  This protects both 
the debtor and the practitioner.  In particular, IVA proposals must be the debtor’s 
“best offer”. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It will always be difficult for an insolvency practitioner to maintain a balance between a 
workable and realistic IVA proposal which can be controlled by the Supervisor and the 
flexibility and freedom from constraint which debtors see as a major advantage of IVAs.  
In addition there will always be IVAs that fail through no fault on the part of the debtor 
and the practitioner. 
 
By recognising common problems with IVAs, however, and designing systems and 
procedures to gain early warning of foreseeable problems ahead, insolvency practitioners 
can ensure that a greater proportion of the IVAs they manage end up successfully.  This 
outcome benefits the reputation of the practitioner, the return to creditors and the 
acceptance of the IVA scheme as a whole. 
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TABLE 1:    INDIVIDUAL INSOLVENCY STATISTICS 1987 - 1994 
 
 
Year  Bankrup- IVAs  Deeds of Total  IVAs as % 
  tcies    Arrangement   of Total 
 
 
1987  6,994  404  29  7,427  5.44% 
 
1988  7,717  779  11  8,507  9.16% 
 
1989  8,138  1,224  3  9,365  13.07% 
 
1990  12,058  1,927  2  13,987  13.78% 
 
1991  22,632  3,002  6  25,640  11.71% 
 
1992  32,106  4,686  2  36,794  12.74% 
 
1993  31,025  5,679  8  36,712  15.47% 
 
1994   25,634  5,103  2  30,739  16.60% 
 
1995 (q1)   5,609  1,174  1    6,784  17.30% 
 
 
Source: The Insolvency Service (1995) 
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A DECADE OF CHANGE FOR THE IVA 
 
1. Introduction and background 
 
The last decade has seen not only the successful implementation of Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement (IVA) legislation but also the rising influence of creditors in IVA situations.  
The period 1987 to 1997 has also seen significant ways in which IVAs have changed.  IVAs 
were introduced in the Insolvency Act 1986 following a major review of insolvency law by 
Sir Kenneth Cork [Cork Committee, 1982] and were intended to help small business and 
professional debtors to avoid the penalties and restrictions of bankruptcy.  A major aim of the 
new law was to offer creditors a better deal than bankruptcy (See Box for a summary 
definition). 
 
DEFINITION BOX ABOUT HERE 
 
This paper aims to summarise the key findings from a 1998 survey of IVA cases commenced 
in 1994 and 1995 and to compare them, where possible, with findings from an earlier study 
published in 1989 and 1993 [Pond, 1989 and 1993].  The paper summarises the research 
methodology used and reports key findings from the survey’s descriptive statistics.  The 
paper concludes with an analysis of some of the more significant findings of the survey and 
provides some broad interpretations of the data uncovered. 
 
IVAs have grown considerably in popularity since 1987.  Bankruptcies have yet to reduce in 
number to their pre-recession (1988/89) level and may not ever do so due to the reduced 
“stigma” of bankruptcy and the growth in availability of credit.  In the meantime IVAs have 
held a consistent 17 percent share of the personal insolvency “market” a level the Society of 
Practitioners of Insolvency (SPI) suggest is a “natural” one, given current economic 
circumstances [SPI, 1997].  IVAs saw a comparative reduction in popularity during the 
recession, possibly due to the failure to keep pace with the huge increase in bankruptcies.  In 
1997 there were 4,545 IVA cases recorded against 19,892 bankruptcies.  Early indications 
for 1998 show that the 17 percent level has been maintained. 
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This “natural” level of IVAs shows that the early ignorance of them by creditors [Pond, 
1989] has evaporated.  More Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) and creditors now have first hand 
knowledge of them.  Some IPs continue to “specialise” in IVAs although this is not always 
the most appropriate insolvency vehicle to use. 
 
 
2. The focus and methodology of the study 
 
The current study focused largely on the areas of influence that a creditor might have on the 
IVA process.  The study questionnaire not only asked respondents for factual information 
about accepted IVA proposals but also about the contact with creditors.  Such contact could 
be prior to the IVA, during the formation of the proposal and at the creditors’ meeting.  This 
approach has given both comparative data across the ten or so years that IVAs have been 
available and, most importantly, insights into the practical running of IVAs. 
 
Cases from 1994 and 1995 were chosen for the study sample, as these would have had long 
enough, by early 1998, to have either run their course or to be close to a conclusion.  This 
mirrored the methodology used in 1989 [Pond, 1989] and 1993 [Pond, 1993] when a sample 
of IVAs from 1987 and 1988 was studied.  The two studies together provide a unique 
longitudinal study of IVAs and an opportunity to observe those key factors that are 
associated with successful IVAs. 
 
The 1998 survey contained three main elements: 
 
1. A basic review of 879 sample accepted IVA cases from 1994 and 1995. 
2. A postal survey of 490 accepted IVA cases (response rate 30 percent). 
3. A set of interviews with selected practitioners. 
A systematic sampling method was used to select 879 accepted IVA cases from 1994 and 
1995 from the public register of IVAs maintained by The Insolvency Service.  This was 
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reduced to 490 through restricting the number of survey questionnaires being sent to each IP 
to a maximum of three. 
 
Two major issues were highlighted by IPs who chose not to respond to the survey.  These 
were: Client confidentiality and a feeling that the Society for Practitioners of Insolvency 
(SPI) already surveyed IVAs sufficiently.  The first reason is fully accepted but, as will be 
shown, the very useful SPI surveys [SPI, 1991-1996] reflect major trends but fail to report on 
some very practical areas of IVA procedure that can often spell success or failure. 
 
A total of eight IPs and Insolvency Managers were interviewed following the survey in an 
attempt to explore some of the more significant findings of the analysis.  A representative of 
The Insolvency Service was also interviewed and a representative of a major bank.  This 
process was successful in confirming a number of assumptions and interpretations of the 
survey data and comments from interviews are included in the analysis of the sample 
(below). 
 
  
3. Analysis of the survey sample 
 
The following section looks at some key descriptive statistics from the survey.  These 
combine to give a comprehensive picture of the IVAs in the study and compare the data, 
where possible, with data from 1987 and 1988. 
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Large and Small Practitioners 
 
IVAs appear to be the domain of the small independent Practitioner.  These Practitioners 
shared 60 percent of the sample cases (57 percent in 1987/88) with 70 percent of 
introductions coming from professional advisors.  Larger firms have a strong presence in the 
market but gain more from introductions via Yellow Pages, family advice and Court and 
Official Receiver referrals.  This could be due to the rota system operated by Courts and 
Official Receivers and to the impression, held by interviewees, that smaller firms would offer 
lower fees.  This is also supported by the finding that larger firms gain more cases following 
a bankruptcy order whilst smaller firms rely more on cases where there has been no prior 
procedure. 
 
One other observation comes from an analysis of supervisor location and Court locations for 
828 IVAs in 1994 and 1995.  It appears that small Practitioners in London and the South East 
and those in the North West are particularly successful in gaining business from other parts 
of the country.  In the North West, for example, the courts dealt with 16 percent of the cases 
reviewed whilst North West based IPs handled 27 percent of cases. 
 
Net “losers” are Practitioners in the Eastern and South West regions.  Interviewees offered a 
number of explanations for this including the use of “Work Finders” or “Ambulance 
Chasers” and the experience of London based IPs with High Court cases.  Interviewees also 
noted that creditors’ views were coloured by the inappropriate use of IVAs by a small 
number of IPs.  Data from the public register of IVAs (which is notoriously incomplete as 
regards closed cases) shows that for two IPs with clients outside their regional boundaries, 
failure rates are substantially higher than the national average.  Many failures are recorded 
two to three years into the IVA. 
 
Larger firms were more successful in initiating contact with creditors prior to the creditors’ 
meeting.  There is no evidence to suggest, however, that larger firms are any more effective 
in supervising successful IVAs than smaller firms.  In fact the study shows an exactly equal 
likelihood of successful IVA outcomes regardless of IP size. 
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Routes to the IVA 
 
As in 1987/88 most IVAs start with a Section 253 (Insolvency Act) application for an interim 
order.  Today 81 percent of cases commence with no prior procedure – a figure unchanged 
from 1987/88.  Additionally only 4.14 percent of cases (4 percent in 1987/88) were referrals 
by the court following a debtor’s petition for bankruptcy (Section 274). 
 
As mentioned above, mainly larger firms deal with the small numbers of IVAs emerging 
after a bankruptcy order.  These cases do, however, carry a slightly higher chance of failure - 
38 percent against the 31 percent failure rate of the whole sample. 
 
In 1987/88 the concertina order [Practice Direction, 1992] was not available but in 1994/95 
43.45 percent of cases used it.  The criteria for use include the judgement, by the nominee, 
that the case is “straightforward” and that the interim order is not needed whilst the proposal 
is being designed.  The use of the concertina should, in addition, reduce the costs of the IVA.  
Whilst use of the concertina order did not significantly presage a successful conclusion to the 
IVA its use correlates highly with contact prior to the creditors’ meeting between creditors 
and the nominee.  This could suggest that creditors are reacting in a positive way to IVAs 
and that their oft heard plea of early advice of problems is being heard. 
 
Measuring the IVA 
 
Table 1 shows that IVAs, when measured in assets and income offered to creditors, are 
getting smaller.  Table 2 shows that expected dividends are shrinking too, especially for the 
smallest and the largest cases.  Average dividends anticipated at the outset of the IVA were 
30.69p in the £ for IVAs in the study (47.62p in 1987/88).  This contrasts with 14.35p if 
bankruptcy had ensued for these individuals (22.06p in 1987/88). 
 
TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
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The smallest cases in 1994/95 are associated with the smallest dividends and with the 
smallest of benefits over bankruptcy, measured by the difference in anticipated dividends.  In 
addition the cases with assets below £20,000 show a considerably greater chance of failure 
during the course of the IVA.  There appears, therefore, to be little reason for backing 
particularly small and low dividend IVAs from a creditor's point of view.  This view is 
supported by a number of interviewees who suggested that the person most likely to benefit 
from smaller IVAs was the fee-earning supervisor, even if the IVA failed. 
 
Reviewing the study cases by level of liabilities is also shown interesting.  The smaller cases 
(<£50,000) are associated with a slightly higher chance of success (71 percent as opposed to 
the study average of 67 percent).  A simplistic view would be, therefore, that IVAs with 
assets available of more than £20,000 and liabilities of less than £50,000 show more signs of 
ultimate success than IVAs outside these limits. 
 
One method of making IVAs larger, where they are based on an income stream, is to make 
them longer.  The incidence of creditor modifications to extend IVAs is reviewed later but 
what is clear from Table 3 is that IVAs are becoming longer.  In 1987/88 51.22 percent of 
IVAs studied were due to be completed in less than one year.  These were largely cases 
where only liquidation of assets was proposed.  In 1992 Stephen Lawson wrote, “It will only 
be in exceptional circumstances that a voluntary arrangement will last for longer than two 
years” [Lawson, 1992].  These timescales proved to be over ambitious [Pond, 1993] which 
may account, in part, for the longer durations now being seen. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In 1994/95 only 10.34 percent of cases were due to be completed in under one year whilst 
44.13 percent (17.08 percent in 1987/88) were designed to exceed the three year mark.  
Three years had always been seen as a benchmark as this was the likely duration of a full 
bankruptcy. 
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In the study sample only the shortest IVAs (under one year) had a significantly higher 
success rate (87 percent) than the average (67 percent).  Although not certain, this could be 
because they relied on the liquidation of assets rather than the expectation of income in the 
future. 
 
 
Demographic features 
 
The study sample shows that IVAs cover all types of businesses and domestic insolvency 
situations.  As Practitioners learned about the IVA legislation during the recession they saw, 
for themselves, where IVAs were best suited.  In 1987/88 IVAs were used more for domestic 
cases, Agricultural cases and in Hotels and Catering than in other trades.  By 1994/95 IVAs 
were positively avoided for Construction cases (3.4 percent of IVAs but 12.9 percent of 
bankruptcies) but showed considerable progress in the share of insolvencies in Business and 
Professional Services (15.9 percent IVA, 7 percent bankruptcies) and Domestic (Employee 
and Consumer) cases (18.6 percent and 9 percent respectively).  This is very much in 
accordance with Cork's designs. 
 
Apart from the notable exception of the Construction industry, however, IVAs based on a 
business are just as likely to succeed as are Domestic cases. 
 
The focus on particular trades, where IVAs have been seen to work, is not the only change in 
the insolvency landscape.  In 1987/88 only 15 percent of cases were London and South East 
based with the North West “championing” the use of IVAs and accounting for 31 percent of 
cases.  By 1994/95 this had reversed with London and South East accounting for 37 percent 
of cases and North West for only 14 percent. 
 
No region, however, reported a significantly different success or failure rate for completed 
IVAs.  It should be noted that few, if any “Ambulance Chasers” responded to the survey. 
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Debtor Non-co-operation 
 
In the 1993 study of the outcomes of some of the earliest IVAs [Pond, 1993] a success rate of 
76.7 percent of cases was reported.  This was buoyed largely by improving property prices 
post 1987 which supervisors were able to divert into IVAs [Flynn, 1993].  This artificial 
boost was not available for the 1994/95 cases and a lower success rate of 67 percent was 
recorded. 
 
Among the principal reasons for IVA failure in 1993 was debtor non-co-operation and this is 
seen as a significant feature in the current sample too. 
 
 
What is Non - co-operation? 
 
Survey respondents were asked to rate debtor co-operation on a five point scale (5 for “really 
co-operative” and 1 for “really uncooperative”).  Not surprisingly the success rate for co-
operative debtors was significantly higher (92.1 percent) than for non-co-operative ones 
(19.4 percent).  Where respondents scored co-operation at 3 (a neutral response) the success 
rate was close to the study average of 67 percent at 69.6 percent. 
 
Interviewees were asked to explore what was meant by non-co-operation and it became clear 
that two different interpretations were held.  The first was the debtor’s motivation and 
supportiveness of the IVA.  Many debtors see the IVA as a godsend at a time of huge 
pressure from creditors and family.  Optimism and co-operativeness prior to the creditors’ 
meeting can soon turn to non-compliance afterwards, as cash payments have to be made to 
the supervisor.  Many “non-co-operative” debtors fail to realise the importance of what they 
enter into and rely on the supervisor to implement the proposal.  It was felt that nominees 
should judge whether debtors are suitable candidates to carry out what is promised in the 
proposal rather than rely on the “punishment strategy” of the genuine threat of bankruptcy.  
Many cases studied show that the bankruptcy threat is very credible, given the retention of 
funds by the supervisor for this purpose [see also Pond & Evans, 1995]. 
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The second interpretation offered was the failure of the debtor to fulfil the conditions of the 
proposal.  This could be something as basic as a failure to provide accounts within a set time 
limit (a favourite Inland Revenue modification) or as serious as a business downturn 
resulting in insufficient funds to make monthly payments or to pay ongoing tax and VAT 
obligations.  Clearly some debtors in this situation will still be co-operative and motivated to 
make the IVA succeed but will fail due to external pressures. 
 
Although the measure of non-co-operation is very subjective and varies from practitioner to 
practitioner the study does reveal some more objective factors that are associated with a 
greater likelihood of failure. 
 
 
Identifying unrealistic proposals 
 
Creditors have relatively little time to consider their response to an IVA proposal and must 
base their judgement on: 
 
• The proposal itself 
• Their knowledge of the debtor 
• Their contact (if any) with the nominee 
 
One certain source of information is the proposal itself and the creditor must judge whether it 
is realistic, whether the proposed dividend is acceptable and whether the proposal protects 
the creditor’s position adequately.   In addition a positive report from the Nominee, prior to 
the creditors’ meeting, should indicate that the statement of affairs is realistic, the proposal 
has a real prospect of success and that the proposal is fair [SPI, 1997b]. 
 
The creditor’s position can be further strengthened by drafting and submitting modifications 
to the proposal for consideration at the creditors’ meeting (see later) but an initial review of 
the proposal will reveal the anticipated dividend in the IVA and the anticipated dividend in 
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the same debtor’s bankruptcy.  The study has found that there is a significantly increased 
chance of failure of the IVA where the difference between the IVA and bankruptcy dividends 
exceeds 20p. 
 
Thus, a proposal offering a dividend of 10p to 20p more than in bankruptcy has an 83.1 
percent chance of success, whilst a proposal offering more than 20p more than bankruptcy 
has a 62.2 percent chance of success. 
 
Linked with the incidence of debtor non-co-operation it can be seen that over ambitious 
IVAs are far riskier.  Creditors must have a realistic idea of what is possible in the 
circumstances and what is over - optimistic.  Here two areas need to be reviewed: the income 
stream of the debtor in the future and the likely asset realisation values. 
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Creditor power and influence 
 
One very prominent feature of the 1994/95 cases was the turnaround by creditors from their 
fairly indifferent attitude of 1987/88.  In 1987/88 the average attendance (both actual and by 
proxy) at creditors’ meetings in accepted IVAs was 56.3 percent with only 23 percent of 
meetings actually modifying the proposal [Pond, 1989].  By 1994/95 average attendance had 
risen to 81 percent with 53 percent of cases reporting over 50 percent attendance.  In 
addition, 71 percent of study cases were modified at creditors’ meetings.  This latter finding 
may have much to do with the policy of some creditors to insist on modifications to all IVAs.  
Often nominees receive proxies where support is dependent on acceptance by the debtor and 
other creditors of a suite of “standard” modifications.  IPs have tried to anticipate these and 
proposals often reflect the wishes of major creditors, such as the Inland Revenue, since 
modification by them is inevitable. 
 
Over the period 1986 to 1997 it has been observed that creditors’ meetings have changed 
from being the open, multilateral negotiations envisaged by Cork to being a series of closed, 
bi-lateral negotiations between the debtor and individual creditors.  Typically, meetings are 
attended by “hawkish” creditors and professional proxy holding representatives who have 
strict instructions on the modifications to be sought in exchange for support.  In this way the 
flexibility of the procedure is eroded as the debtor feels more and more pressurised into 
accepting creditor modifications. 
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Unrealistic proposals 
 
This research has discovered that there are links between over-optimism in proposals and 
ultimate failure.  Reported above, the chance of failure for IVAs offering dividends more 
than 20p better than bankruptcy, is greater.  In addition the indication that modifications to 
proposals have taken place at creditors’ meetings is linked with a slightly higher chance of 
failure of the IVA. 
 
This chance of failure is reduced where modifications are “administrative” in nature such as 
restrictions on obtaining further credit or definitions of default under the proposal, such as 
failure to submit accounts within a certain period.  The chance is higher, however, where 
modifications are “contingent”, such as requiring a revaluation and remortgage of the 
debtor's property, should it rise in value, before the end of the IVA period.  Chance of failure 
is average where modifications are “non-contingent”, such as the extension of the IVA by a 
year or the increase in monthly contribution by the debtor. 
 
Together, these features suggest that IVAs are far more creditor friendly than in the past and 
that they reflect less and less the wishes of the debtor.  Creditors need to take note of this and 
temper their actions accordingly.  Short term “success” in getting the debtor to agree to 
modifications to the proposal may be paid for as the chance of debtor non-co-operation 
increases. 
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Creditor support 
 
Creditor influence, however, does not have to be malign.  It is a tool that needs to be used 
sensitively.  Whilst modifications are a creditor’s right the victory can be Phyrric.  Far more 
helpful, according to the research findings, is the maintenance of contact and support during 
the period of the IVA, both before and after the creditors' meeting.  The 1987/88 cases 
showed that support of a main mortgage lender was often linked with ultimate success of the 
IVA [Pond, 1993].  The 1994/95 cases show that ultimate success is linked with creditor 
support and contact throughout the IVA. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The earliest IVAs in 1987 and 1988 were a clear act of faith on the part of debtors, 
practitioners and creditors alike.  Lessons have been learned over the past decade and IVA 
proposals and the procedures that now help to put them in motion have been honed and 
modified extensively.  Creditors are now more aware of the influence they can exercise, for 
better or for worse, and IVAs now come under much greater scrutiny.  IVA proposals are as 
much the product of negotiation, modification and anticipation of creditor wishes as they are 
the realistic offer of the debtor made in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
 
Whilst a small number of independent IPs still appear to use the IVA as a panacea, seeking 
business from all over the country, most nominees seek to design IVA proposals that offer a 
fair deal to creditors (rather than just the debtor).  Creditors must also learn from experience 
and review their own policies towards modifications as these can turn a reasonable IVA into 
a failure, from which no return is paid. 
 
Although this research has shown that small IVAs (below £20,000 in assets /income) are 
more likely to fail and that lower levels of total liabilities (under £50,000) are linked with 
successful IVAs judgement of proposals in this mechanistic way is not recommended.  The 
fact that IVA periods are getting longer indicates that debtors will work hard to avoid 
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bankruptcy especially as a greater proportion of IVAs is seen in Business & Professional 
Services, compared with other trades. 
 
Debtor non-co-operation, however, remains the key reason for IVA failure.  This can be 
linked to unrealistic and over - optimistic proposals that have a greater chance of failure.  
Strict policing of IPs by The Insolvency Service, the Recognised Professional Bodies and the 
SPI is needed if IVAs are to remain a viable tool in any future economic downturn.  Creditor 
confidence in and support for IVAs relies on their experience of successful outcomes – and 
their collective memories are long! 
 
Keith Pond 
Loughborough University 
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TABLES TO BE INSERTED 
 
Table 1 Size of IVAs 
 
SIZE OF IVAs (Income + Assets) 
 
1987/88  percent 1994/95  percent 
< £10K 23.17 28.29 
£10K <= £20K 29.27 22.07 
£20K <= £50K 29.27 31.03 
£50K + 18.29 13.8 
Not known 0 4.83 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 
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Table 2 Anticipated dividends in IVAs and Bankruptcy* 
 
SIZE OF IVAs (Income + Assets) 
 
1987/88  
percent 
1994/95  
percent 
1987/88  
percent 
1994/95  
percent 
 IVA div IVA div Bankruptcy div Bankruptcy div 
< £10K 32.11 5.02 8.24 4.65 
£10K <= £20K 43.17 42.2 18.6 17.75 
£20K <= £50K 49.71 31.76 36.79 10.4 
£50K + 71.07 39.46 56.69 18.65 
Not known - 14.29 - 1.14 
TOTAL / AV 47.62 30.69 22.06 14.35 
 
* Estimated Bankruptcy dividend if bankruptcy, rather than IVA, had ensued for the 
debtor. 
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Table 3 Duration of IVAs 
 
Duration of IVAs (months) 1987/88 percent 1994/95 percent 
up to 12 months 51.22 10.34 
12 to 24 months 8.54 13.1 
24 to 36 months 23.17 24.14 
36 to 48 months 6.1 15.17 
over 48 months 10.98 28.96 
Not known - 8.28 
TOTAL 100 100 
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IVA DEFINITION BOX 
 
WHAT IS AN IVA? 
 
 
 
IVAs are private "contracts" for the satisfaction of debts, entered into by debtors and their 
creditors, pre or post bankruptcy.  In this court supervised and protected procedure (interim 
order) the insolvent debtor proposes how the debts are to be satisfied (proposal), under the 
guidance of a licensed insolvency practitioner (nominee).  This part of the procedure can be 
curtailed and an initial hearing dispensed with in “straightforward” cases (concertina order).  
The creditors are given the opportunity of accepting or rejecting the proposal (creditors’ 
meeting).  At the meeting the creditors have the opportunity to offer modifications to the 
proposal that the debtor can accept or reject.  Once agreed and accepted by at least 75 percent 
by value of creditors attending the creditors’ meeting the IVA is binding and the proposal is 
given effect by the insolvency practitioner (supervisor).  Accepted IVAs have the effect of 
either overturning a bankruptcy order, dismissing a bankruptcy Petition or halting other legal 
action by a creditor to recover a debt. 
 
IVA legislation is covered in Part VIII (Sections 252 to 263) of The Insolvency Act 1986 and 
Part 5 of The Insolvency Rules 1986 (as amended). 
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CHAPTER 6 
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ADMINISTRATION OF RECOVERIES IN INDIVIDUAL INSOLVENCY 
- Case studies of two UK banks 
ABSTRACT 
Against a background of greater competition, market saturation and falling margins 
over the past decade UK banks have sought greater efficiencies in credit and risk 
assessment procedures, especially with personal lending products.  In the same way 
they have attempted to reduce costs associated with the monitoring and collection of 
bad debts.  Failure to monitor debt recoveries adequately, however, can lead to further 
pressure on profits. 
 
This paper uses a case study approach to outline key strategies adopted by two major 
banks in respect of formal insolvency, the “tip” of a considerable debt recovery 
“iceberg”.  The paper illustrates the reactions and changing administrative practices of 
banks, as unsecured creditors, and draws on empirical research that has charted the 
effect of the Insolvency Act 1986 as regards individual debtors. 
 
The collection of bad debts presents banks with risks, heightened by adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems greater than those applicable to credit risk assessment.  
However, whilst the “downside risk” equates with the debt write-off plus transaction 
costs the “upside potential” has elements of both tangible and intangible benefit. 
 
The paper goes on to review specific centralisation and outsourcing policies against 
the critical risks in insolvency.  It also suggests that the bargaining power of major 
creditors, including banks, is increased through these activities, to the possible 
detriment of smaller creditors and of debtors. 
 
Acknowledgement 
This project would not have been possible without the access to records, co-operation 
of managers and assistance given by practitioners allowed by the two banks reviewed. 
 
KEYWORDS:  INSOLVENCY, CREDIT, BANKING, VOLUNTARY 
ARRANGEMENTS, BANKRUPTCY. 
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ADMINISTRATION OF RECOVERIES IN INDIVIDUAL INSOLVENCY 
- Case studies of two UK banks 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates a dilemma for large UK lenders and creditors when faced with 
the formal insolvency of a personal or small business borrower. 
 
The dilemma emanates from the growing incidence and acceptance of the "rescue 
culture" for individual debtors and impacts on lenders faced with the choice of 
bankruptcy (liquidation of available assets) and rescue.  Whilst "rescue" often allows 
lenders to achieve higher levels of recoveries than in bankruptcy it also introduces 
greater risks that must be both understood and managed. 
 
Credit risk is a concept well understood by lenders and strategies have been adopted 
that reduce this to acceptable levels at the lowest possible cost.  Post Insolvency risk 
is less well understood and cannot yet be reduced due to the high cost of monitoring 
that necessarily precedes formalisation of any strategy. 
 
In the two case studies of major UK clearing banks, presented in this paper, different 
approaches to post insolvency monitoring of bankruptcy and Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement (IVA) cases are reviewed.  Empirical research, industry surveys and 
unique access to cases recorded by one of the case study banks help to illustrate the 
complexity of the problem lenders face and the potential rewards for success.  The 
research is at an early stage and concentrates on the administration of new cases.  
Data to measure the success of chosen strategies are either not available (bank A) or 
incomplete (bank B).  It is hoped that such data will feature in future projects. 
 
2. The banking environment 
2.1 The personal banking market 
UK retail banks operate in an extremely competitive environment and invest heavily 
in gaining competitive advantage.  Traditional banks suffer pressure on profit margins 
and growing threats from non-traditional competitors such as supermarkets and even 
football clubs (Howcroft & Hamilton, 1999).  Competitive pressures and available 
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technology have, in part, resulted in an orientation away from the relational banking 
of the “old fashioned” high street bank manager, towards the standardisation and 
transactional banking of the direct seller.  Technical competence in lending is largely 
subordinated to systematic “credit scoring” and centralisation based on empirical 
information from a variety of sources (Leyshon & Thrift, 1999). 
 
Whilst streamlined systems for lending can reduce costs and increase profitability in 
the short-term it does serve to reinforce the moral hazard problems associated with 
dealing with borrowers at “arms length”. 
 
The emphasis on product based, transactional banking in the 1980’s and early 90’s 
had a marked effect on bank organisational structures and sources of income.  Banks 
enjoyed the benefits of profitability and sales growth but suffered from a lack of 
customer loyalty (Howcroft & Hamilton, 1999). 
 
Consequently, by the mid 1990’s banks had begun to realise the importance of 
reintroducing “relationship management” and introducing customer retention policies.  
Although attitudes and practices are often slow to change in large organisations banks 
are beginning to balance the “lifetime value” of customers with the move towards 
individual account profitability (Stone et al., 1996).  Banks also know that customer 
acquisition is more expensive than customer retention although few have applied this 
logic of this in dealing with bad debts, insolvency and defaulting customers (Doherty 
& Pond, 1995). 
 
In the short-term, lenders have profited enormously from the unprecedented demand 
for unsecured consumer credit.  Annual growth rates in credit card debt, for example, 
calculated as part of the money supply - M4, consistently exceeded RPI inflation by 2 
to 3 percentage points between 1996 and 1998 (BBA, 1999).  Over the same period 
bankruptcy and IVA numbers grew (See Table 1) and are now maintained at a higher 
level (30,246 for the year 2000) than at any time since the recession of the early 
1990’s (DTI, 2001).  Table 1 also shows that the growth rate of IVAs exceeds that for 
bankruptcies for most of the period since 1986. 
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TAKE IN TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.2 The case study banks 
Both Banks A and B, subjects of the case studies, are well - known and respected 
retail banks with branches nationwide.  Both have centralised debt recovery units 
located outside the London area and have handled IVAs since 1993 and 1997 
respectively. 
 
Where banks hold unsecured debt the tendency in corporate insolvency has been 
towards liquidation (bankruptcy) rather than rescue or rehabilitation.  Smaller 
businesses appear not to warrant bank involvement in workouts (Gladstone & Lane 
Lee, 1995; Gopinath, 1995) and the same policy appears to be adopted for 
unincorporated businesses and personal debtors.  This approach is typically justified 
by banks on the basis that there is no point “putting good money after bad” (sic). 
 
The financial argument for cost reduction in debt collection is clear: the amount of 
debt written off (debt less recoveries) can influence specific provisions for bad and 
doubtful debt, net profits and tax charges.  Transaction costs incurred in account 
intervention will merely add to losses in the short-term. 
 
In both case study banks the cost savings from centralisation and specialisation were 
prime drivers for strategic action.  The banks had seen bankruptcy and IVA numbers 
rise in the early 1990’s (see Table 1) and sought to reduce both the administrative and 
cost burdens on individual branches since the account holding branch would be the 
first point of contact for administration of the insolvency. 
 
Bank A had previously established a debt recovery unit and in 1993 added formal 
insolvencies from retail branches to its portfolio of activity.  Over time four managers 
were recruited to manage the workload.  Other subsidiaries of Bank A, such as its 
plastic card services, prefer to use their own collection mechanisms. 
 
Bank B had also centralised small debt collection work for all of its subsidiaries some 
years previously.  Spurred on by the efficiency gains required by its new owner Bank 
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B added IVAs and bankruptcies in 1997.  At present corporate recoveries are 
administered by a unit based in London. 
 
Reducing the burden on individual branches was also a part of a wider strategy to re-
designate branches as retail and customer service outlets, rather than administrative 
units.  The reduction in numbers of, largely unprofitable, branches has also been part 
of this focus.  Cost reduction and efficiency gains were the key driver for Bank B. 
 
A secondary objective, especially of Bank A, was to build up expertise, consistency 
and rewards in dealing with insolvencies.  Although cost reduction has been the key 
driver the wider benefits have exceeded expectations. 
 
In 1998 and 1999 Bank A’s unit handled 1,508 and 1,400 IVA cases respectively.  
On-going monitoring is being undertaken for around half of all cases.  Bank B’s 
workload was lower at 621 in 1998 and 400 in 1999.  On-going monitoring is 
undertaken for around 87% of these. 
 
For both banks the longer-term economic argument is less clear but sees write-offs as 
“sunk costs” and compares the risk weighted “lifetime value” of the debtor against the 
cost of a more detailed investment in customer rehabilitation.  In a congested and 
competitive market, however, a longer-term view may be more commercially viable, 
especially where both legislation and social values want to encourage “serial 
entrepreneurs” (Atkinson, 1999). 
 
3. Insolvency Law and Practice 
3.1 The Insolvency Act 1986 
Since passage of the 1986 Insolvency Act insolvent UK personal debtors have had 
access to a statutory IVA procedure which is designed to avoid the finality and 
penalties of bankruptcy.  The IVA between debtors and creditors was designed to 
allow viable sole traders to continue in business or to achieve a better and more 
orderly realisation of assets for the creditors.  The legislative provisions followed the 
recommendations of a review committee (Cork, 1982) and extensive consultation 
(DTI, 1984) that noted the need to “rescue” debtors and to distinguish between the 
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dishonest and the unlucky.  Although the review committee also recommended a 
curtailed procedure for consumer debtors this was not carried through to the statute 
books and so the IVA “rescue” vehicle remains available to small unincorporated 
businesses and individual debtors alike. 
 
The IVA is a private contract for the satisfaction of personal debts.  As such it can be 
influenced by the quality of the relationships between lenders and debtors.  In this 
court-supervised procedure the debtor proposes how the debts are to be satisfied, 
under the guidance of a licensed insolvency practitioner and under the protection of a 
“moratorium” on creditor action.  The creditors are given the opportunity of amending 
and accepting or rejecting the proposal (Lawson, 1992). 
 
3.2 The nature of the IVA 
The years since 1986 have seen a steady rise in the incidence and acceptance of IVAs 
(The Insolvency Service 1991 - 98).  There is also growing evidence of their 
successful application (Pond, 1998a).  In 1998 around 20% of formal personal 
insolvencies are dealt with via the IVA procedure.  In 1999 this rose to 25% (see 
Table 1).  From the database made available by bank B, however, (see Table 2) it is 
estimated that 89% of bankruptcies return a nil dividend to creditors.  On this basis it 
is estimated that, where a recovery prospect exists (“live cases” in Table 2) the IVA 
procedure is used approximately 82% of the time. 
 
The choice faced by an increasing number of insolvent debtors is between IVA, and 
the avoidance of penalties, restrictions and opprobrium connected with bankruptcy or 
bankruptcy itself.  The choice faced by the creditor is limited by the predisposition of 
the debtor towards bankruptcy in the first instance and by the existence of “moral 
hazard” which makes the IVA riskier for the creditor.  However, a successful IVA can 
improve creditor recoveries and increase customer retention, since income from 
continued employment or trade is often included as a benefit. 
 
Moral hazard exists in the IVA situation because the creditor is forced by the 
Insolvency Act 1986 to make a choice between IVA acceptance and bankruptcy.  If 
the creditors choose IVA, debtors can take actions, unobservable by creditors, which 
transfer greater risk to creditors.  This is compounded by the lack of a formal 
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investigation of the debtor’s affairs in an IVA and the debtor’s retention and 
possession of assets.  Creditors who doubt the integrity of the debtor or the insolvency 
practitioner can choose bankruptcy and the possibility of a public examination of the 
bankrupt in open court, although this is rare. 
 
Bank A has learned to take special care of IVA proposals put forward by Insolvency 
Practitioners who have presided over failed IVAs in the past.  The bank maintains 
extensive records to allow it to identify both good and poorly performing 
practitioners.  This is useful when IVAs can be rejected at an early stage, avoiding the 
need for monitoring costs, where the risk factor associated with the Insolvency 
practitioner is too high. 
 
Creditor experience of bankruptcy is rarely good as official costs and the preferential 
treatment of some Crown debts deplete available assets and average returns from 
bankrupt estates are low (SPI, 1992 - 98).  This contrasts with the overall experience 
of IVAs (Pond, 1998b).  For banks and larger lenders, with wider portfolios of 
debtors, successful IVAs are balanced against those that fail during their agreed term 
and return nothing.  In this way larger creditors are more likely to favour IVA 
acceptance since their overall experience is positive.  Smaller creditors, with their less 
extensive experience, may have more dichotomised views. 
 
4. Society's view 
4.1 The rationale for insolvency law 
In 1984 Cork (Cork, 1982) recognised that changes in commercial life and society 
since passage of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 necessitated a review and refashioning of 
insolvency law.  The 1986 reforms that Cork influenced recognised that there needed 
to be a balance between two separate views of bankruptcy: as a sanction against 
deviancy and consumer laxness (deterrence) and as a form of consumer protection 
(Ramsay, 1997). 
 
In a society based on credit, bankruptcy will still exclude individuals from the credit 
system and act as a punishment.  It will also provide a “safety valve”, recognising that 
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credit providers share responsibility for over-commitment.  The key task in achieving 
this balance is to distinguish between the dishonest insolvent and the merely unlucky. 
 
The main actors in achieving this balance, apart from individual debtors and creditors 
themselves, are Insolvency Practitioners and their public sector counterparts the 
Official Receivers.  Cork’s recommendation of a licensing system for practitioners 
and the professionalisation of the industry coincided with the government’s wish to 
reduce public sector involvement in the administration of bankruptcy.  Whilst 
licensing has done much to rid the profession of some malpractice not all practitioners 
abide by the code of conduct (SPI, 1997) of the profession in respect of IVAs.  Some 
even advertise for clients (Financial Mail on Sunday, 1999). 
 
After 1986 The Insolvency Service, an Executive Agency of the DTI, wanted to 
concentrate on fraud and malpractice investigations as well as the investigation of 
failed companies and individuals.  The strategy was to offer bankruptcy cases to the 
private practitioners but the sheer numbers of bankruptcies that failed even to pay 
their own costs meant that by 1999 Official Receivers were involved in the 
administration of an estimated 50 - 60% of all insolvencies (The proportion of 
bankruptcies without dividend to all formal insolvency appointments in Table 2). 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The attendant pressure on Insolvency Service resources has a damaging effect on the 
perception of the efficient administration of estates.  This may be a factor that adds to 
the attraction of bankruptcy for the debtor. 
 
4.2 The stigma of bankruptcy 
Although no specific UK research has been undertaken into attitudes to bankruptcy 
there exist a number of other factors that help to shed light onto the conflicting 
attitudes to bankruptcy of creditors and debtors.  Factors exist that support the 
deterrence view of bankruptcy law, typically held by creditors, and the rehabilitation 
view, presumably favoured by debtors. 
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There is said to be a “stigma” associated with bankruptcy that supports the deterrence 
viewpoint.  Bankruptcy, IVAs and County Court judgments, so called “black” 
information, are routinely recorded and included in commercially available Credit 
Reference databases.  A Credit Reference search can highlight a previous bankruptcy 
or IVA for up to six years beyond the discharge of a Bankruptcy Order or completion 
of an IVA (Robson, 1999).  Institutional creditors often base their credit-scoring and 
screening on such databases.  The existence of this negative information assumes an 
importance in decision making despite the fact that such information fails to 
distinguish between the dishonest and the “unlucky” debtor or the recalcitrant 
bankrupt and the debtor who works hard to ensure that the IVA succeeds. 
 
Creditors’ maintenance of a bankruptcy “stigma” is under pressure from government 
(Atkinson, 1999) and society in general.  A society based on credit generally has a 
greater acceptance of debt and a more permissive attitude to default (Lea et al., 1993).  
The sheer numbers of individuals seeking the protection of bankruptcy also serves to 
diminish its threat of censure (Bien, 1999; Wise, 1997).  Combine this with the 
perceived inefficiency in official bankruptcy administration and the automatic 
discharge from bankruptcy after three years appears to be a favourable “exit strategy” 
when compared with the five years for the average IVA. 
 
A more accessible feature of the equation, for UK creditors is the institutional credit-
trust relationship between lender and borrower.  Initial lending relationships between 
banks and new customers are likely to be deterrence based but will develop into 
knowledge based relationships where personal contact and repeated interaction are 
prevalent (Erfat, 1998).  Personal lending by UK banks is rarely relationship based, 
however and most “arms-length” consumer credit transactions will remain deterrence 
based. 
 
When the value of the deterrence diminishes, however, as society’s view changes and 
as bankruptcy law favours rehabilitation the trust relationship breaks down.  In 
addition the deterrence-based relationship is unlikely to engender any emotional or 
moral input by the borrower making the bankruptcy “fresh start” principle more 
accessible. 
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5. Experience of IVAs 
 
The active creditor’s decision to accept or reject an IVA is based on an assessment of 
the risk of IVA failure and the creditor’s own predisposition to the debtor.  Most IVAs 
will offer better dividends than the bankruptcy of the same debtor; indeed, many 
courts will not sanction IVAs that fail this simple test.  The information available to 
the creditor at the point of IVA acceptance is, therefore, an important factor in the risk 
assessment. 
 
5.1 Creditor influence in IVAs 
On receipt of the IVA proposal the creditor has a limited time to judge whether it is 
realistic and whether the proposed dividend is acceptable.  To help creditors a positive 
report from the insolvency practitioner appointed (nominee), prior to the creditors’ 
meeting, should indicate that the statement of affairs is accurate, the proposal has a 
real prospect of success and that the proposal is fair (SPI, 1997). 
 
Creditors can further strengthen their position by drafting and submitting 
modifications to the proposal for consideration at the creditors’ meeting. 
 
One very prominent feature of the 1998 study (Pond, 1998a) was the turnaround by 
creditors from their fairly indifferent attitude of 1989 (Pond, 1989).  In 1989 average 
attendance (both actual and by proxy) at creditors’ meetings in accepted IVAs was 
56.3% with only 23% of meetings actually modifying the proposal.  By 1998 average 
attendance had risen to 81% with 53% of cases reporting over 50% attendance.  In 
addition, 71% of study cases were modified at creditors’ meetings.  This latter finding 
may have much to do with the policy of some creditors to insist on modifications to 
all IVAs.  As the creditors’ only opportunity of influencing the IVA, however, this is 
not surprising.  This finding indicates that creditors are not “risk neutral” due to their 
broadly spread portfolio of investments but “risk averse”, seeking to reduce the 
flexibility of the debtor in the IVA. 
 
Bank A has a pro-active approach and will always vote at creditors' meetings.  Voting 
is normally by postal proxy, never by bank attendance, and sometimes by instructing a 
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meeting service to attend.  Most large insolvency firms offer meeting services to 
creditors, whereby an experienced insolvency specialist attends creditors’ meetings on 
behalf of the creditor.  The attendee exercises a proxy vote where appropriate.  Most 
meeting services are free to creditors and can include summary reports of all cases 
attended. 
 
Bank A is fully aware of the additional costs involved in operating a specialised unit, 
however it considers the most salient factor to be net returns.  To this end bank A has 
adopted a “Champion Challenger” benchmarking strategy wherein 10% of IVAs are 
“outsourced” to a major insolvency firm, enabling the bank to compare potential and 
actual returns after costs. 
 
Bank B uses meeting services exclusively and relies on meeting specialists to 
scrutinise IVA proposals, recommend action and attend and vote at creditors’ 
meetings.  Like Bank A voting is by proxy but the vital difference is that Bank B’s 
approach is to authorise voting and modifications against a standardised requirement 
of a 25p minimum dividend.  Bank A judges cases on their individual merits. 
 
By handing over the scrutiny and voting power to the meeting services bank B avoids 
considerable expense.  Based on Bank A's resource commitment this could represent 
savings of over £200,000 annually.  The bank does, however, lose some degree of 
control over cases and is reliant on the practitioners’ expertise and the efficiency and 
timeliness of their reporting.  Advantages of out-sourcing also include the benefit of 
the enhanced voting power of the meeting service as votes are combined with other 
creditors. 
 
5.2 IVA risk factors 
Analysis of IVA cases commenced in 1994/95 (Pond, 1998a) indicated an overall 
failure rate of accepted IVAs of 31%.  An unknown proportion of this risk is 
exogenous.  IVAs can falter if a downturn in trade or unplanned unemployment 
intervenes to stem the flow of income on which many enhanced dividends rely.  There 
can also be an opposite effect - the domestic house price boom of the late 1980’s in 
the UK intervened to return higher than expected dividends in some early IVAs 
(Pond, 1993; Flynn, 1993). 
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The research has also revealed significant endogenous factors associated with higher 
levels of failure risk including debtor non-co-operation following acceptance of the 
IVA by creditors, the principal reason for IVA failure reported as shown in Table 3. 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
This information is of little use to the creditor trying to decide whether a proposal has 
a realistic chance of success since non-co-operation occurs after the creditors’ 
meeting.  The current case studies show that creditors can use their own data on the 
debtor and build up a profile of the supervising practitioner well enough to make a 
judgement about the integrity of the proposal. 
 
Another major factor that could bear heavily on co-operation by the debtor and is 
affected by other IVA measures, is the size of the forecast dividend.  Average 
dividends, to unsecured creditors, anticipated at the outset of the IVA were 30.69p in 
the £ for IVAs in 1998 (Pond, 1998a) (47.62p in Pond, 1989).  This contrasts with 
14.35p if bankruptcy had ensued for these individuals in 1998 (22.06p in 1989).  
These data correspond to average dividends reported in a series of industry-wide 
surveys carried out by the Society of Practitioners of Insolvency (SPI, 1992–98). 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The smallest cases are associated with the smallest dividends and with the smallest of 
benefits over bankruptcy, measured by the difference in anticipated dividends.  In 
addition the cases with assets below £20,000 show a greater chance of failure during 
the course of the IVA (39%).  Where more than £20,000 is offered in the IVA the 
failure rate falls to 26%.  There appears, therefore, to be little reason, in terms of 
revenue, for backing particularly small IVAs (i.e. those with asset values below 
£20,000). 
 
One of the most significant findings of the 1998 study (Pond 1998a) was the increased 
chance of failure of the IVA where the difference between the IVA and bankruptcy 
dividends exceeds 20p (See Table 3).  A proposal offering a dividend of 10p to 20p 
more than in bankruptcy has a 16.9% chance of failure, whilst a proposal offering 
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over 20p more than bankruptcy has a 37.8% failure chance.  Such cases are 
interpreted as being “over ambitious” since they promise to deliver far more than the 
equivalent bankruptcy.  Linked with the incidence of debtor non-co-operation over 
ambitious IVAs appear to be far riskier based on 1998 study evidence (Pond, 1998a).  
Creditors must have a realistic idea of what is possible and what is over - optimistic.  
Whilst likely asset realisation values are more certain the problems appear to lie with 
the income stream of the debtor in the future. 
 
One method of improving IVA size, where an income stream is available, is to extend 
the duration.  What is clear from Table 5 is that IVAs are becoming longer.  In 1993 
51.22% of IVAs studied were completed in less than one year.  In his 1992 text on 
IVAs Stephen Lawson wrote, “It will only be in exceptional circumstances that a 
voluntary arrangement will last for longer than two years” (Lawson, 1992, p.23).  
The longer duration of IVAs is associated with two design features – The increased 
reliance on income from the debtor and the increased use of property re-valuation as 
sources of funds. 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
In 1998, however, only 10.34 % of cases were due to be completed in under one year 
whilst 44.13% were designed to exceed the three year mark.  Three years had always 
been seen as a benchmark as this is the likely duration of a full bankruptcy. 
 
Only the shortest IVAs (one year or less) had a significantly lower failure rate (13%) 
than the overall average 31% failure rate shown in Table 5.  Although not certain, this 
could be because they relied on the liquidation of assets rather than the expectation of 
income in the future. Duration alone is not a significant indicator of failure risk, 
however.  This observation does provide support for the notion that debtor co-
operativeness and IVA duration are linked.  Longer IVAs are more likely to strain the 
relationship between the debtor, the practitioner. 
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5.3 Creditors’ meeting modifications 
The imposition of modifications per se is not, necessarily linked with an increased 
chance of failure. Table 3 shows that where modifications are made at creditors’ 
meetings only 33% of IVAs fail subsequently against an average of 31% failing. 
 
The major modifications reported in the 1998 study (Pond, 1998a) related to: Changed 
duration; increased income contribution; real property; windfall gains and 
administration of the IVA.  The “administrative” modifications are unlikely to impact 
on the debtor as much as those modifications that extend the duration of the IVA or 
increase the income contribution.  Table 6 shows failure rates of IVAs linked to 
specific modifications of proposals (Pond,1998a). 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Perhaps the most visible sign of creditor power in the IVA is the opportunity to table 
modifications to the proposal for agreement by the debtor.  Heavily modified IVAs do 
have the chance, however, of being far more favourable to the creditor than the debtor 
originally intended. 
 
Both Banks A and B use modifications extensively to “improve” proposals. .  Bank A 
will request modifications in the 14 - 28 day period between notification of the 
creditors' meeting and the meeting itself.  The bank supplies nominees with pro-forma 
list of acceptable modifications after review of the case. 
 
Many of the modifications put forward by both case study banks are “administrative” 
in nature, such as limiting the Supervisor's fee or ensuring that the Supervisor retains 
sufficient funds too petition for bankruptcy should the IVA fail.  Defining IVA failure 
is also a common modification.  Such modifications have been borne of experience.  
Other modifications seek to improve the prospect of recovery by increasing the assets 
available, increasing the income contributed or extending the term of the IVA.  A 
third type of modification is a contingent modification, including, "windfall gains" 
clauses and an undertaking to value the debtors house equity after a certain period 
with a view to re-mortgage or sale to realise this for the benefit of creditors. 
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Modifications to extend the IVA are linked to slightly greater co-operation of the 
debtor (Pond 1998a), although the chance of failure of the IVA is still average.  
Longer IVA periods indicate that some debtors will work hard to avoid bankruptcy.  
A greater proportion of IVAs is now seen in business and professional services, 
compared with other trades, due to that fact that licenses to practice of professionals 
such as lawyers and accountants are withdrawn under bankruptcy but not under IVA 
regulations.  In 1994/95 an estimated 15.9% of all IVAs related to Business and 
Professional Services (Pond, 1998a), whilst only 6.94% of bankruptcies related to this 
sector in the same period (The Insolvency Service, 1995 and 1996). 
 
Greater pressure appears to be placed on the debtor, however, when modifications 
seeking increased monthly contributions from income are included as the level of co-
operation is likely to fall.  This is also the case with property related modifications.  
Typical clauses call for revaluation of the family home towards the end of the IVA, 
and a re-mortgage or sale of the property if sufficient equity is apparent.  These 
clauses are agreed by the pressurised debtor at the creditors’ meeting, but on 
reflection, appear to erode the debtor’s benefits under the IVA.  This erosion puts the 
debtor closer to the position under bankruptcy and offers no compensating advantage, 
especially when the bankruptcy discharge period is generally shorter and the stigma 
much diminished. 
 
The knowledge that so many creditors seek to apply modifications also leads 
insolvency practitioners to incorporate common clauses in proposals at the outset.  
This suggests that IVAs are far more “creditor friendly” than in the past and that they 
reflect less and less the wishes of the debtor.  Short term “victory” in getting the 
debtor to agree to certain modifications may be pyrrhic. 
 
6. Options for creditors 
 
There are a number of options faced by creditors in receipt of notice of a creditors' 
meeting in respect of an IVA.  The debtor’s full proposal and the Nominee’s 
(practitioner) report accompany the meeting notice.  Creditors are given between 14 
and 28 days to decide how to vote at the meeting. 
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The options range from the do-nothing "Bin it" strategy to full investigation and 
scrutiny.  In both cases common benefits are the opportunity to recover any VAT 
element of the debt and eventual receipt of a dividend whether or not a vote is cast.  
Beyond this the "Bin it" strategy can only boast that it has no financial outlay but to 
say that it costs nothing is an overstatement.  The potential for loss under the "Bin it" 
strategy is enhanced since good IVAs could be rejected for lack of support.  In 
addition the creditor may increase the moral hazard problem by failing to share 
information about assets or the debtor's history.  Although other creditors will decide 
the outcome of the IVA meeting and, perhaps the likelihood of its success, this may 
be a strategy that even sophisticated creditors adopt where they only hold a small 
percentage of the total debt and the recovery is likely to be small. 
 
The "Full scrutiny" strategy, such as that practised by Bank A, promises to be very 
costly in terms of staff time, not only at the time of receipt of the notice but afterwards 
in monitoring progress of the IVA over a period of years.  It does, however, allow a 
creditor to build up an expertise in this area and make more informed judgements on 
voting decisions and, importantly, modifications to proposals at the creditors' meeting.  
Organisations that always scrutinise and vote on IVA proposals enhance their 
bargaining power and practitioners may even anticipate their response by designing 
IVAs with particular creditors in mind. 
 
"Full scrutiny" creditors need, however, to temper their expertise and power with the 
observation that some specific modifications, agreed by pressurised debtors at 
creditors' meetings, may increase the chance of debtor non co-operation and IVA 
failure. 
 
 
7. IVA outcomes 
Both case study banks are understandably sensitive about the administrative costs of 
their respective centralised units.  Bank A was also sensitive about recovery levels 
although the continued benchmarking of their own outcomes against insolvency 
professionals suggests that centralisation is considered to be worthwhile. 
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Results that Bank A was willing to divulge indicated that 70% of accepted IVAs 
remained on target during their life cycle (ie: within 20% of forecast dividends).  The 
recoveries also showed significant improvements on the original proposed levels put 
forward by debtors. 
 
Bank B data is reported in table 2.  The full database indicates that most cases achieve 
the 25p minimum dividend required and that forecast dividends are roughly in line 
with national averages reviewed by the SPI surveys (SPI, 1998). 
 
At one level bank B's strategy is highly successful since it has reduced the bank based 
resources and costs associated formerly with the administration of insolvencies.  
Forecast recoveries appear to be around the national average but bank B has lost 
effective control of its own IVAs and is not in a position to act quickly to change its 
stance should problems arise with particular IVAs or with IVAs in general. 
 
The bank relies on the prudence and expertise of the meeting services it employs and 
must ensure that it undertakes regular and thorough analysis of reported cases and 
recoveries in order to inform policy in the future and ensure that the projected 
recoveries have the best chance of materialising. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Changes in insolvency law have often come about following the abuse of existing 
legislation by debtors; creditors and those placed in control of debtors’ estates.  The 
1986 Insolvency Act reflected the need to stem actual and potential abuses and to 
reflect society’s changing view of bankruptcy.  Rescue and rehabilitation for debtors 
was a primary driver for the review committee. 
 
Since 1986 a variety of pressures, including the focus exercised by some creditors and 
professional insolvency practitioners, has worked to make IVAs the primary vehicle 
for dealing with the insolvency of individuals where a recovery prospect exists.  The 
case study banks have acted to streamline and centralise the administration of formal 
insolvency both for reasons of cost control and to improve recovery prospects. 
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The asymmetric bargaining power of larger creditors, a result of their corporate 
experience, centralisation and specialisation and their increasing use of professional 
“meeting services”, offered by Insolvency Practitioners, also helps banks to influence 
the acceptance of IVAs more readily.  Generally, larger creditors are able to use their 
experience and select only IVAs that have a realistic chance of returning better 
dividends than bankruptcy.  In these cases, their recoveries are likely to be greater. 
 
The paper also provides evidence to indicate that the large creditors studied are risk 
averse and work to modify IVA proposals to improve recovery prospects.  In this way 
the case study creditors are pro-active and illustrative of creditors generally who are 
taking an increased interest in IVAs. 
 
Finally the paper indicates that some specific modifications can be seen as counter-
productive as they are associated with a higher chance of IVA failure and overall 
lower dividends.  Creditors are advised to temper their short term aims to maximise 
returns with the longer term need for the IVA to run its course. 
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Table 1: Individual Insolvency statistics 1987 - 2000 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1`995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Bankruptcy 6994 7717 8138 12058 22632 32106 31016 25634 21933 21803 19892 19647 21611 22042 
IVA 404 779 1224 1927 3002 4686 5679 5103 4384 4466 4545 4901 7195 8204 
Deed of 
Arrangement 
29 11 3 2 6 2 8 2 2 2 4 1 0 0 
TOTALS 7427 8507 9365 13987 25640 36794 36703 30739 26319 26271 24441 24549 28806 30246 
%IVAs 5.44% 9.16% 13.07% 13.78% 11.71% 12.74% 15.47% 16.60% 16.66% 17.00% 18.60% 19.96% 24.98% 27.12% 
     
Bankruptcy growth  10.34% 5.46% 48.17% 87.69% 41.86% -3.40% -17.4% -14.4% -0.59% -8.76% -1.23% 10.00% 1.99% 
     
IVA growth  92.82% 57.12% 57.43% 55.79% 56.10% 21.19% -10.1% -14.1% 1.87% 1.77% 7.83% 46.81% 14.02% 
     
TOT. growth  14.54% 10.09% 49.35% 83.31% 43.50% -0.25% -16.3% -14.4% -0.18% -6.97% 0.44% 17.34% 5.00% 
 
Source: DTI Statistics Directorate. 
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Table 2: Comparative IVA and bankruptcy dividends 
 
 
Case Study Bank B 
cases 1998/99 
% of 
total 
cases 
% of 
"live" 
cases 
Case Study Bank B 
average anticipated 
dividends 
Comparative dividend from 
7th SPI Survey (SPI, 1998) 
Accepted IVAs 
 
1034 33.44 82 37.62p 43p 
Bankruptcy with dividend 227 7.34 18 9.67p** 26p 
Bankruptcy without dividend 1831* 0.0 - 0 n/k 
Total Bankruptcy 
 
2058 66.56 - - n/k 
TOTAL / AVERAGE 
 
3092 100 100 -  
 
* Official Receivers appointed in 95% of cases. 
** This includes cases where dividend was forecast but not quantified.  A nil dividend was entered.  If such cases are excluded a 36.42p dividend 
results.   
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Table 3 IVA failure risk factors 
 Chi - square 
Factor Fail % Pearson’s r DF Sig. 
Debtor not co-operative 56.8 50.99719 2 .00000 
IVA dividend = bankruptcy 
dividend 
66.7 19.44784 2 .00006 
IVA div. > 20p more than 
bankruptcy 
37.8 19.44784 2 .00006 
Assets / Income <£20,000 39.4 2.70417 1 .10009 
Modifications at creditors’ 
meeting 
33.0 0.50755 1 .47620 
Source: Pond, 1998a 
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Table 4 Anticipated dividends in IVAs and Bankruptcy* 
 
SIZE OF IVAs 
(Income + 
Assets) 
 
IVA 
dividend 
(av.) 
Est. 
bankruptcy 
dividend 
(av.) 
IVA / 
Bankruptcy 
Difference 
< £10K 5.02 4.65 +0.37 
£10K <= £20K 42.2 17.75 +24.45 
£20K <= £50K 31.76 10.4 +21.36 
£50K + 39.46 18.65 +20.81 
Not known 14.29 1.14 +13.15 
TOTAL / AV 30.69 14.35 +16.34 
Source: Pond 1998a 
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Table 5 Duration of IVAs 
 
Duration of IVAs 
(months) 
1993 study 
(%) 
1998 study 
(%) 
1998 
failure rate 
(%) 
up to 12 months 51.22 10.34 13 
12 to 24 months 8.54 13.1 37 
24 to 36 months 23.17 24.14 37 
36 to 48 months 6.1 15.17 14 
over 48 months 10.98 28.96 38 
Not known - 8.28 38 
TOTAL/OVERALL 100 100 31 
Source: Pond 1998a 
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Table 6 IVA modification failure risk factors 
Modification Fail % n.=* 
Windfall clause 23.81% 21 
Property re-valuation 48.57% 35 
Increased income contribution 35.38% 65 
Increased duration 38.71% 31 
Other modifications 36.84% 57 
 
* n= number of cases where clause noted.  Total sample cases = 145. 
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THE VALUE OF THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP: EXPERIENCE 
OF INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, and in response to the huge growth in demand for 
unsecured consumer credit, UK banks have reviewed, automated, de-skilled and 
streamlined traditional credit assessment techniques.  In pursuit of margin and market 
share, today’s due diligence relies increasingly on centralised data and statistical 
“certainty”. 
 
During this same period the nature of the banks’ “safety net”, the sanction of bankruptcy 
and court action, has changed too.  The effect of this is not only to increase the potential 
for recovery, in respect of bad debts, but also to increase the moral hazard problem.  
However, increased risk is masked by creditor power in recovery situations. 
 
This paper draws on theoretical and empirical research from legal, ethical and economic 
viewpoints and suggests that a reappraisal of this aspect of the banker-customer 
relationship is essential to restore trust, prudence and long-term profitability. 
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THE VALUE OF THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP: EXPERIENCE 
OF INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS 
Introduction 
 
The relationship between a banker and a customer has its foundations in well-established 
UK case law1, reinforced, since 1992, by a code of conduct.  Until 1997, however, the 
code was silent on the matter of dealing with non-performing loans.  In 1997 banks made 
a firm commitment to 
 
“consider cases of financial difficulty sympathetically and positively”. 
 
Banks also pledged themselves to 
 
“ help you (sic) to overcome your difficulties”.2 
 
The banks’ commitment covers the period before formal insolvency action and also 
echoes a much-ignored plea from lenders for customers to give early warning of debt 
problems.  Amongst the motivations for making this plea is that problems can be averted 
and a customer retained.  Coincidentally, early warning of problems allows lenders to act 
to their own best advantage by taking individual action for debt recovery before the 
competing claims of other lenders level the “playing field” with the collective nature of 
the bankruptcy procedure. 
 
The code is silent, however, on the banks’ treatment of customers following notice of 
formal insolvency.  At these times there is growing evidence that banks act purely in their 
own short-term interests3. 
 
This paper focuses on the law and practice surrounding personal and unincorporated 
business debt, although parallels in the corporate world are evident.  The paper looks 
closely at the banker – customer relationship at a crucial time of crisis (customer 
insolvency) and surveys the various influences placed on bankers including the increasing 
demand for consumer credit and society’s changing attitude to bankruptcy. 
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The paper also looks at the statutory choices faced by insolvent debtors and their creditors 
and goes on to review the general economic factors that have coloured creditor behaviour 
during the last decade.  It touches on the operational handling of insolvency situations, the 
creditors’ policies towards problem debt and the ethical considerations that guide them. 
 
The paper concludes by arguing that in a highly competitive environment, where debt is a 
direct corollary to credit granting, banks can do much to regain the trust and security that 
lead to profitable lifetime relationships with customers. 
 
 
The banker - customer relationship 
 
UK retail banks operate in an extremely competitive environment and invest heavily in 
gaining competitive advantage.  Traditional banks suffer pressure on profit margins and 
growing threats from non-traditional competitors such as supermarkets and even football 
clubs4.  Competitive pressures and available technology have, in part, resulted in an 
orientation away from the relational banking of the “old fashioned” high street bank 
manager, towards the standardisation and transactional banking of the direct seller.  
Technical competence in lending is largely subordinated to systematic “credit scoring” 
and centralisation based on empirical information from a variety of sources5. 
 
Whilst streamlined systems for lending can reduce costs and increase profitability in the 
short-term it does serve to reinforce the moral hazard problems associated with dealing 
with borrowers at “arms length”. 
 
The legal relationship between bankers and their customers was investigated by the 
National Consumer Council in 19836 and reviewed by the Jack Committee, which 
reported in 19897.  Jack found that the legal relationship was robust and did not require 
urgent amendment8.  Both the NCC and Jack, however, were silent on the specific 
problem of non-performing loans and bad debts. 
 
With a widely publicised code of conduct in place, bankers and their customers should be 
more certain about their legal relationship.  Their commercial relationship, however, is far 
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less clear especially as both retail banks and consumers have undergone significant 
changes in recent years.  Emphasis in the banker-customer relationship, bank training and 
professional education, has typically focussed on “beginnings” (the initial lending 
decision) and “endings” (the effective use of security).  Whilst these are undoubtedly 
important it is the “middle” (the quality of relationship) that must now be developed. 
 
The emphasis on product based, transactional banking in the 1980’s and early 90’s had a 
marked effect on bank organisational structures and sources of income.  Banks enjoyed 
the benefits of profitability and sales growth but suffered from a lack of customer 
loyalty9.  Increased levels of competition and the advent of technology driven delivery 
channels have effectively compounded the problem by commoditising bank products and 
replacing inertia with a greater degree of customer empowerment. 
 
Consequently, by the mid 1990’s banks had begun to realise the importance of 
reintroducing “relationship management” and introducing customer retention policies.  
Although attitudes and practices are often slow to change in large organisations banks are 
beginning to balance the “lifetime value” of customers with the move towards individual 
account profitability10.  Banks also know that customer acquisition is more expensive 
than customer retention although few have applied this logic of this in dealing with bad 
debts, insolvency and defaulting customers11. 
 
US research has indicated that the long term success of firms, in terms of sustainable 
competitive advantage, is associated with investment in relationships with customers and 
suppliers12 (in banking, customers and suppliers are synonymous in certain circumstances 
since funds deposited in accounts are used by banks to fund lending).  Fine tuning of 
communications with customers also gives benefits.  Specialised training and the focused 
deployment of staff can, therefore, help to engender the trust, satisfaction and 
commitment that banks desire in their relationships with customers13. 
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Insolvency Law and Practice 
 
Since passage of the 1986 Insolvency Act insolvent UK personal debtors have had access 
to a statutory Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) procedure which is designed to 
avoid the finality and penalties of bankruptcy.  The IVA between debtors and creditors 
was designed to allow viable sole traders to continue in business or to achieve a better and 
more orderly realisation of assets for the creditors.  The legislative provisions followed 
the recommendations of a review committee14 and extensive consultation15 that noted the 
need to “rescue” debtors and to distinguish between the dishonest and the unlucky.  
Although the review committee also recommended a curtailed procedure for consumer 
debtors this was not carried through to the statute books and so the IVA “rescue” vehicle 
remains available to small unincorporated businesses and individual debtors alike. 
 
The IVA is a private contract for the satisfaction of personal debts.  As such it can be 
influenced by the quality of the relationships between lenders and debtors.  In this court-
supervised procedure the debtor proposes how the debts are to be satisfied, under the 
guidance of a licensed insolvency practitioner (IP) and under the protection of a 
“moratorium” on creditor action.  The creditors are given the opportunity of amending 
and accepting or rejecting the proposal16. 
 
Whilst bankruptcy ends the banker – customer contract the IVA does not.  Consequently, 
creditor predisposition, influence and action have had an important place in the IVA 
procedure and the years since 1986 have seen a steady rise in the incidence and 
acceptance of IVAs17.  There is also growing evidence of their successful application18.  
At the time of writing around 25% of formal personal insolvencies are dealt with via 
IVAs. 
 
The choice faced by an increasing number of insolvent debtors is between IVA, and the 
avoidance of penalties, restrictions and opprobrium connected with bankruptcy or 
bankruptcy itself (liquidation of available assets).  The choice faced by the creditor is 
limited by the predisposition of the debtor towards bankruptcy in the first instance and by 
the existence of “moral hazard” which makes the IVA riskier for the creditor.  However, a 
  133
successful IVA can improve creditor recoveries and increase customer retention, since 
income from continued employment or trade is often included as a benefit. 
 
Moral hazard exists in the IVA situation because the creditor is forced by the Insolvency 
Act 1986 to make a choice between IVA acceptance and bankruptcy.  If the creditors 
choose IVA, debtors can take actions, unobservable by creditors, which transfer greater 
risk to creditors.  This is compounded by the lack of a formal investigation of the debtor’s 
affairs in an IVA and the debtor’s retention and possession of assets.  Creditors must be 
aware that over-ambitious repayment proposals made by debtors may look attractive 
initially but may fail to materialise as debtors fail to co-operate with the IP once the IVA 
has been accepted.  Creditors who doubt the integrity of the debtor or the IP can choose 
bankruptcy and the possibility of a public examination of the bankrupt in open court. 
 
Creditor experience of bankruptcy is rarely good as official costs and the preferential 
treatment of some Crown debts deplete available assets and average returns from 
bankrupt estates are low19.  This contrasts with the overall experience of IVAs20.  For 
banks and larger lenders, with wider portfolios of debtors, successful IVAs are balanced 
against those that fail during their agreed term and return nothing.  In this way larger 
creditors are more likely to favour IVA acceptance since their overall experience is 
positive.  Smaller creditors, with their less extensive experience, may have more 
dichotomised views. 
 
The asymmetric bargaining power of larger creditors, a result of their corporate 
experience, centralisation and specialisation, security position and size of debt and their 
increasing use of professional “meeting services”, offered by Insolvency Practitioners, 
also helps banks, in particular, to influence the acceptance of IVAs more readily. 
 
Generally, larger creditors are able to use their experience and select only IVAs that have 
a realistic chance of returning better dividends than bankruptcy.  In these cases, their 
recoveries will be greater and, arguably, their retention of customers more marked. 
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Economic considerations 
 
The fact that banks, as lenders, should be able to pursue profitable lending opportunities 
is not in question.  What is questioned, however, is the time-scale over which such profits 
are measured. 
 
In the short-term it appears that banks have profited enormously from the unprecedented 
demand for unsecured consumer credit.  Annual growth rates in credit card debt, for 
example, calculated as part of the money supply - M4, consistently exceeded RPI 
inflation by 2 to 3 percentage points between 1996 and 199821.  Over the same period 
bankruptcy and IVA numbers have grown (See Figure 1) and are now maintained at a 
higher level (total estimated at 28,000 for 1999) than at any time since the recession of 
the early 1990’s.  In 1998-99 total insolvency growth outstripped the growth in consumer 
credit with IVAs maintaining their “share” of cases.  Petitions for bankruptcy also 
maintained high numbers, with around 65 – 68% of all petitions being granted and 
debtors being made bankrupt between 1991 and 199822 
 
TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Where banks hold unsecured debt the tendency in corporate insolvency has been towards 
liquidation (bankruptcy) rather than rescue or rehabilitation.  Smaller businesses appear 
not to warrant bank involvement in workouts23 and the same policy appears to be adopted 
for unincorporated businesses and personal debtors.  This approach is typically justified 
by banks on the basis that there is no point “putting good money after bad” (sic) 24. 
 
The financial argument for this is clear: the amount of debt written off (debt less 
recoveries) can influence specific provisions for bad and doubtful debt, net profits and tax 
charges.  Transaction costs incurred in account intervention will merely add to losses in 
the short-term. 
 
The longer-term economic argument is less clear but sees write-offs as “sunk costs”.  
Normal costs of extending credit must take potential losses into consideration and be 
discounted in the risk related interest rate charged.  The decision to invest in relationships 
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with debtors should not, therefore, take the bad debt loss into account.  Instead, the 
decision should compare the risk weighted “lifetime value” of the debtor against the cost 
of a more detailed investment in customer rehabilitation. 
 
In a congested and competitive market such a policy may be more commercially viable in 
the longer term, especially where both legislation and social values want to encourage 
“serial entrepreneurs”25 and where large numbers of bankrupts are repaying nothing to 
their lenders.  Taking a slightly different perspective, customer information relating to 
crisis and rehabilitation could eventually lead to danger signals being recognised much 
earlier in the day, allowing banks to take preventative action and, perhaps, even avoid the 
need for bankruptcy and IVAs. 
 
 
The ethical dimension 
In 1984 Cork26 recognised that changes in commercial life and society since passage of 
the Bankruptcy Act 1883 necessitated a review and refashioning of insolvency law.  The 
1986 reforms that Cork influenced recognised that there needed to be a balance between 
two separate views of bankruptcy: as a sanction against deviancy and consumer laxness 
(deterrence) and as a form of consumer protection27. 
 
In a society based on credit, bankruptcy will still exclude individuals from the credit 
system and act as a punishment.  It will also provide a “safety valve”, recognising that 
credit providers share responsibility for over-commitment.  The key task in achieving this 
balance is to distinguish between the dishonest insolvent and the merely unlucky. 
 
The main actors in achieving this balance, apart from individual debtors and creditors 
themselves, are Insolvency Practitioners and their public sector counterparts the Official 
Receivers.  Cork’s28 recommendation of a licensing system for IPs and the 
professionalisation of the industry coincided with the government’s wish to reduce public 
sector involvement in the administration of bankruptcy.  After 1986 The Insolvency 
Service, an Executive Agency of the DTI, wanted to concentrate on fraud and malpractice 
investigations.  The strategy was to offer bankruptcy cases to the private IPs but the sheer 
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numbers of bankruptcies that failed even to pay their own costs meant that by 1999 
Official Receivers were involved in the administration of up to 50% of all insolvencies29. 
 
The attendant pressure on Insolvency Service resources has a damaging effect on the 
perception of the efficient administration of estates.  Although all bankrupts are subject to 
an investigation this may be paper based only, with much reliance placed on the debtor to 
provide information.  This may be a factor that adds to the attraction of bankruptcy for the 
dishonest debtor. 
 
Although no specific UK research has been undertaken into attitudes to bankruptcy there 
exist a number of other factors that help to shed light onto the conflicting attitudes to 
bankruptcy of creditors and debtors.  Factors exist that support the deterrence view of 
bankruptcy law, typically held by creditors, and the rehabilitation view, presumably 
favoured by debtors. 
 
There is said to be a “stigma” associated with bankruptcy that supports the deterrence 
viewpoint.  Bankruptcy, IVAs and County Court judgments, so called “black” 
information, are routinely recorded and included in commercially available Credit 
Reference databases.  A Credit Reference search can highlight a previous bankruptcy or 
IVA for up to six years beyond the discharge of a Bankruptcy Order or completion of an 
IVA30.  Institutional creditors often base their credit-scoring and screening on such 
databases.  The existence of this negative information assumes an importance in decision 
making despite the fact that such information fails to distinguish between the dishonest 
and the “unlucky” debtor or the recalcitrant bankrupt and the debtor who works hard to 
ensure that the IVA succeeds. 
 
Banks’ also find themselves in a privileged position in bankruptcy through their taking of 
direct and indirect security and guarantees – a privilege maintained by the priority given 
to types of creditor in the Insolvency Act 1986.  An unpopular view put forward in 1992 
was the outlawing of collateral that would: 
“ ….force banks into relationship banking, rather than simply paying lip 
service to it in hard times.”31 
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This view ignores the increased cost of credit that unsecured lending would bring but 
does address the fundamental relationship between banker and customer. 
 
Creditors’ maintenance of a bankruptcy “stigma” is under pressure from government32 
and society in general.  A society based on credit generally has a greater acceptance of 
debt and a more permissive attitude to default33.  The sheer numbers of individuals 
seeking the protection of bankruptcy also serves to diminish its threat of censure34.  
Together, the perceived inefficiency in official bankruptcy administration and the 
automatic discharge from bankruptcy after three years appear a favourable alternative 
when compared with the five years for the average IVA35. 
 
A more accessible feature of the equation, for UK creditors is the institutional credit-trust 
relationship between lender and borrower.  Initial lending relationships between banks 
and new customers are likely to be deterrence based but will develop into knowledge 
based relationships where personal contact and repeated interaction are prevalent36.  
Personal lending by UK banks is rarely relationship based, however and most “arms-
length” consumer credit transactions will remain deterrence based. 
 
When the value of the deterrence diminishes, however, as society’s view changes and as 
bankruptcy law favours rehabilitation, the deterrent effect breaks down.  In addition the 
deterrence-based relationship is unlikely to engender any emotional or moral input by the 
borrower. 
 
 
 Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a dilemma for bankers.  It is a common dilemma as short-term profits 
are often prioritised ahead of long-term gains.  It also presents a range of options for the 
bank when customer default presages formal insolvency. 
 
Traditionally “short termism”, driven by the need to satisfy shareholders, has taken 
overwhelming precedence over the need to develop long term relationships with 
customers.  Increases in the level of competition have, however, focused attention on the 
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importance of customer retention and the active management of the banker-customer 
relationship. 
 
Consequently, banks that were traditionally transaction oriented, with an emphasis on 
standardisation and centralisation, in an endeavour to reduce costs, are emerging as 
relationship oriented organisations.  The value and importance of relationship strategies in 
reducing moral hazard in the provision of credit to personal customers has been 
discussed.  The paper also recognises the impact of moral hazard on the administration of 
insolvency law, which, since 1986 has embraced the concepts of rescue and survival. 
 
Insolvency law has, in this respect, been ahead of the “thinking” within banks and, 
significantly, has reflected the changing ethical attitudes of society to debt.  In beginning 
to emerge as relationship-oriented organisations, therefore, the banks are adopting the 
values of society and the legal system but still have a long way to go in taking full 
advantage of IVAs.  In a competitive environment banks need to embrace the importance 
of business rescue and survival in order to benefit from customer retention and continuing 
relationships with their debtor customers. 
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Source DTI 
 
Figure 1: UK Individual Insolvency Growth 1987 - 1999*
(*1999 estimate based on Q1 and Q2)
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ABSTRACT 
 
Under UK Insolvency law creditors face a strategic choice when dealing with some insolvent 
individual debtors.  Since 1986 Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVAs) have been 
available to return better recoveries than bankruptcy but returns are subject to a greater 
degree of uncertainty. 
 
In this paper Game Theory is used to model the strategic choice and the proposition that 
creditors face.  The game played out is an indefinitely repeating non-co-operative game with 
player learning and risk minimisation supported by empirical evidence from studies of IVAs. 
 
The paper shows that creditors have the potential to select revenue maximising strategies 
based on simple review of the IVA proposal their knowledge of the debtor and the perceived 
probity of the insolvency profession.  Consistent use of successful strategies could both 
increase the acceptance and incidence of IVAs and improve the likelihood of recovery. 
(140 words) 
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CREDITOR STRATEGY IN INDIVIDUAL INSOLVENCY 
 
 
INSOLVENCY CHOICES 
 
Since the Insolvency Act 1986 came into force in late 1986 both creditors and debtors have 
been faced with a choice when formal insolvency proceedings for an individual are 
commenced.  Initially the individual debtor can choose bankruptcy via a debtor’s petition or 
apply for an Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA).  The IVA, introduced in the 1986 
Insolvency Act is a formal means of avoiding bankruptcy by getting creditors to accept a 
compromise in the satisfaction of their debts.  A similar choice was theoretically available 
via the Deeds of Arrangement Act 1914 before 1986 but in reality this regime had fallen into 
disuse (Cork Committee, 1982). 
 
The choice faced by creditors and debtors is not a completely free one however.  It is 
constrained by assumptions made about the creditors; specifically whether or not they will 
accept an IVA (See Box 1), and what conditions they will exact before acceptance.  It is also 
constrained by assumptions made about the capacity of debtors to fulfil their obligations 
under the IVA. 
 
TAKE IN BOX 1 HERE 
 
 
IVA incidence has grown considerably since 1986.  Bankruptcies have yet to reduce in 
number to their pre-recession (1988/89) level and may not ever do so due to the reduced 
“stigma” of bankruptcy and the growth in availability of credit (Bien, 1999; Wise, 1997).  
Current government proposals also suggest greater scope for relaxation of restrictions on 
bankrupts (Atkinson, 1999, Insolvency Service, 2000).  In the meantime, IVAs have steadily 
increased their share of the personal insolvency “market”.  Despite a Society of Practitioners 
of Insolvency (SPI) suggestion that the 1996 level of 17% was a “natural” one (SPI, 1992-
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1998) IVA numbers have grown steadily and in 1999 represented 25% of formal insolvencies 
(DTI Statistics Service, 2000). 
 
The apparent low level of IVA uptake, however, is deceptive.  When viewed alongside the 
observation that 80% of bankruptcies reveal no assets and return a nil dividend to creditors 
(Pond, 2000) the proportion of remunerative insolvencies dealt with by IVA rises to 82% of 
the total.  This is helped by the courts insisting that IVAs must offer better creditor returns 
than bankruptcy.  IVAs can often do this on the basis of reduced costs and the opportunity 
for the debtor to continue to trade or to earn income for the benefit of creditors (Pond, 1989). 
 
This article draws on questionnaire and interview based research undertaken at 
Loughborough University Banking Centre (Pond, 1998) that focused largely on the IVA 
process and how creditor attitudes to IVAs have changed over the last decade.  The period 
since 1987 has seen significant ways in which IVAs have changed due both to external, 
largely economic, influences and to a growing realisation amongst creditors that they can 
have a significant influence on the IVA process. 
 
The findings are set against the background of economic “Game Theory” which models 
situations of interdependence where discrete choices are made by a small number of parties 
based on their assumptions of how their opponents will react (Bierman & Fernandez, 1998; 
Kay, 1993).  The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is familiar to students of oligopoly or duopoly 
behaviour.  In this paper I argue that the possible solutions to the dilemma are applicable in 
the individual insolvency situation. 
 
 
THE PRISONERS DILEMMA 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma models the choices faced by two thieves arrested carrying the tools 
of their trade and kept in separate cells in the Police Station.  Each thief is made the same 
offer by the police: If one thief confesses and the other does not the partner will get 10 years 
in jail whilst the other goes free.  If both confess they are likely to get 7 years in jail each but 
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each knows that if they both stay silent the police only have enough evidence to jail them for 
1 year each. 
 
TAKE IN FIGURE 1 
 
For each thief the “Confess” strategy is strictly dominant since each thief knows that, 
whatever decision the other thief takes, confession will deliver a better pay-off than silence. 
 
The central problem is one of simultaneous decision making, unaffected by the actual 
decision made by the other party (Poundstone, 1992).  In a single iteration of the game both 
thieves will confess as the risk of trusting the fellow thief to remain silent is too great.  Thus, 
the best outcome for both - silence - will not be chosen.  Individual rationality will dominate 
group rationality (Thomas, 1984) 
 
Co-operation or collusion prior to their arrest, or a better knowledge of the other thief’s 
likely decision would potentially change the outcome to a “Silence” strategy being adopted 
by each thief.  This is especially true if the thieves were put in the same position repeatedly 
and learned to trust each other to remain silent. 
 
Where the game is repeated a fixed number of times then the last game’s dominant strategy 
is “Confess”.  In this way co-operation unravels and, in anticipation of the last game, all 
earlier games will use the {Confess, Confess} strategy too (Selten's theorem (Selten, 1973). 
 
By repeating the game indefinitely, however, a “tit for tat” strategy is optimum.  Confession 
by one thief is punished by “Confess” at the next iteration by the other.  Likewise “Silence” 
is rewarded by “Silence” the next time around.  The overall effect is co-operation in the long 
run. 
 
An alternative solution to the dilemma is to change the pay-offs for each thief.  If, instead of 
freedom, the thieves believed that the penalty for confession would be a visit from the friends 
of the thief who goes to jail, equivalent, say, to a five year “sentence” in hospital (The 
 148
Criminal’s Revenge game) the outcome would also be altered (Kay, 1993).  In the Criminal’s 
Revenge game the best strategy for each thief is to follow what the other thief does, or at 
least to choose the same strategy that the thief anticipates the other thief will choose.  In 
more formal terms this is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
THE INSOLVENCY GAME 
 
The choice faced by insolvent debtors and creditors is a potential Prisoners’ Dilemma game.  
The best outcome for both parties in terms of benefit is to propose and accept an IVA but the 
creditor’s choice severely curtailed by the predisposition of the debtor towards bankruptcy in 
the first instance.  It is also affected by the existence of “moral hazard” and “adverse 
selection” which combine to make the IVA choice riskier for the creditor. 
 
Moral hazard exists in the IVA situation as the creditor is forced by the Insolvency Act 1986 
to make a choice (IVA acceptance) following which debtors can take actions, unobservable 
by creditors, which transfer greater risk to creditors.  Moral hazard is apparent in all lending 
situations where the honesty of debtors is not known.  Credit "scoring" and other "arms 
length" credit assessment techniques lead to the retention of this type of risk.  In short, 
debtors can fail to comply with their own IVA proposals.  This is compounded by the lack of 
a formal investigation of the debtor’s affairs in an IVA.  Creditors who doubt the integrity of 
the debtor should opt for bankruptcy and the certainty of an investigation and possibility of a 
public examination of the bankrupt in open court. 
 
Physical hazard exists in IVA and bankruptcy alike.  This refers to events outside the debtor's 
control and cannot be avoided completely. 
 
Adverse selection occurs in the IVA since all debtors entering an IVA are, by definition, 
insolvent and generally less desirable for creditors to bargain with both in terms of their 
history of failure.  By definition insolvent debtors are without liquid resources, neither are 
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they isolated from their poor credit history with the very creditors to whom the settlement 
offer is made. 
 
The insolvency game can be summarised in the following matrix: 
 
TAKE IN FIGURE 2 
 
In the matrix the pay-off “B” is the benefit available to the creditor in bankruptcy.  The 
debtor’s benefits are “0” in bankruptcy which includes the penalties and restrictions of full 
bankruptcy or “<0”, where the debtor has, in addition, paid the petition fee or the IVA set up 
costs.  The debtor pay-off “(>B-B)” is the value of the positive “benefit” to the debtor of the 
IVA in terms of the price above “B” that the debtor is willing to pay to secure an IVA.  It is 
assumed that the debtor will wish to avoid bankruptcy provided the cost, in terms of IVA 
commitments, does not exceed the perceived benefits of the IVA.  One element in the choice 
is the moral stance of the debtor as opposed to the purely economic one but this analysis does 
not model different views on debt repayment.  The influence of different attitudes to 
bankruptcy is very real, however, and should be acknowledged (Erfat, 1998). 
 
Creditor benefits are summarised as projected dividends on unsecured debts.  The pay-off 
“>B” indicates that the IVA dividend is superior to that in the bankruptcy of the same debtor.  
It is assumed that creditors will wish to maximise their revenue returns from the insolvency 
situation.  Lastly, the pay-off “<B” includes the transaction costs associated with abortive 
attempts to set up an IVA from either the debtor or creditor moving first (see Figure 3).  
Average dividends in recent IVA cases indicate a 31% return in IVA and 14% in bankruptcy 
(Pond, 1998). 
 
Where a debtor opts for bankruptcy, and moves first, an IVA is unlikely.  Average costs of 
£2,500 to set up an IVA compare unfavourably with the £350 bankruptcy petition fee.  The 
Insolvency Act 1986 (Section 273-4) does provide that when an insolvent debtor presents a 
bankruptcy petition and the accompanying Statement of Affairs (Section 272) indicates debts 
of under £20,000 and assets of over £2,000, the court will order an IVA feasibility study by a 
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court-appointed IP.  Without the debtor’s co-operation, however, the proposal cannot be 
generated and court approval cannot be gained.  Only an estimated 4% of all IVAs are 
commenced via this route (Pond, 1998). 
 
Where a creditor opts for bankruptcy by presenting a bankruptcy petition the debtor is most 
likely to be declared bankrupt.  IVAs are possible after a petition but the time to set one up is 
limited.  IVAs are also technically possible after bankruptcy but only 15% begin in this way 
(Pond, 1998).  When bankruptcy ensues following rejection or failure of an IVA the 
bankruptcy dividend is likely to be lower than that in a first instance bankruptcy since some 
of the debtor’s funds have been used in paying the IVA fees.  The passage of time has also 
caused some asset values to decline. 
 
TAKE IN FIGURE 3 
 
The real dilemma for the creditor is that an accepted IVA that fails subsequently is likely to 
result in a reduced or even zero dividend. 
 
As in the Prisoners’ dilemma game the strategy where both creditor and debtor benefit the 
most {IVA, IVA} will only be chosen where each party knows and trusts the intentions of the 
other and where risk can be reduced or eliminated.  In the absence of this collusion or risk 
assessment the strictly dominant strategy will result in the certainty of bankruptcy and the 
lower dividend payout.  The creditor’s optimum strategy, therefore, is to accept only IVA 
proposals that combine the projection of higher dividends than in bankruptcy and the 
likelihood of successful realisation. 
 
In this context creditors will rely on their experience and knowledge of Insolvency 
Practitioners (IPs) as they pre-select IVAs that are likely to succeed.  The IP's own code of 
conduct, embodied in the Statement of Insolvency Practice 3 (SPI, 1997) engages IPs to 
consider the credibility of the debtor in making a Proposal.  Comments from the IP can 
indicate to creditors those cases most likely to return a dividend. 
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The debtor’s optimum strategy for IVA acceptance is to propose a compromise that 
realistically offers creditors a better return than bankruptcy and also offers the debtor benefits 
over and above the mere avoidance of bankruptcy.  Although no specific research has been 
published, to date, on the changing attitude to bankruptcy in the UK since the 1986 
legislation there is evidence of more permissive attitudes to debt (Lea, 1993).  This could 
mean that the “stigma” of bankruptcy is not as great as before and the threat of bankruptcy 
not as motivating for the debtor as in the past (Bien, 1999; Wise, 1997). 
 
If creditors assume that the debtor’s attitude to bankruptcy is one of indifference the pay-offs 
will alter as the debtor perceives some positive benefit under bankruptcy to balance out the 
penalties.  In this way the prediction of the Criminal’s Revenge game prevails suggesting 
that the best strategy for the creditor is to copy the option chosen by the debtor.  Whilst this 
strategy does offer the creditor the best dividend in the circumstances there is less overall 
incentive to choose the IVA route. 
 
Oddly this gives rise to the paradox that policy makers may need to retain or reinstate the 
punitive effects of bankruptcy if business rescue via the IVA is to be encouraged. 
 
 
BUILDING TRUST 
 
Unlike the static Prisoners’ Dilemma game creditors and debtors have opportunities to assess 
each other’s position and to frame the IVA offer so that it anticipates and answers the 
reservations that each party has.  Insolvency Practitioners (IPs), as proxy for the debtors they 
advise, can benefit from past experience where individual debtors cannot, since they are 
precluded from proposing a subsequent IVA within five years of the acceptance of their last.  
In this way the insolvency game is not static but an indefinitely repeated game between IP 
and major creditors since most insolvencies feature debts payable to the Inland Revenue, 
Customs & Excise and major credit providers. 
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Although the creditor and IP learning process and the practical management of IVAs shows 
that there is contact between these parties the insolvency game is a non-co-operative one.  
Creditors make independent decisions about IVAs based on their own predisposition and risk 
assessment procedures.  Indeed, the evidence from the current research indicates that 
creditors often act in a unilateral but predictable way.  There is also evidence that creditors 
are risk-averse rather than risk-neutral in that they seek to reduce risk by suggesting 
modifications to proposals. 
 
Central to the choice of IVA acceptance by the creditor is the perception of the 
trustworthiness and probity of the IP.  The prudent IP will have pre-selected debtors who are 
able to put forward and sustain realistic IVA proposals (Pond & Evans, 1995).  Creditors are 
also aware of the activities of less diligent IPs in this respect, much as they are in corporate 
situations (Flood, 1995).  Some IPs were described to us by survey respondents as 
“cowboys” and “ambulance chasers”.  These IPs use IVA in every instance of individual 
insolvency due to the front loading of their fee rather than the IVA being the best solution.  
Only creditors willing to file complaints to the IP regulatory bodies can realistically police 
the activities of the “cowboys”.  Perhaps the introduction of an insolvency “watchdog” may 
help in this regard (Finch, 1998; Kemeny, 1999). 
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IVA FAILURE RISK 
 
Creditors have relatively little time to consider their response to an individual IVA proposal 
but have the capacity to base their judgement on the proposal itself; previous knowledge of 
the debtor; knowledge of the IP and contact with the IP. 
 
One certain source of information is the proposal itself and the creditor must judge whether it 
is realistic, whether the proposed dividend is acceptable and whether the proposal protects 
the creditor’s position adequately.  In addition a positive report from the IP, prior to the 
creditors’ meeting, should indicate that the statement of affairs is realistic, the proposal has a 
real prospect of success and that the proposal is fair (SPI, 1997). There is no evidence to 
suggest, however, that larger IP firms are any more effective in supervising successful IVAs 
than smaller ones. 
 
Although it is a necessary feature of all IVAs that the projected dividends are better than in 
the bankruptcy of that debtor the probability that the higher dividend will be paid is much 
less.  There is an estimated overall 31% failure rate of accepted IVAs (Pond, 1998), 
correlated significantly with debtor non-co-operation.  In addition, IVA dividends are more 
likely to be paid over a longer period, which means that the creditor will need to discount the 
dividend flow over the duration of the IVA rather than the 12 months of a typical bankruptcy.  
The longer time period and the greater involvement when the IVA is set up also give rise to 
greater transaction costs. 
 
Analysis of data from the 1998 study of IVAs reveals a number of features associated, to a 
greater or lesser degree, with an above average likelihood of failure.  These features are 
summarised in Table 1. 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 1 
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Linked with the incidence of debtor non-co-operation it appears that over-ambitious IVAs 
which offer substantially larger dividends than bankruptcy and those which give debtors no 
benefit over bankruptcy are far riskier. 
 
 
IVA RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
The 1998 research used a postal questionnaire addressed to a sample of IPs from IVAs 
commenced in 1994/95.  The questionnaire was advised through the use of focus group 
feedback at the January 1997 regional meeting of SPI, the IPs “umbrella” professional body.  
This forum highlighted the dearth of research on creditor attitudes to and influence on IVAs. 
 
A systematic sampling method was used to select 879 accepted cases from the public register 
of IVAs maintained by the Insolvency Service.  By restricting the number of questionnaires 
to be sent to individual IPs to three this sample was reduced to 490 cases.  The questionnaire 
was designed to elicit both objective and subjective information about accepted IVA 
proposals.  Cases from 1994 and 1995 were chosen for the study sample, as these would have 
had long enough, by early 1998, to have either run their course or to be close to a conclusion.  
This mirrored the methodology used in 1989 (Pond, 1989) and 1993 (Pond, 1993).  An 
overall response rate of 30% was achieved (145 cases) and key findings were discussed in 
interview with 10 representative IPs together with The Insolvency Service and a major 
creditor organisation. 
 
Based on Table 1 the IVA features that indicate riskier than average proposals include: 
 
• Debtor non-co-operation 
• Forecast dividends 
• Size and length of the IVA 
• Modifications agreed at creditors’ meetings 
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Debtor Non-co-operation 
 
The principal reason for IVA failure reported is debtor non-co-operation (see also Pond & 
Evans, 1995).  In the 1998 survey respondents were asked to rate debtor co-operation on a 
five-point scale (5 for “really co-operative” and 1 for “really uncooperative”).  Not 
surprisingly the failure rate for co-operative debtors was significantly lower (7.9%) than for 
non-co-operative ones (80.6%). 
 
This information is of little use to the manager trying to decide whether a proposal has a 
realistic chance of success since non-co-operation occurs after the creditors’ meeting.  In a 
few cases the creditor will know the debtor or the IP well enough to make a judgement about 
the integrity of the proposal but in most cases, this will be an unquantifiable element of the 
risk factor. 
 
Non-co-operation encompasses two different types of behaviour, according to interviewees.  
The first is the debtor’s motivation and supportiveness of the IVA.  Many debtors see the 
IVA as a godsend at a time of huge pressure from creditors and family.  Optimism and co-
operativeness prior to the creditors’ meeting can soon turn to non-compliance afterwards, as 
cash payments have to be made to the supervisor.  Many “non-co-operative” debtors fail to 
realise the importance of what they enter into and rely on the IP to implement the proposal.  
It was felt that IPs should judge whether debtors are suitable candidates to carry out what is 
promised in the proposal rather than rely on the “punishment strategy” of the genuine threat 
of bankruptcy.  Many cases studied show that the bankruptcy threat is very credible, given 
the retention of funds by the IP for this purpose. 
 
The second type of behaviour is the failure of the debtor to fulfil the conditions of the 
proposal.  This could be something as basic as a failure to provide accounts within a set time 
limit or as serious as a business downturn resulting in insufficient funds to make monthly 
payments or to pay ongoing tax and VAT obligations.  Clearly some debtors in this situation 
will still be co-operative and motivated to make the IVA succeed but will fail due to external 
pressures. 
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During the house price boom of the late 1980’s IVA returns improved as property equity 
boosted debtors’ assets (Flynn, 1993).  The 1998 study shows that the economic cycle can 
also have negative effects. 
 
Measuring the IVA 
 
Two factors that could bear heavily on co-operation by the debtor are the size of the dividend 
forecast and the duration of the IVA.  Average dividends, to unsecured creditors, anticipated 
at the outset of the IVA were 30.69p in the £ for IVAs in the 1998 study (47.62p in 1989).  
This contrasts with 14.35p if bankruptcy had ensued for these individuals (22.06p in 1989). 
 
The smallest cases are associated with the smallest dividends and with the smallest of 
benefits over bankruptcy, measured by the difference in anticipated dividends.  In addition 
the cases with assets below £20,000 show a greater chance of failure during the course of the 
IVA (39%).  Where more than £20,000 is offered in the IVA the failure rate falls to 26%.  
There appears, therefore, to be little reason, in terms of revenue, for backing particularly 
small IVAs. 
 
One of the most significant findings of the 1998 study was the increased chance of failure of 
the IVA where the difference between the IVA and bankruptcy dividends is either nil or 
exceeds 20p.  A proposal offering a dividend of 10p to 20p more than in bankruptcy has a 
16.9% chance of failure, whilst a proposal offering over 20p more than bankruptcy has a 
37.8% failure chance.  A proposal offering the same dividend as in a bankruptcy has a 66.7% 
chance of failure. 
 
Linked with the incidence of debtor non-co-operation it can be seen that proposals that either 
mirror the effects of bankruptcy for the debtor or are over-ambitious are riskier. 
Whilst likely asset realisation values are more certain the problems appear to lie with the 
income stream of the debtor in the future.  One method of improving IVA size, where an 
income stream is available, is to extend the duration of the IVA.  What is clear from the 1998 
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study is that IVAs are becoming longer.  In 1993 51.22% of IVAs studied were completed in 
less than one year.  In his 1992 text on IVAs Stephen Lawson wrote, “It will only be in 
exceptional circumstances that a voluntary arrangement will last for longer than two years” 
(Lawson, 1992) 
 
In 1998, however, only 10.34 % of cases were due to be completed in under one year whilst 
44.13% were designed to exceed the three year mark.  Three years had always been seen as a 
benchmark as this is the likely duration of a full bankruptcy.  Only the shortest IVAs (under 
one year) had a lower failure rate (13%) than the average.  Although not certain, this could 
be because they relied on the liquidation of assets rather than the expectation of income in 
the future. 
 
Creditors’ meeting modifications 
 
On receipt of the IVA proposal the creditor has a limited time to judge whether it is realistic 
and whether the proposed dividend is acceptable.  To help creditors a positive report from the 
IP, prior to the creditors’ meeting, should indicate that the statement of affairs is accurate, the 
proposal has a real prospect of success and that the proposal is fair (SPI, 1997).  Creditors 
can further strengthen their position by drafting and submitting modifications to the proposal 
for consideration at the creditors’ meeting. 
 
One very prominent feature of the 1998 study was the turnaround by creditors from their 
fairly indifferent attitude of 1989.  In 1989 the average attendance (both actual and by proxy) 
at creditors’ meetings in accepted IVAs was 56.3% with only 23% of meetings actually 
modifying the proposal.  By 1998 average attendance had risen to 81% with 53% of cases 
reporting over 50% attendance.  In addition, 71% of study cases were modified at creditors’ 
meetings.  This latter finding may have much to do with the policy of some creditors to insist 
on modifications to all IVAs.  Many modifications are offered in exchange for support. 
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The imposition of modifications per se is not linked with the chance of failure.  When 
particular modifications are reviewed, however, a different picture is presented.  The major 
modifications reported in the 1998 study were: 
 
• Changed duration 
• Increased income contribution 
• Property related 
• Windfall 
• Administrative modifications, including a limit on new credit and provision of accounts. 
 
Both increased debtor co-operation and a lower than average chance of ultimate failure 
(24%) are associated with “Windfall” modifications.  The logical explanation is that the 
clause has no immediate impact on the debtor and can be seen as a cost-less concession. 
 
Modifications to extend the IVA are linked to slightly greater co-operation of the debtor, 
although the chance of failure of the IVA is still average (31%).  Longer IVA periods 
indicate that debtors will work hard to avoid bankruptcy especially as a greater proportion of 
IVAs is seen in Business & Professional Services, compared with other trades.  A number of 
professions, including Solicitors, Architects and Accountants, withdraw the license to 
practice on bankruptcy but not on the acceptance of an IVA. 
 
Greater pressure appears to be placed on the debtor, however, when modifications seeking 
increased monthly contributions from income are tabled as the level of co-operation falls.  
The same is seen when “administrative” modifications are added such as the retention of 
funds by a supervisor to ensure that the bankruptcy threat for non-compliance is a credible 
one. 
 
The clearest links to non-co-operation and a higher failure rate (49%) are seen when property 
related modifications are sought.  Typical clauses call for revaluation of the family home 
towards the end of the IVA, and a re-mortgage or sale of the property if sufficient equity is 
apparent.  These clauses are agreed by the pressurised debtor at the creditors’ meeting but, on 
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reflection, appear to erode the debtor’s benefits under the IVA.  This erosion puts the debtor 
closer to the position under bankruptcy and offers no compensating advantage, especially 
when the bankruptcy discharge period is generally shorter. 
 
The knowledge that so many creditors seek to apply modifications also leads IPs to 
incorporate commonly suggested modifications in proposals at the outset.  This suggests that 
IVAs are far more “creditor friendly” than in the past and that they reflect less and less the 
wishes of the debtor.  The eventual price of “success” in getting the debtor to agree to certain 
modifications may be the greater likelihood of debtor non-co-operation and IVA failure in 
the longer run. 
 
 
The repeated game prediction 
 
The 1998 study also confirms that the insolvency game is played out not between creditor 
and debtor but increasingly by their proxies and agents.  Through their privileged position 
created by licensing, introduced in the Insolvency Act 1986, and their offer of “free” meeting 
attendance services to creditors, IPs call, run and attend creditors’ meetings to the potential 
exclusion of independent creditors. 
 
These features allow for the necessary building of trust between creditors and IPs and the 
opportunity for creditors to monitor performance.  Whilst there is no evidence of any 
conflicts of interest this does suggest that the insolvency game is moving closer and closer to 
the “repeated game” prediction of an {IVA, IVA} strategy.  Additionally IPs can signal the 
good intentions of debtors to creditors with whom they have developed good relationships. 
 
Although creditor influence can be malign it does not have to be so.  It is a tool that needs to 
be used sensitively.  Whilst modifications are a creditor’s right the victory can be pyrrhic.  
Far more helpful, according to the research findings, is the maintenance of contact and 
support during the period of the IVA, both before and after the creditors' meeting.  The 
1987/88 cases showed that support of a main mortgage lender was often linked with ultimate 
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success of the IVA (Pond, 1993).  The 1994/95 cases show that ultimate success is linked 
with creditor support and contact throughout the IVA. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Successful debt recovery strategies depend not only on a good knowledge of the alternative 
legal procedures available but also on a good assessment of the risks involved in following 
one particular procedure.  This is brought into sharp focus by the choice facing creditors 
presented with a debtor’s proposal for an IVA.  Over the past decade creditors, their 
professional advisors and IPs have learned crucial lessons about IVAs that succeed and those 
that fail. 
 
In the indefinitely repeated non-co-operative game the strategic choice to be made by 
creditors allows a revenue maximising strategy to be selected more consistently by assessing 
the risk of IVA failure and using this to discount the projected dividend.  Where the risk and 
present value discounted dividend is higher than that achievable in the bankruptcy of the 
debtor the creditor should vote for the IVA. 
 
Creditors need to be aware that as society’s attitude to bankruptcy changes the risk factor 
also changes.  If bankruptcy is no longer stigmatised by society debtors may not work as 
hard to avoid it. 
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Figure 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
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Figure 2: The Static Insolvency Game 
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Figure 3 Extensive form of the static insolvency game  
(a) Creditor strategies (Debtor moves first) 
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(b) Debtor strategies (Creditor moves first) 
   Debtor concurs with 
bankruptcy option 
(0) 
 Creditor petitions 
for bankruptcy 
   
   Debtor proposes an IVA 
 
(<0) 
Debtor     
   Debtor rejects IVA and 
petitions for bankruptcy 
(<0) 
 Creditor suggests 
an IVA 
   
   Debtor designs 
acceptable IVA proposal 
(>B) 
 
 
 166
 
BOX 1 
 
WHAT IS AN IVA? 
 
IVAs are private "contracts" for the satisfaction of debts, entered into by insolvent debtors 
and their creditors, pre- or post- bankruptcy.  In this court-supervised and protected 
procedure (interim order) the debtor proposes how the debts are to be satisfied (proposal), 
under the guidance of a licensed insolvency practitioner (nominee).  The creditors are given 
the opportunity of accepting or rejecting the proposal (creditors’ meeting).  At the meeting 
the creditors have the opportunity to offer modifications to the proposal that the debtor can 
accept or reject.  Once agreed and accepted by at least 75 percent by value of creditors 
attending the creditors’ meeting the IVA is binding and the proposal is given effect by the 
insolvency practitioner (supervisor).  Accepted IVAs have the effect of either overturning a 
bankruptcy order, dismissing a bankruptcy petition or halting other legal action by a creditor 
to recover a debt. 
 
IVA legislation is covered in Part VIII (Sections 252 to 263) of The Insolvency Act 1986 and 
Part 5 of The Insolvency Rules 1986 (as amended). 
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TABLE I 
IVA failure risk factors 
 Chi - square 
Factor Fail % Pearson DF Sig. Comment 
Debtor not co-operative 56.8 50.99719 2 .00000 Significant at 1% level 
IVA dividend = bankruptcy dividend 66.7 19.44784 2 .00006 Significant at 1% level 
IVA div. > 20p more than bankruptcy 37.8 19.44784 2 .00006 Significant at 1% level 
Assets / Income <£20,000 39.4 2.70417 1 .10009 Close to significance at 10% level 
Creditors not generally supportive 42.9 5.53624 2 .06278 Appears significant at 10% level but 2 
cells with observations less than 5 
Creditors’ support “neutral” 39.7 5.53624 2 .06278 As above 
Modifications at creditors’ meeting 33.0 0.50755 1 .47620 Not significant at 10% level 
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Abstract 
 
This paper reflects on the activities and experience of Creditors and Insolvency 
Practitioners with respect to Individual Voluntary Arrangements since 1986.  It draws on 
empirical studies, secondary data, new rules contained within the Insolvency Act 2000 
and recent legal decisions to provide a background against which the Insolvency Service 
"Second Chance" proposals can be reviewed. 
 
The position of creditors is given particular focus in the paper reflecting their emerging 
influence on the IVA process. 
 
The paper suggests how the new rôles for IVAs need to take into consideration the 
experience of insolvency practitioners and creditors - factors that may undermine the cost 
efficiencies promised. 
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NEW RULES AND NEW ROLES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL 
VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
The IVA is a private agreement for the satisfaction of personal debts, introduced by the 
Insolvency Act 1986.  It is considered to be by far, the most successful element of the 
1986 reforms both in terms of numbers of cases and returns to creditors. 
 
Legal decisions since 1986 have sought to clarify many aspects of the Insolvency Rules 
19861 but no major amendments to the IVA legislation had been contemplated until 2000. 
 
This paper reviews the experience of insolvency practitioners and creditors through the 
available research and outlines the potential effects of the Insolvency Act 2000 changes.  
The paper goes on to discuss the latest Insolvency Service "Second Chance" proposals 
(Insolvency Service, 2001) which affect IVAs by suggesting an expansion in usage and 
deregulation of their supervision. 
 
The IVA record 
 
As a private agreement the IVA can be influenced by the quality of the relationships 
between lenders and debtors.  In this court-supervised procedure the debtor proposes how 
the debts are to be satisfied, under the guidance of an authorised insolvency practitioner 
and under the protection of a “moratorium” on creditor action.  The creditors are given 
the opportunity of amending and accepting or rejecting the proposal (Lawson, 2000).  All 
creditors are bound by the agreement, according to the "statutory hypothesis"2 provided at 
least 75% by value vote in favour at the creditors' meeting. 
 
The years since 1986 have seen a steady rise in the incidence and acceptance of IVAs 
(DTI, 2001).  There is also growing evidence of their successful application (Pond, 2000).  
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In 1987 only 5% of insolvencies were dealt with as IVAs.  At the height of the early 
1990's recession this had risen to 12%.  At the time of writing, however, around 25% of 
formal personal insolvencies are dealt with via IVAs (5,000 to 6,000 cases per annum).  
Most bankruptcies however fail to deliver any dividend to ordinary creditors.  Where only 
insolvencies with assets and a forecast dividend are considered IVA incidence rises to 
82% (Pond, 2000), making IVAs very significant to creditors. 
 
The choice faced by an increasing number of insolvent debtors is between IVA, and the 
avoidance of penalties, restrictions and opprobrium connected with bankruptcy or 
bankruptcy itself.  The choice faced by the creditor is limited by the predisposition of the 
debtor towards bankruptcy in the first instance and by the perceived risk of the IVA 
failing after it has been accepted by creditors.  However, a successful IVA can improve 
creditor recoveries, since income from continued employment or trade is often included 
as a benefit.  Whilst income is also available in bankruptcy via an Income Payments 
Order3 this mechanism is not always used. 
 
The Association of Business Recovery Professionals (formerly the Society for 
Practitioners of Insolvency) has studied dividends to unsecured creditors, forecast at the 
commencement of the IVA or bankruptcy, over many years (SPI, 1992 - 1999).  IVAs 
have shown consistently higher returns to creditors than bankruptcy.  On average returns 
are estimated at 17% higher for IVAs although the time-scale for recovery in an IVA is 
longer (five years against three years in bankruptcy). 
 
The novelty of the IVA in 1986 was such that it readily achieved Cork's proposal to allow 
businesses to continue to trade and professionals to continue to earn money for the benefit 
of their creditors (Cork, 1982).  In the intervening years, however, numerous contracts 
have been re-written that equate IVAs with bankruptcy.  Of particular interest is the 
practice of credit reference agencies to record all IVAs on their databases.  To the typical 
credit provider this will be a signal to deny credit.  Banks may even decline to open a 
bank account for an individual even where the IVA has been successfully completed.  
The IVAs ability to rehabilitate consumer debtors, in particular, is questionable. 
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A genealogical model 
 
The field of insolvency is peppered with medical analogies: "Company Doctors", 
"Rehabilitation", "Intensive care" and, of course, "Undertakers".  With the fervent wish 
not to over-extend the analogy I contend that a review of the interaction between IP, 
Debtor and Creditor in the design of the IVA Proposal can benefit from this 
correspondence. 
 
From the viewpoint of the creditor, IVAs can present with different genealogies, the most 
basic of which are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
IPs are in the vanguard in pre-selecting those debtors most likely to benefit from an IVA, 
they can not only report to the courts on the viability of the Proposal4 and its likely 
acceptance by creditors but they can also signal to creditors the intentions of the debtor. 
 
For the ultimate success of the proposal and for the continued use of the IVA scheme in 
appropriate circumstances, creditors need to be assured that the case before them has 
every hope of recovery.  This is most likely where a good IP combines with an honest 
debtor. 
 
Potential for recovery 
 
Good IPs, working in accordance with their own professional code (SPI, 1997) will only 
propose IVAs where the likelihood of ultimate successful conclusion of the arrangement 
is greatest.  Honest debtors will intend, at least at the outset, to do their best to repay to 
creditors, as much of the outstanding debt as they can.  During the currency of the IVA 
the honest debtor will also co-operate fully with the IP and adhere to the detail of the 
arrangement agreed with creditors.  The prognosis here is "recovery". 
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Problems arise for creditors and IPs (but in different measures) when a less trustworthy 
debtor and / or a less diligent IP become involved in the proceedings.  These IVA types I 
classify as "sickly" and "infected". 
 
Sickly and Infected proposals 
 
Debtor non-co-operation has long been seen by IPs as a major reason for the failure of 
accepted IVAs (Pond & Evans, 1995).  "Sickly" IVAs can often suffer from strategic non-
co-operation.  Strategic non-co-operation arises by design as the debtor achieves 
acceptance of an IVA proposal only to fail to fulfil its objectives in the hope that creditors 
will not pursue the case into bankruptcy.  This strategy was certainly possible before 
creditors began to insist upon proposal clauses that obliged the supervisor (IP) to retain 
sufficient funds to petition for bankruptcy should the need arise.  It may still be possible 
where the IP or creditors lack the funds or the will to take this option. 
 
Perhaps the most worrying aspect of IVA scrutiny is the creditors' perception of the IP.  
Less diligent IPs are still practising in the insolvency market despite the strictures of 
licensing brought in by the 1986 Act5.  Into this category must be brought IPs who fail to 
scrutinise fully IVA proposals put forward by "debt counsellors" or "work finders" and 
IPs who prescribe over-optimistic and standardised IVAs in all and any circumstances, 
regardless of the appropriateness of the case.  Large creditors have, over the years, built 
up databases of cases and can identify those IPs who put forward cases that subsequently 
fail (Pond, 2000). 
 
Innocent non-co-operation can arise through a combination of circumstances impacting 
on debtors that have the effect of reducing their ability to fulfil the IVA proposal.  These 
circumstances include marital problems, employment problems and changes in family 
circumstances.  I exclude from this category external and environmental occurrences 
since these can impact on honest and dishonest debtors alike. 
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Terminal cases 
 
Unfortunately there is little hope of recovery or viability where a non-co-operative debtor 
works in conjunction with a less diligent IP.  These cases I label "Terminal" and are 
probably best dealt with objectively at the outset.  Where trust is lacking and creditors' 
doubt that the IVA will deliver the promised benefits the option to decline the proposal 
and petition for immediate bankruptcy may be the best idea.  IVAs that fail can exhaust 
assets in the payment of IP fees and in on-going trading (in business cases) making 
subsequent bankruptcy a worthless exercise for creditors. 
 
Therapy for IVAs 
 
Since 1986 creditors and IPs have worked on strategies that attempt to cure "defects" in 
the design of IVA proposals.  Medication is often prescribed in order to overcome 
deficiencies arising from doubts about either the IP or the debtor or the proposal itself.  
Medication for terminal cases is, of course, useless but is administered anyway since 
creditors tend to have a uniform response to proposals and do not always know whether a 
case is "terminal" or merely "unwell" until after acceptance of the proposal has taken 
place. 
 
Medication can have considerable benefits when applied to "sickly" or "infected" cases 
(especially as creditors are only rewarded if the patient recovers).  However, the therapy 
often administered can, at the same time, have serious side-effects on otherwise healthy 
cases that show every sign of recovery.  Some medication as a precautionary or 
preventative step is needed but a full course of therapy can be counter-productive. 
 
The opportunities that creditors have for intervention occur before, during and after the 
creditors' meeting6 as shown in Figure 2: 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Before the creditors' meeting 
 
The IP, as nominee of the proposal, is obliged to assure the court that the proposal has 
every likelihood of acceptance by creditors.  This can be done by contacting major 
creditors during the review phase of the IVA procedure or by relying on knowledge of 
how certain creditors have reacted in past cases.  Major creditors, such as the Inland 
Revenue, the banks and credit card companies have centralised departments specialising 
in the collection of debts and in the review of IVA proposals.  Other creditors use 
"meeting services" provided by IPs and these can offer advice on sensible amendments to 
proposals or on voting. 
 
Experienced IPs will, therefore, be able to predict the tenor of suggested amendments 
and, either incorporate them in the proposal at the outset, or gauge the voting intentions of 
the specific creditors as amendments are tabled.  Creditors and their representatives have 
the opportunity of tailoring modifications to proposals to meet the perceived deficiencies 
of the debtor, IP or both. 
 
The Insolvency Act 2000 adds the obligation for the nominee to give an opinion as to 
whether the IVA has a reasonable prospect of being implemented.  This places a 
significant new legal burden on the nominee but one which those following the 
professional code of conduct (SPI, 1997) will be very used to. 
 
Under the protection of the IVA moratorium nominees have been able to make early 
contact with creditors to gauge acceptability of proposals without the creditors being able 
to take precipitate action.  Once accepted, however, IVAs cannot be controlled fully by 
supervisors, especially in the "sickly and infected" cases mentioned earlier. 
 
If the nominee's opinion is to be worth anything in the future, however, this may need to 
be coupled with higher costs for investigating proposals at the nominee stage and higher 
monitoring costs for accepted cases.  Currently nominees must investigate proposals 
within the 14-day moratorium period, although extension is possible.  It is feasible that 
more extensions will be required to allow "due diligence" to take place, especially where 
ownership of assets must be established. 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that, as in bankruptcy investigations, many IVAs proceed on 
the unsubstantiated details given by the debtor at interview with the nominee.  The 
Insolvency Act 2000 does strengthen the nominee's hand by making debtors criminally 
liable for false representations at this stage but wilful debtors may still take the risk. 
 
Another implication may be the closer scrutiny of IVA records by the Insolvency Service.  
Annual supervisor reports and completion reports must be supplied to the Insolvency 
Service for all IVAs.  The public register of IVAs carries only basic information, 
however.  Recent research by the Insolvency Service (Flynn, 2001) shows how readily 
this aspect can be policed.  To date this has only been carried out for research purposes. 
 
So far only a small number of large creditors have sophisticated procedures for feeding 
back experience of IVAs to those responsible for agreeing new cases.  The potential is 
there, however, to identify and discipline nominees making negligent claims about 
implementation. 
 
One final part of the Insolvency Act 2000 concerns the deregulation of those overseeing 
IVAs (and CVAs).  Unlicensed persons may now apply to the Secretary of State to 
become nominees and supervisors.  Anybody taking this route will find that a track record 
of success will be needed before creditors will accept their recommendations readily. 
 
At the creditors' meeting 
 
Similar opportunities are available at the creditors' meeting itself but whilst most creditors 
now vote at meetings few actually attend.  Negotiation and application of modifications is 
limited, in most cases, to numerous bi-lateral agreements between the IP and the 
individual creditors. 
 
Study of modifications put forward in a sample of IVAs (Pond, 1998) reveals that 
amendments fall into three main categories: 
 
• Administrative 
• Contingent and, 
• Non-Contingent 
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Administrative amendments often relate to the fees payable to the insolvency practitioner, 
either placing a cap on them or ensuring that they are referred to creditors for approval.  
IVA supervisors can also be required to retain sufficient funds to ensure that the threat of 
bankruptcy for debtor non-co-operation is credible.  This type of amendment can also 
address the possibility of the IVA failing by defining what is meant by "failure" (see 
below). 
 
Contingent amendments relate to post acceptance events that may improve the creditors' 
recovery position.  Following early success in including house equity in IVAs (Flynn, 
1993) creditors routinely amend proposals in order that house equity is reviewed before 
the end of the IVA term with a view to re-mortgage or sale.  Contingencies such as 
"windfall gains" are also included in IVAs in order to bring them more in line with the 
rules relating to "after-acquired property" in a bankruptcy. 
 
Lastly, non-contingent amendments relate directly to the assets to be included in the IVA, 
the level of income to be made available and the term of the arrangement.  Over 70% of 
IVAs now have terms of five years. 
 
Administrative amendments do not appear to have a marked affect on IVA success or 
failure in the long run.  Whilst amendments are readily agreed by pressurised debtors at 
the time of the creditors' meeting, however, those contingent amendments relating to 
property are generally associated with IVAs that have a greater risk of ultimate failure.  
One explanation for this is that the more amendments and restrictions that are required by 
the creditors the more like a bankruptcy the IVA becomes for the debtor and the "hill" 
becomes too steep to climb (Brewin, 2000) 
 
Creditors know that debtors will agree to amendments at the outset of an IVA or face 
rejection of their proposals.  Creditors are advised, therefore, to monitor failure rates 
closely and modify their demands in the future.  The risk for the creditor is that the 
recovery of funds may be jeopardised if the IVA fails during its course and that a 
bankruptcy at the outset would have returned a higher dividend. 
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After the creditors' meeting 
 
The years since 1986 have shown that, post meeting; IVAs are subject to turbulence and 
setbacks on the road to debtor recovery.  Where debtors intentionally withdraw their co-
operation little can be done to keep recovery on track.  Where environmental or external 
factors intervene, however, the supervisor may attempt to avoid complete failure of the 
IVA by taking remedial action. 
 
Remedial action is most often taken by making amendments to the original proposals or 
variations to the original detail of the IVA.  IVAs can be extended to allow for a longer 
income stream or assets that were not originally included in the IVA can be included.  
Under the Insolvency Act 1986 the supervisor is able to seek court directions7 
 
In recent years the courts have distinguished clearly between variations of proposals 
allowed for in the original proposal and variations outside the remit of the original 
proposal. 
 
In cases where a proposal is silent on the procedure to be followed should variation of the 
IVA be deemed necessary any consensual variation of its terms will bind only those 
creditors agreeing to it.  It will be contractual, much like a composition, rather than carry 
the statutory force of the original agreement8.  The absence of terms in the proposal 
covering the possibility of later re-negotiation does not preclude variation provided the 
rights of any creditor not agreeing to the variation are not affected adversely.  The 
Insolvency Act 1986 provides that creditors who feel unfairly prejudiced by the outcome 
of a creditors' meeting may lodge an appeal within 28 days of the meeting9. 
 
In Raja v. Rubin a creditor who had waived his right to a dividend in the original proposal 
but then objected to the variation of the proposal later was deemed not to have an interest 
in the variation and could not, therefore, overturn it. 
 
This is supportive to creditors since there will be numerous IVAs in existence that do not 
contain clauses covering possible re-negotiation or variation.  It also gives leverage to 
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smaller creditors who may be able to exact preferential treatment in re-negotiations as 
they could avoid being bound by the variation and pursue their claim outside the IVA. 
 
Because of this potential risk most recent IVA proposals will contain clauses that provide 
for variations.  Large creditors with more standardised approaches to IVAs will insist on 
such amendments before IVAs will be accepted. 
 
The court further clarified the position of variations of IVAs when it was faced with a 
case, in 1999, in which the original proposal had specifically included rules covering 
variations.  It had foreseen the possibility of calling of a creditors' meeting at 14 day's 
notice and the possibility of adjournment for a further 14 days10. 
 
The court11 held that the "variation meeting" could be governed by the same rules that 
governed the original meeting in 1994 and that decisions, agreed by more than 75% by 
value of creditors, would be binding on all creditors with notice of the meeting.  
Interestingly, the court observed that the "variation meeting" could have actually agreed 
variations without the concurrence of the debtor in a way that was not possible in the 
original meeting.  Accordingly, debtors may be advised to ensure that variation clauses 
specifically include the provisions of the Insolvency Act12 that only allow modifications 
that have the consent of the debtor. 
 
This case illustrates clearly that the IVA is a private agreement, albeit with statutory 
force, and that careful drafting is vital at all stages. 
 
The scope for variation since 1986 has been wide since the decision at a Section 257 
creditors' meeting was only binding on those creditors who had notice of it.  Creditors 
emerging after the meeting often had little option but to join in the IVA, following a 
variation.  The Insolvency Act 2000 makes Section 257 meeting decisions binding on all 
creditors, whether they had notice of it or not.  As IVAs are not advertised this will, 
clearly, have an impact on those not party to the original proposal. 
 
Such post-meeting creditors do retain the right, however, to appeal against the decision of 
the creditors' meeting within 28 days of becoming aware of the IVA.  At first sight this 
plugs a loophole and reduces the potential for disruption of IVAs.  It also increases the 
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potential for appeals to be made.  The outcomes of proposals accepted without the prior 
knowledge of a major creditor could be prejudiced where accommodation of that creditor 
means that dividends will be lower than anticipated or a variation causes the failure of the 
IVA. 
 
"Second Chance" implications 
 
When the government proposals contained in the Enterprise White paper (Insolvency 
Service, 2001) come into force then IVAs will face a new challenge. 
 
A direct corollary to the reduction in the bankruptcy disqualification period to 12 months 
will be the increased usage of IVAs supervised by Official Receivers.  The proposals 
foresee Official Receivers operating a centralised, cost efficient post-bankruptcy IVA 
machine.  However, research to date suggests that the IVA cases to be dealt with by this 
method will be amongst the most troublesome and the promise of cost reduction through 
centralisation and economies of scale may not emerge. 
 
Post bankruptcy IVAs are unlikely to offer realisable assets to creditors.  My estimate, 
from a review of bankruptcy cases from 1997/98, indicates that 90% of bankruptcies offer 
no assets and no return to unsecured creditors (Pond, 2000).  Asset rich cases are likely to 
be commenced as IVAs. 
 
Accordingly, post-bankruptcy IVAs will be smaller and offer only an income stream over 
a period of years.  Whilst such schemes are eminently workable they rely on the honesty 
and commitment of the debtor and the absence of vitiating factors during the term of the 
arrangement. 
 
Costs are proportionately higher in small cases due to the irreducible fixed costs of setting 
up an arrangement and bringing it to a state of acceptance.  These cases are, therefore, 
amongst the most marginal since they are very sensitive to external factors and 
"contribution drift".  Official Receivers expect to be able to contain and curtail costs at 
the nominee stage.  Current nominee fees average £1,500.  Lower fees will enhance 
benefits to creditors. 
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Lower costs will also derive from the fact that the traditional Official Receiver scale 
fees13 for bankruptcy will not apply.  Official fees calculated on both realisations and 
distributions can account for around 40% of proceeds in a small bankruptcy (realisations 
between £10,000 and £20,000).  Once again this should benefit creditors.  The Enterprise 
Bill (Insolvency Service, 2001) will propose alternative methods of funding the 
Insolvency Service and so the above fees may no longer be applicable. 
 
Cost reductions will also be seen through economies of scale and the avoidance of court 
supervision, as in the case of Income Payment Orders in bankruptcy at present. 
 
Recent experience has shown that well organised creditors can, and do, act to amend IVA 
proposals via the S.257 meeting or after it.  The difficult task, for Official Receivers, will 
be to ensure that such amendments do not add risk and monitoring cost to an already 
marginal case. 
 
The 2001 proposals may also result in uniformity of IVA proposals, altered slightly to 
reflect the circumstances of individual debtors.  In practice, this is what many insolvency 
practitioners already provide - the problem being that they can be used in inappropriate 
circumstances, adding further risk of failure. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Enterprise White Paper puts forward a reasonable and workable scheme for post-
bankruptcy IVAs.  The scheme is based, however, on some questionable assumptions 
about the acceptance by creditors of "official" IVAs.  The main argument to sway 
creditors appears to be that of lower costs and higher potential returns without adequately 
pointing out the additional risks.  The White Paper fails to address how such debtors will 
become rehabilitated by this mechanism. 
 
Experience since 1986 has shown that creditor acceptance is vital to the success of an 
IVA.  The law protects the rights of creditors to negotiate individual terms of IVAs and to 
appeal when treated "unfairly" by an IVA.  Creditors have shown themselves to be 
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willing and able to use this power.  Increasingly, however, IVAs are seen as quasi-
bankruptcies and the "stigma" of bankruptcy is not, thereby, diminished.  For true 
rehabilitation to take place it is this long-term issue that must be addressed rather than the 
shorter-term issue of returns to creditors. 
 
No doubt the proposals on post-bankruptcy IVAs will go ahead and an Enterprise Act will 
come into being.  Only time will tell whether it delivers on its promises. 
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Figure 1: The different genealogies of IVA Proposals 
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Figure 2: Opportunities for therapeutic intervention 
 
 
Before the S. 257 
meeting 
 
• Discussion with IP during "design" phase of proposal. 
• IP knowledge of common proposal amendments put 
forward by specific creditors. 
 
At the S.257 meeting 
 
• Tabling of amendments to proposal. 
• Conditional voting at the meeting. 
 
After the S.257 
meeting 
• Legal objection to outcome of meeting within 28 days 
(S. 262). 
• Variation of proposal following failure. 
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ILLUSTRATIVE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS. 
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The Study Sample 
 
By assuming that 5 % error and 10 % confidence interval can be acceptable for  a 
statistical analysis of IVA cases, we calculated that we would need 271 cases.  
 
( n = ( (z x σ) / E )2 = ( (1.645 x 0.5) / 0.05)2 = 270.6  or nearly 271 ) 
 
Moreover as we assumed that if  the response rate reaches 50%, it would be useful to 
double the number of questionnaires which would be sent. As a result we calculated 
the number of 542 as the number of questionnaires which would be sent out (271 + 
(0.5 x 271) = 542). 
 
To choose 542 cases of IVAs randomly, firstly, two days (two weeks difference 
between every two days) in every month of 1994 and 1995 were chosen; and then, the 
Insolvency Service in Birmingham was contacted to provide us with the details of 
IVA cases which were registered on these chosen days. The number of cases provided 
by the Insolvency Service was 879 cases (500 cases for 1994 and 379 cases for 1995). 
Moreover, we assumed that we should not send more than 3 questionnaires (on 3 
cases) to every IP who were supervising IVAs in our sample. This was considered in 
respect to response rate. As a result, the number of cases was reduced to 504. Then, 
two different databases (a database for the details of 504 IVA cases and another one 
for addresses of all IPs) were merged. After this the number of cases was reduced to 
490 and the number of IPs (who were supervising these cases) was 250.  
 
145 questionnaires were returned by 87 IPs. 22 IPs responded by saying that they 
would be unable to help due to various reasons. The major reason was that they 
thought that filling in such questionnires could mean breaching of customer 
confidentiality. If they responded they would fill in 48 questionnaires. (After we had 
tabulated the results by utilising those 145 returned questionnaires, we received 
further 12 questionnaires (by 7 IPs). However we didn’t included these into our 
tabulations.) 
 
As a result  
 
response rate  =  145 / 490 = 29.6 %  
(157 / 490 = 32 %; If we had included the other 12 questionnaires to the sample.) 
((145 + 48) / 490 = 39.4 %; If those IPs who informed us that they cannot unable also 
had filled in questionnaires.) 
IPs responded / All IPs whom questionnaires posted to   =  87 / 250 = 34.8 %   
 
Total number of IPs who indicated interest in the research = 87 + 7 + 22 = 116  
(116 / 250 = 46.4 %) 
 
36 IPs requested a ‘report summary’ for the research results. 
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The Questionnaire 
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Banking Centre 
 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE  
on  
INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Insolvency Practitioner’s 
Name «Title»  «IP_Int»  «IP_Surname» Firm «Firm_Name» 
 
Debtor’s Name «D_Title»  «D_Int»  «D_Surname» IVA No «IVA_No» 
 
What was the principal reason for insolvency? Please state in the given space. 
Commercial / Business Domestic / Consumer 
 
 
 
Type of Business  Employment 
  
 
Had any creditor (i.e. bank) worked with the Debtor  
to avert insolvency? If yes - how? 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
 
 
 
 
please continue overleaf
 
What was the point of entry to this IVA procedure?  
Please tick the appropriate box. 
 No prior procedure (Insolvency Act / Section 253 (3)(b) ). 
 Via the Debtor’s petition (Insolvency Act / Section 274 ). 
 After a bankruptcy order (Insolvency Act / Section 253 (3)(a) ). 
 
What was the source of the introduction of the Debtor to the IP? (ie bank, accountant)  
 
 
Had the Debtor or the Nominee had contact with any of the 
Creditors before the Interim Order (i.e. in Proposal design stage) 
?  
If yes - what was the effect of this contact? 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
please continue overleaf
 
Was a ‘Concertina Order’ Practice Direction (Bankruptcy 1/91) 
used in this order? 
 
Yes 
  
No 
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What percentage of the Creditors attended the Creditors’ Meeting or 
voted by proxy? %
  
What percentage of the Creditors who attended the Meeting voted 
for the IVA? %
 
Did any of the Creditors propose any modifications to the IVA 
Proposal? If yes, please note the details. 
Yes  No  
 
 
 
please continue overleaf
 
Did any Creditors accept concessions? (ie giving up a security or 
a preferential status) If yes, please note the details. 
Yes  No  
 
 
 
please continue overleaf
 
In respect of the supervision of the accepted IVA 
please circle the number most closely representing 
your view on the following statements: 
 
strongly 
agree 
 
 
agree 
 
 
neutral 
 
 
disagree 
 
strongly 
disagree 
The Creditors were / have been really 
supportive. 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
The Debtor was / has been really co-
operative. 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
What is the current position of the IVA? Please tick appropriate answer. 
 IVA progressing according to original or changed Proposal. 
 IVA completed in accordance with original or changed Proposal. 
 Supervisor vacated office with Proposal unfulfilled. 
 External factors have threatened viability of the Proposal. 
If the answer is the last choice, what major problems have been encountered? 
 
 
 
 
 
please continue overleaf
 
Please complete the following details about the Proposal. 
Duration of IVA (months)
Assets realised (£)
Income available (if any) (£)
Total liabilities (£)
Anticipated dividend to unsecured creditors in IVA (p in £)
Anticipated dividend to unsecured creditors in BANKRUPTCY  (p in £)
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Summary Statistics 
 
Size of IP Firms 
 
IP FIRM SIZE Count % IP FIRM SIZE Count % 
Big Six Firms 16 11.11    
National Firms 42 29.17 Big Firms 58 40.28 
One-Office Firms 81 56.25    
Two-Office Firms 6 3.47 Small Firms 87 59.72 
TOTAL 144 100.00 TOTAL 144 100.00 
 
 
Average Dividend in IVAs 
 
33.39p in £ 
 
 
Average Dividend in Bankruptcies 
 
14.28p in £ 
 
 
Average Difference between Dividend of IVAs and Dividend of Bankruptcies 
 
19.11p in £ 
 
 
Size of IVAs 
 
SIZE OF IVAs (Income + Assets) Count % 
< £10K 41 28.29 
£10K <= £20K 32 22.07 
£20K <= £50K 45 31.03 
£50K <= £100K 13 8.97 
£100K + 7 4.83 
Not known 7 4.83 
TOTAL 145 100.00 
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Route to IVAs 
 
ROUTE TO IVAs Count % 
No prior procedure 117 80.69 
Via debtor’s petition 6 4.14 
After a bankruptcy order 21 14.48 
Not known 1 0.69 
TOTAL 145 100.00 
 
 
Concertina Order Practice 
 
CONCERTINA ORDER PRACTICE Count % 
Yes 63 43.71 
No 81 56.29 
TOTAL 144 100.00 
 
 
Creditors’ Meeting Attendance 
 
ATTENDANCE TO MEETING Count % 
0 - 25 % 14 10 
26 - 50 % 39 27 
51 - 75 % 28 19 
76 - 100 % 50 34 
Not known 14 10 
TOTAL 145 100 
 
 
Concessions 
 
CONCESSIONS TO DEBTORS Count % 
Yes 7 4.83 
No 136 93.79 
Not known 2 1.38 
TOTAL 145 100 
 
 
Modifications 
 
MODIFICATIONS TO IVA PROPOSALS  Count % 
Yes 103 71.03 
No 36 24.83 
Not known 6 4.14 
TOTAL 145 100 
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Reasons for Insolvency 
 
 
REASONS FOR INSOLVENCY /    
                                   BUSINESS RELATED count % 
Financing / liquidity problems 11 9.32 
Personal guarantees given 16 13.56 
Loss of sales / margin 41 34.75 
Tax problems 11 9.32 
Declining prices in the property market 5 4.24 
Knock-on (eg. bad debt) 13 11.02 
Management weaknesses 3 2.54 
Other (eg. bad luck, act of god) 5 4.24 
not known 13 11.02 
TOTAL 118 100 
 
 
 
REASONS FOR INSOLVENCY /    
                                                      PERSONAL count % 
Overspending on credit cards / consumer 
credits / other types of borrowing 
 
8 
 
27.59 
Divorce 5 17.24 
Loss of employment 4 13.79 
Personal guarantees given 3 10.34 
Declining prices in the property market 5 17.24 
Tax problems 2 6.90 
not known 4 13.79 
TOTAL 29 100 
 
Note: There are 4 cases which have business related reasons as well as personal 
reasons for insolvency. 
 
 
Trades 
 
 
TYPE OF BUSINESS count % 
Agriculture 2 1.69 
Manufacturing 6 5.08 
Construction 5 4.24 
Transport & Communication 9 7.63 
Wholesale 3 2.54 
Retail 19 16.10 
Financial / Business & Profesional Services 23 19.49 
Hotels & Catering 12 10.17 
Other 33 27.97 
not known 6 5.08 
TOTAL 118 100 
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Regional Distribution of IVA Cases (1987, 1988, 1994, 1995 Cases) 
 
 
 1987 1988 1994 1995 1994&95* 
REGION count % count % count % count % count % 
London &  
South East 
 
50 12.41 
 
61 17.13 
 
1930 
 
38.67 
 
1535 35.66 
 
281 32.11 
Eastern 13 3.23 21 5.90 315 6.31 284 6.60 67 7.66 
South West 84 20.84 58 16.29 781 15.65 603 14.01 130 14.86 
East Midlands 24 5.96 21 5.90 212 4.25 203 4.72 53 6.06 
West Midlands 30 7.44 20 5.62 207 4.15 351 8.15 69 7.89 
North East 49 12.16 55 15.45 594 11.90 560 13.01 120 13.71 
North West 130 32.26 106 29.78 712 14.27 605 14.05 133 15.20 
Wales 23 5.71 14 3.93 240 4.81 164 3.81 22 2.51 
TOTAL 403 100.00 356 100.00 4991 100.00 4305 100.00 875 100.00 
 
* Initial Sample 
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Tabulation of Results 
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Success or Failure by Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) 
 
                    DEBTVIEW 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                             Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    58  |     6  |    32  |    96 
                   |  60.4  |   6.3  |  33.3  |  68.6 
                   |  92.1  |  19.4  |  69.6  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     5  |    25  |    14  |    44 
                   |  11.4  |  56.8  |  31.8  |  31.4 
                   |   7.9  |  80.6  |  30.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column      63       31       46      140 
             Total    45.0     22.1     32.9    100.0 
 
SF // 1: Success 2:Failure 
DEBTVIEW // 1:Agree (Cooperative) 2: Disagree (Not cooperative) 3: Neutral 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                         50.99719           2                  .00000 (Significant at  
         1 per cent level.) 
Number of Missing Observations:  5 
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Success or Failure by Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) 
 
 
 Debtor’s Cooperativeness to IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
cooperative 
 
neutral 
not 
cooperativ
e 
not 
known 
 
Total 
Success 58 32 6 1 97
Failure 5 14 25 1 45
not known - - - 3 3
Total 63 46 31 5 145
 
 
 Debtor’s Cooperativeness to IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
cooperative 
 
neutral 
not 
cooperativ
e 
not 
known 
 
Total 
Success 92% 70% 19% 20% 67%
Failure 8% 30% 81% 20% 31%
not known - - - 50% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Debtor’s Cooperativeness to IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
cooperative 
 
neutral 
not 
cooperativ
e 
not 
known 
 
Total 
Success 60% 33% 6% 1% 100%
Failure 11% 31% 56% 2% 100%
not known - - - 100% 100%
Total 43% 32% 21% 3% 100%
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Success or Failure by Difference between Dividend of IVA and Dividend 
of Bankruptcy 
 
                    DIVDIFFE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                                      Row 
                   |   -1.00|     .00|    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     3  |     8  |    49  |    28  |    88 
                   |   3.4  |   9.1  |  55.7  |  31.8  |  66.7 
                   |  75.0  |  33.3  |  83.1  |  62.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     1  |    16  |    10  |    17  |    44 
                   |   2.3  |  36.4  |  22.7  |  38.6  |  33.3 
                   |  25.0  |  66.7  |  16.9  |  37.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column       4       24       59       45      132 
             Total     3.0     18.2     44.7     34.1    100.0 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
DIVDIFFE // -1:Less than 0p(Dividend of Bankruptcy > Dividend of IVA) 0:No 
Difference (Dividend of Bankruptcy = Dividend of IVA) 1:Up to 20 (Dividend of 
IVA > Dividend of Bankruptcy Up to 20p) 2:More than 20p (Dividend of IVA > 
Dividend of Bankruptcy is more than 20p) 
 
Chi-Square                      Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                         19.65212           3                  .00020 (Seems significant at 1 
per         cent level but see note) 
Number of Missing Observations:  13 
 
Note: 2 cell includes less than 5 observations / Therefore not significant. 
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Success or Failure by Difference between Dividend of IVA and Dividend of 
Bankruptcy 
 
                    DIVDIFFE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct |                             Row 
           Col Pct |     .00|    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     8  |    49  |    28  |    85 
                   |  9.4%  | 57.6%  | 32.9%  | 66.4% 
                   | 33.3%  | 83.1%  | 62.2%  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    16  |    10  |    17  |    43 
                   | 37.2%  | 23.3%  | 39.5%  | 33.6% 
                   | 66.7%  | 16.9%  | 37.8%  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column      24       59       45      128 
             Total   18.8%    46.1%    35.2%   100.0% 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
DIVDIFFE // 0:No Difference (Dividend of Bankruptcy = Dividend of IVA) 1:Up to 
20 (Dividend of IVA > Dividend of Bankruptcy Up to 20p) 2:More than 20p 
(Dividend of IVA > Dividend of Bankruptcy is more than 20p) 
 
Chi-Square                      Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                         19.44784           2                  .00006 (Significant at  
         1 per cent level) 
Number of Missing Observations:  17 
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Success or Failure by Difference between Dividend of IVA and Dividend of 
Bankruptcy 
 
 
 Dividend Difference  
End Result 
of IVA 
No 
Difference 
DivIVA>DivB
Up to 20p 
DivIVA>DivB 
More than 20p 
not 
known
 
Total 
Success 8 49 28 1 86
Failure 16 10 17 9 52
not known - 1 - 1 2
Total 24 60 45 11 140
 
 
 Dividend Difference  
End Result 
of IVA 
No 
Difference 
DivIVA>DivB
Up to 20p 
DivIVA>DivB 
More than 20p 
not 
known
 
Total 
Success 33% 82% 62% 9% 61%
Failure 67% 17% 38% 82% 37%
not known - 1% - 9% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Dividend Difference  
End Result 
of IVA 
No 
Difference 
DivIVA>DivB
Up to 20p 
DivIVA>DivB 
More than 20p 
not 
known
 
Total 
Success 9% 57% 33% 1% 100%
Failure 31% 19% 33% 17% 100%
not known - 50% - 50% 100%
Total 17% 43% 32% 8% 100%
 
 
 
 205
Success or Failure by Difference between Dividend of IVA and Dividend of 
Bankruptcy 
 
 
 Dividend Difference  
End Result 
of IVA 
DivB>
DivI 
DivB=
DivI 
0<-
10p 
11-
20p 
21-
30p 
31-
40p 
41-
50p 
61-
70p
71-
80p 
91-
100p 
not 
known 
 
Total
Success 3 8 30 19 8 7 3 - 3 7 9 97
Failure 1 16 9 1 8 2 3 1 3 1 45
not known 1 - 1 - - - - - - - 1 3
Total 5 24 40 20 16 9 6 1 3 10 11 145
 
 
 
 Dividend Difference  
End Result 
of IVA 
DivB>
DivI 
DivB=
DivI 
0<-
10p 
11-
20p 
21-
30p 
31-
40p 
41-
50p 
61-
70p 
71-
80p 
91-
100p 
not 
known 
 
Total
Success 60% 33% 75% 95% 50% 78% 50% - 100% 70% 82% 67%
Failure 20% 67% 23% 5% 50% 22% 50% 100% - 30% 9% 31%
not known 20% - 3% - - - - - - - 9% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 
 Dividend Difference  
End Result 
of IVA 
DivB>
DivI 
DivB=
DivI 
0<-
10p 
11-
20p 
21-
30p 
31-
40p 
41-
50p 
61-
70p 
71-
80p 
91-
100p 
not 
known 
 
Total
Success 3% 8% 31% 20% 8% 7% 3% - 3% 7% 9% 100%
Failure 2% 36% 20% 2% 18% 4% 7% 2% 7% 2% 100%
not known 33% - 33% - - - - - - - 33% 100%
Total 3% 17% 28% 14% 11% 6% 4% 1% 2% 7% 8% 100%
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Contact by Concertina Order Practice 
 
                    CONCERTI      
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
CONTACT    --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    29  |    22  |    51 
                   |  56.9  |  43.1  |  35.4 
                   |  46.0  |  27.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    34  |    59  |    93 
                   |  36.6  |  63.4  |  64.6 
                   |  54.0  |  72.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      63       81      144 
             Total    43.8     56.3    100.0 
 
CONTACT // 1:Yes 2:No 
CONCERTI // 1:Yes 2:No 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          5.51742           1                  .01883 (Significant at 
         5 per cent level.) 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
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Contact by Concertina Order Practice 
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 29 22 - 51
No 34 59 - 93
Not known - - 1 1
Total 63 81 1 145
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 46% 27% - 35%
No 54% 73% - 64%
Not known - 100% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 57% 43% - 100%
No 37% 63% - 100%
Not known - - 100% 100%
Total 43% 56% 1% 100%
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IP Firm’s Size by Source (Source for Introduction to IVA) 
 
                    SOURCE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
IPSIZE     --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    12  |    42  |    54 
                   | 22.2%  | 77.8%  | 39.7% 
                   | 57.1%  | 36.5%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     9  |    73  |    82 
                   | 11.0%  | 89.0%  | 60.3% 
                   | 42.9%  | 63.5%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      21      115      136 
             Total   15.4%    84.6%   100.0% 
 
IPSIZE // 1:Big Firms (Big Six Firms & National Firms)  
                 2:Small Firms (One-Office Firms & Two-Office Firms) 
SOURCE // 1:Debtor is introduced to IVA by a family member or a friend. 
                      2:Debtor is introduced to IVA by a professional. 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          3.15408           1                  .07574 (Significant at  
        10 per cent level.) 
Number of Missing Observations:  10 
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IP Firm’s Size by Source (Source for Introduction to IVA) 
 
 Insolvency Practioners’ Firms Size  
 
Source 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Accountant 40 2 8 5 55
Solicitor 14 1 15 3 33
Yellow Pages 4 - 3 - 7
Bank 1 4 2 7
Financial Advisor 6 - - - 6
Official Receiver / Court 4 - - - 4
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State - 1 1
 
1 3
Local Advertisement - 3 - 3
Other 11 - 6 3 20
Not known 2 - 3 2 7
Total 81 5 43 16 145
 
 
 Insolvency Practioners’ Firms Size  
 
Source 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Accountant 73% 4% 15% 9% 100%
Solicitor 42% 4% 45% 9% 100%
Yellow Pages 57% - 43% - 100%
Bank 14% 57% 29% 100%
Financial Advisor 100% - - - 100%
Official Receiver / Court 100% - - - 100%
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State - 33.33% 33.33%
 
33.33% 100%
Local Advertisement - 100% - 100%
Other 55% - 30% 15% 100%
Not known 29% - 42% 29% 100%
Total 56% 3% 30% 11% 100%
 
 
 Insolvency Practioners’ Firms Size  
 
Source 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Accountant 49% 40% 19% 31% 38%
Solicitor 17% 20% 35% 19% 23%
Yellow Pages 5% - 7% - 5%
Bank - 20% 9% 13% 5%
Financial Advisor 7% - - - 4%
Official Receiver / Court 5% - - - 3%
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State - 20% 2%
 
6% 2%
Local Advertisement - - 7% - 2%
Other 14% - 14% 19% 14%
Not known 2% - 7% 13% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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IP Firm’s Size by Source (Source for Introduction to IVA) 
 
 Insolvency Practioners’ Firms Size  
Source Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Accountant 42 13 55
Solicitor 15 18 33
Yellow Pages 4 3 7
Bank 1 6 7
Financial Advisor 6 - 6
Official Receiver / Court 4 - 4
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State 1 2 3
Local Advertisement - 3 3
Other 11 9 20
Not known 2 5 7
Total 86 59 145
 
 
 
 Insolvency Practioners’ Firms Size  
Source Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Accountant 76% 24% 100%
Solicitor 45% 55% 100%
Yellow Pages 57% 43% 100%
Bank 14% 86% 100%
Financial Advisor 100% - 100%
Official Receiver / Court 100% - 100%
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State 33% 67% 100%
Local Advertisement - 100% 100%
Other 55% 45% 100%
Not known 29% 81% 100%
Total 59% 41% 100%
 
 
 
 Insolvency Practioners’ Firms Size  
Source Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Accountant 49% 22% 38%
Solicitor 17% 31% 23%
Yellow Pages 5% 5% 5%
Bank 1% 10% 5%
Financial Advisor 7% - 4%
Official Receiver / Court 5% - 3%
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State 1% 3% 2%
Local Advertisement - 5% 2%
Other 13% 15% 14%
Not known 2% 8% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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Entry Route  by  IP Firm Size 
 
                    IPSIZE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
ENTRY      --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    44  |    73  |   117 
                   |  37.6  |  62.4  |  81.3 
                   |  77.2  |  84.0  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     3  |     3  |     6 
                   |  33.3  |  66.7  |   4.2 
                   |   5.2  |   3.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             3.00  |    10  |    11  |    21 
                   |  47.6  |  52.4  |  14.6 
                   |  17.6  |  12.6  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      57       87      144 
             Total    39.6     60.4    100.0 
 
ENTRY ROUTE // 1:No prior procedure (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-b)  
                                  2:Via debtor’s petition (Insolvency Act/Sec.274)  
                                  3:After a bankruptcy order (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-a) 
IPSIZE // 1:Big Firms (Big Six Firms & National Firms)  
      2:Small Firms (One-Office firms & Two-Office Firms) 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          2.95038           2                  .22874 (Not significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
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Entry Route  by  IP Firm Size 
 
                    IPSIZE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct |                    Row 
           Col Pct |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
ENTRY      --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    47  |    76  |   123 
                   | 38.2%  | 61.8%  | 85.4% 
                   | 82.5%  | 87.4%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             3.00  |    10  |    11  |    21 
                   | 47.6%  | 52.4%  | 14.6% 
                   | 17.5%  | 12.6%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      57       87      144 
             Total    39.6%    60.1%   100.0% 
 
ENTRY ROUTE // 1:No prior procedure (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-b) & Via 
debtor’s                    
                                      petition (Insolvency Act/Sec.274)  
                                  3:After a bankruptcy order (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-a) 
IPSIZE // 1:Big Firms (Big Six Firms & National Firms)  
      2:Small Firms (One-Office firms & Two-Office Firms) 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          2.90705           1                  .08819 (Significant at  
         10 per cent level) 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
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Entry Route  by  IP Firm Size 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Entry Route to IVA 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
No prior procedure 12 32 71 2 117 
Via debtor’s petition - 3 3 - 6 
After a bankruptcy order 3 7 7 4 21 
Not known 1 - - - 1 
Total 16 42 81 6 145 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Entry Route to IVA 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
No prior procedure 75% 76% 88% 33% 81% 
Via debtor’s petition - 7% 4% - 4% 
After a bankruptcy order 19% 17% 9% 67% 14% 
Not known 6% - - - 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Entry Route to IVA 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
No prior procedure 10% 27% 61% 2% 100% 
Via debtor’s petition - 50% 50% - 100% 
After a bankruptcy order 14% 33% 33% 19% 100% 
Not known 100% - - - 100% 
Total 11% 29% 56% 4% 100% 
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Entry Route  by  IP Firm Size 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Entry Route to IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
No prior procedure 44 73 117
Via debtor’s petition 3 3 6
After a bankruptcy order 10 11 21
Not known 1 - 1
Total 58 87 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Entry Route to IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
No prior procedure 76% 84% 81%
Via debtor’s petition 5% 3% 4%
After a bankruptcy order 17% 13% 14%
Not known 2% - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Entry Route to IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
No prior procedure 38% 62% 100%
Via debtor’s petition 50% 50% 100%
After a bankruptcy order 52% 48% 100%
Not known 100% - 100%
Total 40% 60% 100%
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Entry Route  by  IP Firm Size 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Entry Route to IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
No prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 47 76 123
After a bankruptcy order 10 11 21
Not known 1 - 1
Total 58 87 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Entry Route to IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
No prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 81% 87% 85%
After a bankruptcy order 17% 13% 14%
Not known 2% - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Entry Route to IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
No prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 38% 62% 100%
After a bankruptcy order 52% 48% 100%
Not known 100% - 100%
Total 40% 60% 100%
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Success or Failure by IVA Size (Income plus Assets) 
 
                    IVASIZE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    43  |    48  |    91 
                   |  47.3  |  52.7  |  66.9 
                   |  60.6  |  73.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    28  |    17  |    45 
                   |  62.2  |  37.8  |  33.1 
                   |  39.4  |  26.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      71       65      136 
             Total    52.2     47.8    100.0 
 
SF // 1: Success 2:Failure 
IVASIZE // 1: Up to 20K (incl.20K)   2: More than 20K 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          2.70417           1                  .10009 (Not Significant / 
However,     very close to the level of significance at 10% 
level.) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  9 
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Success or Failure by IVA Size (Income plus Assets) 
 
 
 Size of IVA  
 
End Result of IVA 
up to  
20K 
more than 
20K 
not  
known 
 
Total 
Success 43 48 6 97
Failure 28 17 - 45
not known - - 3 3
Total 71 65 9 145
 
 
 Size of IVA  
 
End Result of IVA 
up to  
20K 
more than 
20K 
not  
known 
 
Total 
Success 61% 74% 67% 67%
Failure 49% 26% - 31%
not known - - 33% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Size of IVA  
 
End Result of IVA 
up to  
20K 
more than 
20K 
not  
known 
 
Total 
Success 44% 49% 7% 100%
Failure 62% 38% - 100%
not known - - 100% 100%
Total 49% 45% 6% 100%
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Success or Failure by IVA Size (Income plus Assets) 
 
 
 Size of IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
<10K 
 
10<=20K 
 
20<=50K 
 
50<=100K
 
100K+
not 
known
 
Total
Success 22 21 33 9 6 6 97 
Failure 19 9 12 4 1 - 45 
not known - 2 - - - 1 3 
Total 41 32 45 13 7 7 145 
 
 
 Size of IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
<10K 
 
10<=20K 
 
20<=50K 
 
50<=100K
 
100K+
not 
known
 
Total
Success 54% 66% 73% 69% 86% 86% 67% 
Failure 46% 28% 27% 31% 14% - 31% 
not known - 6% - - - 14% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 Size of IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
<10K 
 
10<=20K 
 
20<=50K 
 
50<=100K
 
100K+
not 
known
 
Total
Success 23% 22% 34% 9% 6% 6% 100% 
Failure 42% 20% 27% 9% 2% - 100% 
not known - 67% - - - 33% 100% 
Total 28% 22% 31% 9% 5% 5% 100% 
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Avertion by Concertina Order Practice 
 
                    CONCERTI 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
AVERTION   --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    10  |     1  |    11 
                   |  90.9  |   9.1  |   7.6 
                   |  15.9  |   1.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    53  |    80  |   133 
                   |  39.8  |  60.2  |  92.4 
                   |  84.1  |  98.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      63       81      144 
             Total    43.8     56.3    100.0 
 
AVERTION // 1:Yes 2:No 
CONCERTI // 1:Yes 2:No 
 
Chi-Square                      Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                         10.76301           1                  .00104 (Seems significant at  
            1 per cent level but see note) 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
 
Note: 1 cell includes observations less than 5 / Therefore not significant. 
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Avertion by Concertina Order Practice 
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
Avertion Yes No not known Total 
Yes 10 1 - 11
No 53 80 133
Not known - - 1 1
Total 63 81 1 145
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
Avertion Yes No not known Total 
Yes 16% 1% - 8%
No 84% 99% - 92%
Not known - - 100% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
Avertion Yes No not known Total 
Yes 91% 9% 100%
No 40% 60% 100% 100%
Not known - - - 100%
Total 43% 56% 1% 100%
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Success or Failure by Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) 
 
                    CREDVIEW 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                             Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    51  |     4  |    41  |    96 
                   |  53.1  |   4.2  |  42.7  |  68.6 
                   |  78.5  |  57.1  |  60.3  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    14  |     3  |    27  |    44 
                   |  31.8  |   6.8  |  61.4  |  31.4 
                   |  21.5  |  42.9  |  39.7  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column      65        7       68      140 
             Total    46.4      5.0     48.6    100.0 
 
SF // 1: Success 2:Failure 
CREDVIEW // 1:Agree (Supportive) 2: Disagree (Not supportive) 3: Neutral 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          5.53624           2                  .06278 (Seems significant at  
          10 per cent level but see note) 
Number of Missing Observations:  5 
 
Note: 2 cells include observations less than 5 / Therefore not significant. 
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Success or Failure by Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) 
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
Success 51 41 4 1 97
Failure 14 27 3 1 45
not known - - - 3 3
Total 65 68 7 5 145
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
Success 78% 60% 57% 20% 67%
Failure 22% 40% 43% 20% 31%
not known - - - 60% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
Success 53% 42% 4% 1% 100%
Failure 31% 60% 7% 2% 100%
not known - - - 100% 100%
Total 45% 47% 5% 3% 100%
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Success or Failure by Concessions 
 
                    CONCESSI 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     7  |    90  |    97 
                   |   7.2  |  92.8  |  68.8 
                   | 100.0  |  67.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |        |    44  |    44 
                   |        | 100.0  |  31.2 
                   |        |  32.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column       7      134      141 
             Total     5.0     95.0    100.0 
 
SF //  1:Success 2:Failure 
CONCESSI // 1: Yes 2: No 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          3.34113           1                  .06757 (Seems significant at  
          10 per cent level but see note) 
Number of Missing Observations:  4 
 
Note: 1 cell includes no observations / Therefore not significant. 
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Success or Failure by Concessions 
 
 
 Concessions  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 7 90 - 97
Failure - 44 1 45
not known - - 3 3
Total 7 134 4 145
 
 
 Concessions  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 100% 67% - 67%
Failure - 33% 25% 31%
not known - - 75% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Concessions  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 8% 92% - 100%
Failure - 98% 2% 100%
not known - - 100% 100%
Total 5% 92% 3% 100%
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Contact by Concessions 
 
                    CONCESSI 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
CONTACT    --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     4  |    46  |    50 
                   |   8.0  |  92.0  |  35.0 
                   |  57.1  |  33.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     3  |    90  |    93 
                   |   3.2  |  96.8  |  65.0 
                   |  42.9  |  66.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column       7      136      143 
             Total     4.9     95.1    100.0 
 
CONTACT //  1: Yes 2: No 
CONCESSI // 1: Yes 2: No 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          1.59203           1                  .20704 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  2 
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Contact by Concessions 
 
 
 Concessions  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 4 46 1 51
No 3 90 - 93
not known - - 1 1
Total 7 136 2 145
 
 
 Concessions  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 57% 34% 50% 35%
No 43% 66% - 64%
not known - - 50% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Concessions  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 8% 90% 2% 100%
No 3% 97% - 100%
not known - - 100% 100%
Total 5% 94% 1% 100%
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Success or Failure  by  Contact 
 
                    CONTACT 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    37  |    60  |    97 
                   |  38.1  |  61.9  |  68.8 
                   |  75.5  |  65.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    12  |    32  |    44 
                   |  27.3  |  72.7  |  31.2 
                   |  24.5  |  34.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      49       92      141 
             Total    34.8     65.2    100.0 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
CONTACT // 1:Yes 2:No 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          1.57778           1                  .20908 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  4 
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Success or Failure  by  Contact 
 
 Contact  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 37 60 - 97
Failure 12 32 1 45
not known 2 1 - 3
Total 51 93 1 145
 
 
 Contact  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 73% 65% - 67%
Failure 24% 34% 100% 31%
not known 97% 1% - 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Contact  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 38% 62% - 100%
Failure 27% 71% 2% 100%
not known 67% 33% - 100%
Total 35% 64% 1% 100%
 
 229
IP Firm’s Size by Contact 
 
                    CONTACT 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
IPSIZE     --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    34  |    23  |    57 
                   |  59.6  |  40.4  |  39.6 
                   |  66.7  |  24.7  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    17  |    70  |    87 
                   |  19.6  |  80.4  |  60.4 
                   |  33.3  |  75.3  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      51       93      144 
             Total    35.4     64.6    100.0 
 
IPSIZE // 1:Big Firms (Big Six Firms & National Firms)  
      2:Small Firms (One-Office firms & Two-Office Firms) 
CONTACT // 1:Yes 2:No  
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          1.50953           1                  .21921 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
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IP Firm’s Size by Contact 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Contact 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes 11 23 16 1 51
No 4 19 65 5 93
not known 1 - - - 1
Total 16 42 81 6 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Contact 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes 69% 55% 20% 17% 35%
No 25% 45% 80% 83% 64%
not known 6% - - - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Contact 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes 22% 45% 31% 2% 100%
No 4% 20% 70% 5% 100%
not known 100% - - - 100%
Total 11% 29% 56% 4% 100%
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IP Firm’s Size by Contact 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Contact Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 34 17 51
No 23 70 93
not known 1 - 1
Total 58 87 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Contact Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 59% 20% 35%
No 40% 80% 64%
not known 1% - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Contact Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 67% 33% 100%
No 25% 75% 100%
not known 100% - 100%
Total 40% 60% 100%
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Contact by Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) 
 
                    CREDVIEW 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                             Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00| Total 
CONTACT    --------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    29  |     4  |    17  |    50 
                   |  58.0  |   8.0  |  34.0  |  35.2 
                   |  43.9  |  57.1  |  24.6  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    37  |     3  |    52  |    92 
                   |  40.2  |   3.3  |  56.5  |  64.8 
                   |  56.1  |  42.9  |  75.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column      66        7       69      142 
             Total    46.5      4.9     48.6    100.0 
 
CONTACT // 1: Yes  2:No 
CREDVIEW // 1:Agree (Supportive) 2: Disagree (Not supportive) 3: Neutral 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          7.06139           2                  .02928 (Seems significant at  
          5 per cent level but see note) 
Number of Missing Observations:  3 
 
Note: 2 cells include observations less than 5 / Therefore not significant. 
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Contact by Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) 
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
 
Contact 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
Yes 29 17 4 1 51
No 37 52 3 1 93
not known - - - 1 1
Total 66 69 7 3 145
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
 
Contact 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
Yes 44% 25% 57% 33.3% 35%
No 56% 75% 43% 33.3% 64%
not known - - - 33.3% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
 
Contact 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
Yes 57% 33% 8% 2% 100%
No 40% 56% 3% 1% 100%
not known - - - 100% 100%
Total 46% 48% 5% 1% 100%
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Dividend of IVA by Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) 
 
                    CREDVIEW 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                             Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00| Total 
DIVIVA     --------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    44  |     6  |    53  |   103 
                   |  42.7  |   5.8  |  51.5  |  76.3 
                   |  69.8  |  85.7  |  81.5  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    19  |     1  |    12  |    32 
                   |  59.4  |   3.1  |  37.5  |  23.7 
                   |  30.2  |  14.3  |  18.5  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column      63        7       65      135 
             Total    46.7      5.2     48.1    100.0 
 
DIVIVA // 1: Less than 50p (including 50p)   2:More than 50 p 
CREDVIEW // 1:Agree (Supportive) 2: Disagree (Not supportive) 3: Neutral 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          2.78249           2                  .24876 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  10 
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Dividend of IVA by Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) 
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
Dividend  
of IVA 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
50p in £ or less 44 53 6 1 104
51p in £ or more  19 12 1 1 33
not known 3 4 - 1 8
Total 66 69 7 3 145
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
Dividend  
of IVA 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
50p in £ or less 67% 77% 86% 33.33% 72%
51p in £ or more  29% 17% 14% 33.33% 23%
not known 4% 6% - 33.33% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA  
Dividend  
of IVA 
 
supportive 
 
neutral 
not 
supportive
not 
known 
 
Total 
50p in £ or less 42% 51% 6% 1% 100%
51p in £ or more  58% 36% 3% 3% 100%
not known 38% 50% - 12% 100%
Total 46% 48% 5% 3% 100%
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Dividend of IVA by Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) 
 
 
Creditors’ Dividend of IVA 
Supportiveness to 
IVA 
No 
Div. 
0<-
10p 
11-
20p 
21-
30p
31-
40p
41-
50p
51-
60p
61-
70p
71-
80p
91-
100p
not 
known 
 
Total 
not supportive 1 2  1 1 1    1  7 
neutral 7 18 10 10 4 4 2 2 1 7 4 69 
supportive 8 10 12 6 5 3 2 1 4 12 3 66 
not known 1         1 1 3 
Total 17 30 22 17 10 8 4 3 5 21 8 145 
 
 
Creditors’ Dividend of IVA 
Supportiveness to 
IVA 
No 
Div. 
0<-
10p 
11-
20p 
21-
30p
31-
40p
41-
50p
51-
60p
61-
70p
71-
80p
91-
100p
not 
known 
 
Total 
not supportive 6% 7%  6% 10% 13% 5%  5% 
neutral 41% 60% 45% 59% 40% 50% 50% 67% 20% 33% 50% 48% 
supportive 47% 34% 54% 35% 50% 38% 50% 33% 80% 57% 38% 45% 
not known 6%   5% 13% 2% 
Total 100% 100
% 
100
% 
100
%
100
%
100
%
100
%
100
%
100
%
100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Creditors’ Dividend of IVA 
Supportiveness to 
IVA 
No 
Div. 
0<-
10p 
11-
20p 
21-
30p
31-
40p
41-
50p
51-
60p
61-
70p
71-
80p
91-
100p
not 
known 
 
Total 
not supportive 14% 29
% 
 14
%
14
%
14
%
14%  100% 
neutral 10% 26
% 
14
% 
14
%
6% 6% 3% 3% 1% 10% 6% 100% 
supportive 12% 15
% 
18
% 
9% 8% 5% 3% 1% 6% 18% 5% 100% 
not known 33%   33% 33% 100% 
Total 12% 21
% 
15
% 
12
%
7% 6% 3% 2% 3% 14% 6% 100% 
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Success or Failure by Source (Source for Introduction to IVA) 
 
                    SOURCE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    12  |    81  |    93 
                   | 12.9%  | 87.1%  | 69.9% 
                   | 60.0%  | 71.7%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     8  |    32  |    40 
                   | 20.0%  | 80.0%  | 30.1% 
                   | 40.0%  | 28.3%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      20      113      133 
             Total   15.0%    85.0%   100.0% 
 
SF // 1:Success  2:Failure 
SOURCE // 1:Debtor is introduced to IVA by a family member or a friend. 
                      2:Debtor is introduced to IVA by a professional. 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          1.10257           1                  .29370 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  13 
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Success or Failure by Source (Source for Introduction to IVA) 
 
 
Source Success Failure Not known Total 
Accountant 34 20 1 55 
Solicitor 25 7 1 33 
Yellow Pages 6 1 - 7 
Bank 3 4 - 7 
Financial Advisor 1 4 1 6 
Official Receiver / Court 3 1 - 4 
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State 
 
3 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3 
Local Advertisement 3 - - 3 
Other 13 7 - 20 
Not known 6 1 - 7 
Total 97 45 3 145 
 
 
Source Success Failure Not known Total 
Accountant 62% 36% 2% 100% 
Solicitor 76% 21% 3% 100% 
Yellow Pages 86% 14% - 100% 
Bank 43% 57% - 100% 
Financial Advisor 16.5% 67% 16.5% 100% 
Official Receiver / Court 75% 25% - 100% 
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State 
 
100% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
100% 
Local Advertisement 100% - - 100% 
Other 65% 35% - 100% 
Not known 86% 14% - 100% 
Total 67% 31% 2% 100% 
 
 
Source Success Failure Not known Total 
Accountant 35% 44% 33.33% 38% 
Solicitor 26% 16% 33.33% 23% 
Yellow Pages 6% 2% - 5% 
Bank 3% 9% - 5% 
Financial Advisor 1% 9% 33.33% 4% 
Official Receiver / Court 3% 2% - 3% 
Appointment as a trustee  
          by the Sec. of State 
 
3% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2% 
Local Advertisement 3% - - 2% 
Other 13% 16% - 14% 
Not known 6% 2% - 5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Success or Failure  by  Concertina Order Practice  
 
                    CONCERTI 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    44  |    53  |    97 
                   |  45.4  |  54.6  |  68.8 
                   |  73.3  |  65.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    16  |    28  |    44 
                   |  36.4  |  63.6  |  31.2 
                   |  26.7  |  34.6  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      60       81      141 
             Total    42.6     57.4    100.0 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
CONCERTI // 1:Yes 2:No 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          1.00235           1                  .31674 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  4 
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Success or Failure  by  Concertina Order Practice  
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 44 53 - 97
Failure 16 28 1 45
not known 3 - - 3
Total 63 81 1 145
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 70% 65% - 67%
Failure 25% 35% 100% 31%
not known 5% - - 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Concertina Order Practice  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 45% 55% - 100%
Failure 36% 62% 2% 100%
not known 100% - - 100%
Total 43% 56% 1% 100%
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Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) by Difference 
between Dividend of IVA and Dividend of Bankruptcy 
 
                    DIVDIFFE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                                      Row 
                   |   -1.00|     .00|    1.00|    2.00| Total 
CREDVIEW   --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     4  |    11  |    28  |    20  |    63 
                   |   6.3  |  17.5  |  44.4  |  31.7  |  47.7 
                   |  80.0  |  50.0  |  46.7  |  44.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |        |     1  |     1  |     5  |     7 
                   |        |  14.3  |  14.3  |  71.4  |   5.3 
                   |        |   4.5  |   1.7  |  11.1  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             3.00  |     1  |    10  |    31  |    20  |    62 
                   |   1.6  |  16.1  |  50.0  |  32.3  |  47.0 
                   |  20.0  |  45.5  |  51.7  |  44.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column       5       22       60       45      132 
             Total     3.8     16.7     45.5     34.1    100.0 
 
CREDVIEW // 1:Agree (Supportive) 2: Disagree (Not supportive) 3: Neutral 
DIVDIFFE // -1:Less than 0p(Dividend of Bankruptcy > Dividend of IVA) 0:No 
Difference (Dividend of Bankruptcy = Dividend of IVA) 1:Up to 20 (Dividend of 
IVA > Dividend of Bankruptcy Up to 20p) 2:More than 20p (Dividend of IVA > 
Dividend of Bankruptcy is more than 20p) 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          7.00626           6                  .32027 (Not significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  13 
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Creditors’ View (Creditors’ Supportiveness to IVA) by Difference between 
Dividend of IVA and Dividend of Bankruptcy 
 
 
Creditors’ Dividend Difference  
Supportiveness  
to IVA 
DivIVA< 
DivB 
No 
Difference 
DivIVA>DivB 
Up to 20p 
DivIVA>DivB 
More than 20p 
 
Total 
not supportive - 1 1 5 7 
neutral 1 10 31 20 62 
supportive 4 11 28 20 63 
Total 5 22 60 45 132 
 
 
 
Creditors’ Dividend Difference  
Supportiveness  
to IVA 
DivIVA< 
DivB 
No 
Difference 
DivIVA>DivB 
Up to 20p 
DivIVA>DivB 
More than 20p 
 
Total 
not supportive - 14% 14% 72% 100% 
neutral 2% 16% 50% 32% 100% 
supportive 6% 18% 44% 31% 100% 
Total 4% 17% 46% 34% 100% 
 
 
 
Creditors’ Dividend Difference  
Supportiveness  
to IVA 
DivIVA< 
DivB 
No 
Difference 
DivIVA>DivB 
Up to 20p 
DivIVA>DivB 
More than 20p 
 
Total 
not supportive - 5% 2% 12% 5% 
neutral 20% 45% 47% 44% 48% 
supportive 80% 50% 51% 44% 47% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 243
Success or Failure by Avertion 
 
                    AVERTION 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     9  |    88  |    97 
                   |   9.3  |  90.7  |  68.8 
                   |  81.8  |  67.7  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     2  |    42  |    44 
                   |   4.5  |  95.5  |  31.2 
                   |  18.2  |  32.3  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      11      130      141 
             Total     7.8     92.2    100.0 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
AVERTION // 1:Yes 2:No 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .94267           1                  .33159 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  4 
 
Note: 1 cell includes less than 5 observations (2 observations). 
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Success or Failure by Avertion 
 
 Avertion  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 9 88 - 97
Failure 2 42 1 45
not known - 3 - 3
Total 11 133 1 145
 
 Avertion  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 82% 66% - 67%
Failure 18% 32% 100% 31%
not known - 2% - 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 Avertion  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 9% 91% - 100%
Failure 4% 94% 2% 100%
not known - 100% - 100%
Total 8% 92% 0% 100%
 
Question: Had any creditor (i.e. bank) worked with the debtor to avert insolvency?  
If yes, how? 
 
• Debtor worked closely with Bank to maximise recoveries through the company 
and although a substantial amount was still owed after the realisation of assets, the 
bank was sympathetic and didn't blame the debtor and wish to bankrupt him. 
 
• The only creditor of the IVA is the Inland Revenue, unofficial agreements but not 
adhered to. Informal IVA approach made to Inland Revenue not accepted formal 
IVA approved. 
 
• Bank declined to appoint receiver over property. 
 
• Extended credit. 
 
• The debtor entered into a schedule of repayment with all creditors but failed to 
maintain them when he was temporarily unemployed. 
 
• The main franchiser supported the debtor. 
 
• Agreed repayment schedules with all creditors except one. This creditor petitioned 
for his bankruptcy. 
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IP Firm’s Size by Concessions 
 
                    CONCESSI 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
IPSIZE     --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     4  |    54  |    58 
                   |   6.9  |  93.1  |  40.6 
                   |  57.1  |  39.7  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     3  |    82  |    85 
                   |   3.5  |  96.5  |  59.4 
                   |  42.9  |  60.3  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column       7      136      143 
             Total     4.9     95.1    100.0 
 
IPSIZE // 1:Big Firms (Big Six Firms & National Firms)  
      2:Small Firms (One-Office firms & Two-Office Firms) 
CONCESSI // 1:Yes 2:No 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .83959           1                  .35951 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  2 
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IP Firm’s Size by Concessions 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Concessions 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes - 4 3 - 7
No 15 39 77 5 136
not known 1 1 - - 2
Total 16 44 80 5 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Concessions 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes - 9% 4% - 5%
No 94% 89% 96% 100% 94%
not known 6% 2% - - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
 
Concessions 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes - 57% 43% - 100%
No 11% 29% 57% 3% 100%
not known 50% 50% - - 100%
Total 11% 30% 55% 4% 100%
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IP Firm’s Size by Concessions 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Concessions Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 4 3 7
No 54 82 136
not known 2 - 2
Total 60 85 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Concessions Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 7% 4% 5%
No 90% 96% 94%
not known 3% - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Concessions Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 57% 43% 100%
No 40% 60% 100%
not known 100% - 100%
Total 41% 59% 100%
 
 
 248
IP Firm’s Size by Concertina Order Practice 
 
                    CONCERTI 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
IPSIZE     --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    32  |    25  |    57 
                   |  56.0  |  44.0  |  39.6 
                   |  51.0  |  31.0  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    31  |    56  |    87 
                   |  36.0  |  64.0  |  60.4 
                   |  49.0  |  69.0  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      63       81      144 
             Total    43.8     56.3    100.0 
 
IPSIZE // 1:Big Firms (Big Six Firms & National Firms)  
      2:Small Firms (One-Office firms & Two-Office Firms) 
CONCERTI // 1:Yes 2:No 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .80834           1                  .36861 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
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IP Firm’s Size by Concertina Order Practice 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Concertina 
Order Practice 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes 11 21 28 3 63
No 4 21 53 3 81
not known 1 - - - 1
Total 16 42 81 6 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Concertina 
Order Practice 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes 69% 50% 35% 50% 43%
No 25% 50% 65% 50% 56%
not known 6% - - - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
Concertina 
Order Practice 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Yes 17% 33% 44% 5% 100%
No 5% 26% 65% 4% 100%
not known 100% - - - 100%
Total 11% 29% 56% 4% 100%
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IP Firm’s Size by Concertina Order Practice 
 
 
Concertina IP Firm’s Size  
Order Practice Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 32 25 57
No 31 56 87
not known 1 - -
Total 64 81 145
 
 
Concertina IP Firm’s Size  
Order Practice Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 50% 31% 39%
No 48% 69% 61%
not known 2% - -
Total 100% 100% 100%
 
 
Concertina IP Firm’s Size  
Order Practice Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Yes 56% 44% 100%
No 36% 64% 100%
not known 100% - 100%
Total 44% 56% 100%
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Contact by Modifications to IVA Proposal 
 
                    MODIFICA 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
CONTACT    --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    37  |    10  |    47 
                   |  78.7  |  21.3  |  33.8 
                   |  35.9  |  27.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    66  |    26  |    92 
                   |  71.7  |  28.3  |  66.2 
                   |  64.1  |  72.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column     103       36      139 
             Total    74.1     25.9    100.0 
 
CONTACT //  1: Yes 2: No 
MODIFICA // 1: Yes 2: No 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .79068           1                  .37389 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  6 
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Contact by Modifications to IVA Proposal 
 
 
 Modifications to IVA Proposal  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 37 66 - 103
No 10 26 - 36
not known 4 1 1 6
Total 51 93 1 145
 
 
 Modifications to IVA Proposal  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 73% 71% - 71%
No 20% 28% - 25%
not known 7% 1% 100% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Modifications to IVA Proposal  
Contact Yes No not known Total 
Yes 36% 54% - 100%
No 28% 74% - 100%
not known 70%% 15% 15% 100%
Total 35% 64% 1% 100%
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Success or Failure  by  Entry Route 
 
                    ENTRY 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                             Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    78  |     6  |    13  |    97 
                   |  80.4  |   6.2  |  13.4  |  68.8 
                   |  68.4  | 100.0  |  61.9  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    36  |        |     8  |    44 
                   |  81.8  |        |  18.2  |  31.2 
                   |  31.6  |        |  38.1  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column     114        6       21      141 
             Total    80.9      4.3     14.9    100.0 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
ENTRY ROUTE // 1:No prior procedure (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-b)  
                                  2:Via debtor’s petition (Insolvency Act/Sec.274)  
                                  3:After a bankruptcy order (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-a) 
 
Chi-Square                  Value              DF               Significance 
Pearson                          3.19337           2                  .20257 (Not significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  4 
 
Note: 1 cell includes NO observations (0 observations). 
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Success or Failure  by  Entry Route 
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
End Result 
of IVA 
(1) 
no prior 
procedure 
(2) 
via debtor’s 
petition 
(3)  
after a bank-
ruptcy order
 
not 
known 
 
 
Total 
Success 78 6 13 - 97
Failure 36 - 8 1 45
not known 3 - - - 3
Total 117 6 21 1 145
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
End Result 
of IVA 
(1) 
no prior 
procedure 
(2) 
via debtor’s 
petition 
(3)  
after a bank-
ruptcy order
 
not 
known 
 
 
Total 
Success 67% 100% 62% - 67%
Failure 31% - 38% 100% 31%
not known 2% - - - 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
End Result 
of IVA 
(1) 
no prior 
procedure 
(2) 
via debtor’s 
petition 
(3)  
after a bank-
ruptcy order
 
not 
known 
 
 
Total 
Success 80% 7% 13% - 100%
Failure 80% - 18% 2% 100%
not known 100% - - - 100%
Total 81% 4% 14% 1% 100%
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Success or Failure  by  Entry Route 
 
                    ENTRY 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct |                    Row 
           Col Pct |    1.00|    3.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    84  |    13  |    97 
                   | 86.6%  | 13.4%  | 68.8% 
                   | 70.0%  | 61.9%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    36  |     8  |    44 
                   | 81.8%  | 18.2%  | 31.2% 
                   | 30.0%  | 38.1%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column     120       21      141 
             Total   85.1%    14.9%   100.0% 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
ENTRY ROUTE // 1:No prior procedure (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-b) & Via 
debtor’s                    
                                      petition (Insolvency Act/Sec.274)  
                                  3:After a bankruptcy order (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-a) 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .54558           1                  .46013 (Not significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  4 
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Success or Failure  by  Entry Route 
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
End Result 
of IVA 
(1 or 2) 
no prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 
(3)  
after a  
bankruptcy order
 
not  
known
 
 
Total 
Success 84 13 - 97
Failure 36 8 1 45
not known 3 - - 3
Total 123 21 1 145
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
End Result 
of IVA 
(1 or 2) 
no prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 
(3)  
after a  
bankruptcy order
 
not  
known
 
 
Total 
Success 87% 13% - 100%
Failure 80% 18% 2% 100%
not known 100% - - 100%
Total 85% 14% 1% 100%
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
End Result 
of IVA 
(1 or 2) 
no prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 
(3)  
after a  
bankruptcy order
 
not  
known
 
 
Total 
Success 68% 62% - 67%
Failure 29% 38% 100% 31%
not known 3% - - 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Success or Failure by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ Meeting 
 
                    ATTENDAN 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                                      Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00|    4.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     9  |    23  |    18  |    35  |    85 
                   |  10.6  |  27.1  |  21.2  |  41.2  |  66.4 
                   |  64.3  |  62.2  |  66.7  |  70.0  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     5  |    14  |     9  |    15  |    43 
                   |  11.6  |  32.6  |  20.9  |  34.9  |  33.6 
                   |  35.7  |  37.8  |  33.3  |  30.0  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column      14       37       27       50      128 
             Total    10.9     28.9     21.1     39.1    100.0 
 
SF //  1:Success 2:Failure 
ATTENDANCE // 1: 0-25% 2: 26-50% 3: 51-75% 4: 76-100% 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .61725           3                  .89247 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  17 
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Success or Failure by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ Meeting 
 
                    ATTENDAN 
            Count  | 
           Exp Val | 
           Row Pct |                    Row 
           Col Pct |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    32  |    53  |    85 
                   |  33.9  |  51.1  | 66.4% 
                   | 37.6%  | 62.4%  | 
                   | 62.7%  | 68.8%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    19  |    24  |    43 
                   |  17.1  |  25.9  | 33.6% 
                   | 44.2%  | 55.8%  | 
                   | 37.3%  | 31.2%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      51       77      128 
             Total   39.8%    60.2%   100.0% 
 
SF //  1:Success 2:Failure 
ATTENDANCE // 1: 0-50% 2: 51-100% 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .50940           1                  .47540 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  17 
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Success or Falure by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ Meeting 
 
 
End Result Attendance to Meeting  
of IVA 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% not known Total 
Success 9 23 18 35 12 97 
Failure 5 14 9 15 2 45 
not known - 2 1 - - 3 
Total 14 39 28 50 14 145 
 
 
End Result Attendance to Meeting  
of IVA 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% not known Total 
Success 64% 59% 64% 70% 86% 67% 
Failure 36% 36% 32% 30% 14% 31% 
not known - 5% 4% - - 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
End Result Attendance to Meeting  
of IVA 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% not known Total 
Success 9% 24% 19% 36% 12% 100% 
Failure 11% 31% 20% 33% 4% 100% 
not known  67% 33% 100% 
Total 10% 27% 19% 34% 10% 100% 
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Success or Falure by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ Meeting 
 
 
 Attendance to Meeting  
End Result of IVA 0-50% 51-100% not known Total 
Success 32 53 12 97 
Failure 19 24 2 45 
not known 2 1 - 3 
Total 53 78 14 145 
 
 
 Attendance to Meeting  
End Result of IVA 0-50% 51-100% not known Total 
Success 60% 68% 86% 67% 
Failure 36% 31% 14% 31% 
not known 4% 1% - 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 Attendance to Meeting  
End Result of IVA 0-50% 51-100% not known Total 
Success 33% 55% 12% 100% 
Failure 43% 53% 4% 100% 
not known 67% 33% 100% 
Total 36% 54% 10% 100% 
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Success or Failure by Modifications to IVA Proposal 
 
                    MODIFICA 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    69  |    25  |    94 
                   |  73.4  |  26.6  |  68.6 
                   |  67.0  |  73.5  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    34  |     9  |    43 
                   |  79.1  |  20.9  |  31.4 
                   |  33.0  |  26.5  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column     103       34      137 
             Total    75.2     24.8    100.0 
 
SF //  1:Success 2:Failure 
MODIFICA // 1: Yes 2: No 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .50755           1                  .47620 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  8 
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Success or Failure by Modifications to IVA Proposal 
 
 
 Modifications to IVA Proposal  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 69 25 3 97
Failure 34 9 2 45
not known - - 3 3
Total 103 34 8 145
 
 
 Modifications to IVA Proposal  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 67% 74% 38% 67%
Failure 33% 26% 24% 31%
not known - - 38% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Modifications to IVA Proposal  
End Result of IVA Yes No not known Total 
Success 71% 26% 3% 100%
Failure 76% 20% 4% 100%
not known - - 100% 100%
Total 71% 23% 6% 100%
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Success or Failure by Sex (Sex of Debtor) 
 
                    SEX 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    79  |    15  |    94 
                   | 84.0%  | 16.0%  | 67.6% 
                   | 68.7%  | 62.5%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    36  |     9  |    45 
                   | 80.0%  | 20.0%  | 32.4% 
                   | 31.3%  | 37.5%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column     115       24      139 
             Total   82.7%    17.3%   100.0% 
 
SF // 1:Success  2:Failure 
SEX // 1:Male  2:Female 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .34814           1                  .55517 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  6 
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Success or Failure by Sex (Sex of Debtor) 
 
 
 Sex of Debtor  
End Result of IVA Male Female Total 
Success 79 15 94
Failure 36 9 45
Total 115 24 139
 
 
 Sex of Debtor  
End Result of IVA Male Female Total 
Success 84% 16% 100%
Failure 80% 20% 100%
Total 83% 17% 100%
 
 
 Sex of Debtor  
End Result of IVA Male Female Total 
Success 69% 63% 68%
Failure 31% 37% 32%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) by Duration of IVA 
 
                    DURATION 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
DEBTVIEW   --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    36  |    27  |    63 
                   |  57.1  |  42.9  |  47.7 
                   |  52.2  |  42.9  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    14  |    16  |    30 
                   |  46.7  |  53.3  |  22.7 
                   |  20.3  |  25.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             3.00  |    19  |    20  |    39 
                   |  48.7  |  51.3  |  29.5 
                   |  27.5  |  31.7  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      69       63      132 
             Total    52.3     47.7    100.0 
 
DEBTVIEW // 1:Agree (Cooperative) 2: Disagree (Not cooperative) 3: Neutral 
DURATION // 1: Up to 3 years (including 3 years)  2: More than 3 years 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          1.17439           2                  .55588 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  13 
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Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) by Duration of IVA 
 
 
Debtor’s Duration of IVA  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
up to  
3 years 
more than 
3 years 
not  
known 
 
Total 
not cooperative 14 16 1 31
neutral 19 20 8 47
cooperative 36 27 1 64
not known - 1 2 3
Total 69 64 12 145
 
 
Debtor’s Duration of IVA  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
up to  
3 years 
more than 
3 years 
not  
known 
 
Total 
not cooperative 45% 52% 3% 100%
neutral 40% 43% 17% 100%
cooperative 56% 42% 2% 100%
not known - 33% 67% 100%
Total 48% 44% 8% 100%
 
 
Debtor’s Duration of IVA  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
up to  
3 years 
more than 
3 years 
not  
known 
 
Total 
not cooperative 20% 25% 8% 21%
neutral 28% 31% 67% 32%
cooperative 52% 42% 8% 44%
not known - 2% 17% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) by Duration of IVA 
 
 
Debtor’s Duration of IVA  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
0-12 
months 
13-24 
months 
25-36 
months
37-48 
months
49-60 
months
60-  
months
not 
known
 
Total 
not cooperative 1 5 8 2 11 3 1 31 
neutral 4 7 8 7 11 2 8 47 
cooperative 10 7 19 13 11 3 1 64 
not known - - - - 1 - 2 3 
Total 15 19 35 22 34 8 12 145 
 
 
 
Debtor’s Duration of IVA  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
0-12 
months 
13-24 
months 
25-36 
months
37-48 
months
49-60 
months
60-  
months
not 
known
 
Total 
not cooperative 3% 16% 26% 6% 35% 10% 3% 100% 
neutral 9% 15% 17% 15% 23% 4% 17% 100% 
cooperative 17% 11% 30% 20% 17% 5% 2% 100% 
not known - - - - 33% - 67% 100% 
Total 10% 13% 24% 15% 23% 6% 8% 100% 
 
 
 
Debtor’s Duration of IVA  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
0-12 
months 
13-24 
months 
25-36 
months
37-48 
months
49-60 
months
60-  
months
not 
known
 
Total 
not cooperative 7% 26% 23% 9% 32% 38% 8% 21% 
neutral 27% 37% 23% 32% 32% 24% 67% 32% 
cooperative 66% 37% 54% 59% 32% 38% 8% 44% 
not known - - - - 4% - 17% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Concertina Order Practice by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ 
Meeting 
 
                    ATTENDAN 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                                      Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00|    4.00| Total 
CONCERTI   --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     3  |    19  |    11  |    25  |    58 
                   |   5.2  |  32.8  |  19.0  |  43.1  |  44.3 
                   |  21.4  |  48.7  |  39.3  |  50.0  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    11  |    20  |    17  |    25  |    73 
                   |  15.1  |  27.4  |  23.3  |  34.2  |  55.7 
                   |  78.6  |  51.3  |  60.7  |  50.0  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column      14       39       28       50      131 
             Total    10.7     29.8     21.4     38.2    100.0 
 
CONCERTI //  1:Yes 2:No 
ATTENDANCE // 1: 0-25% 2: 26-50% 3: 51-75% 4: 76-100% 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          4.22056           3                  .23861 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  14 
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Concertina Order Practice by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ Meeting 
                     ATTENDAN 
            Count  | 
           Exp Val | 
           Row Pct |                    Row 
           Col Pct |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
CONCERTI   --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    22  |    36  |    58 
                   |  23.5  |  34.5  | 44.3% 
                   | 37.9%  | 62.1%  | 
                   | 41.5%  | 46.2%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    31  |    42  |    73 
                   |  29.5  |  43.5  | 55.7% 
                   | 42.5%  | 57.5%  | 
                   | 58.5%  | 53.8%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      53       78      131 
             Total   40.5%    59.5%   100.0% 
 
CONCERTI //  1:Yes 2:No 
ATTENDANCE // 1: 0-50% 2: 51%-100% 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .27590           1                  .59940 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  14 
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Concertina Order Practice by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ 
Meeting 
 
 
Concertina Attendance to Meeting  
Order Prac. 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% not known Total 
Yes 3 19 11 25 5 63 
No 11 20 17 25 8 81 
not known - - - - 1 1 
Total 14 39 28 50 14 145 
 
 
Concertina Attendance to Meeting  
Order Prac. 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% not known Total 
Yes 21% 49% 39% 50% 36% 43% 
No 79% 51% 61% 50% 57% 56% 
not known - - - - 7% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Concertina Attendance to Meeting  
Order Prac. 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% not known Total 
Yes 5% 30% 17% 40% 8% 100% 
No 14% 25% 21% 31% 10% 100% 
not known - - - - 100% 100% 
Total 10% 27% 19% 34% 10% 100% 
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Concertina Order Practice by Creditors’ Attendance to Creditors’ Meeting 
 
 
Concertina Attendance to Meeting  
Order Practice 0-50% 51-100% not known Total 
Yes 22 36 5 63 
No 31 42 8 81 
not known - - 1 1 
Total 53 78 14 145 
 
 
Concertina Attendance to Meeting  
Order Practice 0-50% 51-100% not known Total 
Yes 42% 46% 36% 43% 
No 58% 54% 57% 56% 
not known - - 7% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Concertina Attendance to Meeting  
Order Practice 0-50% 51-100% not known Total 
Yes 35% 57% 8% 100% 
No 38% 52% 10% 100% 
not known - - 100% 100% 
Total 37% 53% 10% 100% 
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Avertion by Entry Route 
 
                    ENTRY 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                             Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00|    3.00| Total 
AVERTION   --------+--------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     7  |     2  |     2  |    11 
                   |  63.6  |  18.2  |  18.2  |   7.6 
                   |   6.0  |  33.3  |   9.5  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |   110  |     4  |    19  |   133 
                   |  82.7  |   3.0  |  14.3  |  92.4 
                   |  94.0  |  66.7  |  90.5  | 
                   +--------+--------+--------+ 
            Column     117        6       21      144 
             Total    81.3      4.2     14.6    100.0 
 
AVERTION // 1:Yes 2:No 
ENTRY ROUTE // 1:No prior procedure (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-b)  
           2 Via debtor’s petition (Insolvency Act/Sec.274)  
                                  3:After a bankruptcy order (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-a) 
 
Chi-Square                     Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          6.17500           2                  .04562 (Seems significant at  
            5 per cent level but see note) 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
 
Note: 3 cells include observations less than 5 / Therefore not significant. 
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Avertion by Entry Route 
 
                    ENTRY 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct |                    Row 
           Col Pct |    1.00|    3.00| Total 
AVERTION   --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     9  |     2  |    11 
                   | 81.8%  | 18.2%  |  7.6% 
                   |  7.3%  |  9.5%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |   114  |    19  |   133 
                   | 85.7%  | 14.3%  | 92.4% 
                   | 92.7%  | 90.5%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column     123       21      144 
             Total   85.4%    14.6%   100.0% 
 
AVERTION // 1:Yes 2:No 
ENTRY ROUTE // 1:No prior procedure (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-b) & Via 
debtor’s                    
                                      petition (Insolvency Act/Sec.274)  
                                  3:After a bankruptcy order (Insolvency Act/Sec.253-3-a) 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .12381           1                  .72494 (Not significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  1 
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Avertion by Entry Route 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
 
Avertion 
(1) 
no prior 
procedure 
(2) 
via debtor’s 
petition 
(3)  
after a bank-
ruptcy order
 
not 
known 
 
 
Total 
Yes 7 2 2 - 11
No 110 4 19 - 133
not known - - - 1 1
Total 117 6 21 1 145
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
 
Avertion 
(1) 
no prior 
procedure 
(2) 
via debtor’s 
petition 
(3)  
after a bank-
ruptcy order
 
not 
known 
 
 
Total 
Yes 6% 33% 10% - 7%
No 94% 67% 90% 92%
not known - - - 100% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
 
Avertion 
(1) 
no prior 
procedure 
(2) 
via debtor’s 
petition 
(3)  
after a bank-
ruptcy order
 
not 
known 
 
 
Total 
Yes 64% 18% 18% - 100%
No 83% 3% 14% - 100%
not known - - - 100% 100%
Total 81% 4% 14% 1% 100%
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Avertion by Entry Route 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
 
Avertion 
(1 or 2) 
no prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 
(3)  
after a  
bankruptcy order
 
not  
known
 
 
Total 
Yes 9 2 - 11
No 114 19 - 133
not known - - 1 1
Total 123 21 1 145
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
 
Avertion 
(1 or 2) 
no prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 
(3)  
after a  
bankruptcy order
 
not  
known
 
 
Total 
Yes 7% 10% - 7%
No 93% 90% 92%
not known - - 100% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Entry Route to IVA  
 
 
Avertion 
(1 or 2) 
no prior procedure, or  
via debtor’s petition 
(3)  
after a  
bankruptcy order
 
not  
known
 
 
Total 
Yes 82% 8% - 100%
No 86% 14% - 100%
not known - - 100% 100%
Total 85% 14% 1% 100%
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Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) by Concessions 
 
                    CONCESSI 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
DEBTVIEW   --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |     3  |    61  |    64 
                   |   4.7  |  95.3  |  45.1 
                   |  42.9  |  45.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |     1  |    30  |    31 
                   |   3.2  |  96.8  |  21.8 
                   |  14.3  |  22.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             3.00  |     3  |    44  |    47 
                   |   6.4  |  93.6  |  33.1 
                   |  42.9  |  32.6  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column       7      135      142 
             Total     4.9     95.1    100.0 
 
DEBTVIEW // 1:Agree (Cooperative) 2: Disagree (Not cooperative) 3: Neutral 
CONCESSI // 1:Yes  2:No 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .41186           2                  .81389 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  3 
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Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) by Concessions 
 
 
Debtor’s Concessions  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
 
Yes 
 
No 
not  
known 
 
Total 
not cooperative 1 30 - 31
neutral 3 44 - 47
cooperative 3 61 - 64
not known - 1 2 3
Total 7 136 2 145
 
 
Debtor’s Concessions  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
 
Yes 
 
No 
not  
known 
 
Total 
not cooperative 3% 97% - 100%
neutral 6% 94% - 100%
cooperative 5% 95% - 100%
not known - 33% 67% 100%
Total 5% 94% 1% 100%
 
 
Debtor’s Concessions  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
 
Yes 
 
No 
not  
known 
 
Total 
not cooperative 14% 22% - 21%
neutral 43% 32% - 32%
cooperative 43% 45% - 44%
not known - 1% 100% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) by Sex (Sex of Debtor) 
 
                    SEX 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
DEBTVIEW   --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    53  |     9  |    62 
                   | 85.5%  | 14.5%  | 44.6% 
                   | 46.1%  | 37.5%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    27  |     4  |    31 
                   | 87.1%  | 12.9%  | 22.3% 
                   | 23.5%  | 16.7%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             3.00  |    35  |    11  |    46 
                   | 76.1%  | 23.9%  | 33.1% 
                   | 30.4%  | 45.8%  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column     115       24      139 
             Total   82.7%    17.3%   100.0% 
 
DEBTVIEW // 1:Agree (Cooperative) 2: Disagree (Not Cooperative) 3: Neutral 
SEX // 1:Male  2:Female 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                          2.16403           2                  .33891 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  6 
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Debtor’s View (Debtor’s Cooperativeness) by Sex (Sex of Debtor) 
 
 
Debtor’s Sex of Debtor  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Total 
not cooperative 27 4 31
neutral 35 11 46
cooperative 53 9 62
Total 115 24 139
 
 
Debtor’s Sex of Debtor  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Total 
not cooperative 87% 13% 100%
neutral 76% 24% 100%
cooperative 86% 14% 100%
Total 83% 17% 100%
 
 
Debtor’s Sex of Debtor  
Cooperativeness  
to IVA 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Total 
not cooperative 23% 17% 22%
neutral 31% 46% 33%
cooperative 46% 37% 45%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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Success of Failure by Duration of IVA 
 
                    DURATION 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    47  |    43  |    90 
                   |  52.2  |  47.8  |  68.7 
                   |  68.1  |  69.4  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    22  |    19  |    41 
                   |  53.7  |  46.3  |  31.3 
                   |  31.9  |  30.6  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      69       62      131 
             Total    52.7     47.3    100.0 
 
SF // 1: Success 2:Failure 
DURATION // 1: Up to 3 years (incl.3 years)   2: More than 3 years 
 
Chi-Square                  Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .02331           1                  .87865 (Not Significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  14 
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Success of Failure by Duration of IVA 
 
 
 Duration of IVA  
 
End Result of IVA 
up to  
3 years 
more than 
3 years 
not  
known 
 
Total 
Success 47 43 7 97
Failure 22 19 4 45
not known - - 3 3
Total 69 62 14 145
 
 
 Duration of IVA  
 
End Result of IVA 
up to  
3 years 
more than 
3 years 
not  
known 
 
Total 
Success 68% 69% 50% 67%
Failure 32% 31% 29% 31%
not known - - 21% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 Duration of IVA  
 
End Result of IVA 
up to  
3 years 
more than 
3 years 
not  
known 
 
Total 
Success 48% 44% 8% 97
Failure 49% 42% 9% 100%
not known - - 100% 100%
Total 48% 43% 9% 100%
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Success of Failure by Duration of IVA 
 
 
 Duration of IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
0-12 
months
13-24 
months 
25-36 
months
37-48 
months
49-60 
months
60- 
months
not 
known
 
Total
Success 13 12 22 17 21 5 7 97 
Failure 2 7 13 3 13 3 4 45 
not known - - - 2 - - 1 3 
Total 15 19 35 22 34 8 12 145 
 
 
 Duration of IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
0-12 
months
13-24 
months 
25-36 
months
37-48 
months
49-60 
months
60- 
months
not 
known
 
Total
Success 87% 63% 63% 77% 62% 63% 58% 67% 
Failure 13% 37% 37% 14% 38% 38% 33% 31% 
not known - - - 9% - - 8% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 Duration of IVA  
End Result 
of IVA 
0-12 
months
13-24 
months 
25-36 
months
37-48 
months
49-60 
months
61- 
months
not 
known
 
Total
Success 13% 12% 23% 18% 22% 5% 7% 100% 
Failure 4% 16% 29% 7% 29% 7% 9% 100% 
not known - - - 67% - - 33% 100% 
Total 10% 13% 24% 15% 23% 6% 8% 100% 
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Success or Failure  by  IP Firm’s Size 
 
                    IPSIZE 
            Count  | 
           Row Pct | 
           Col Pct |                    Row 
                   |    1.00|    2.00| Total 
SF         --------+--------+--------+ 
             1.00  |    39  |    58  |    97 
                   |  40.2  |  59.8  |  68.3 
                   |  68.4  |  68.2  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
             2.00  |    18  |    27  |    45 
                   |  40.0  |  60.0  |  31.7 
                   |  31.6  |  31.8  | 
                   +--------+--------+ 
            Column      57       85      142 
             Total    40.1     59.9    100.0 
 
SF // 1:Success 2:Failure  
IPSIZE // 1:Big Firms (Big Six Firms & National Firms)  
      2:Small Firms (One-Office firms & Two-Office Firms) 
 
Chi-Square                    Value           DF               Significance 
Pearson                           .00054           1                  .98139 (Not significant) 
 
Number of Missing Observations:  3 
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Success or Failure  by  IP Firm’s Size 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
End Result 
of IVA 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Success 8 31 55 3 97
Failure 8 10 24 3 45
not known - 1 2 - 3
Total 16 42 81 6 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
End Result 
of IVA 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Success 50% 74% 68% 50% 67%
Failure 50% 24% 30% 50% 31%
not known - 2% 2% - 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
End Result 
of IVA 
Big Six 
Firms 
National 
Firms 
One-Office 
Firms 
Two-Office 
Firms 
 
Total 
Success 8% 32% 57% 3% 100%
Failure 18% 22% 53% 7% 100%
not known - 33% 67% - 100%
Total 11% 29% 56% 4% 100%
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Success or Failure  by  IP Firm’s Size 
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
End Result of IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Success 39 58 97
Failure 18 27 45
not known 1 2 3
Total 58 87 145
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
End Result of IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Success 67% 67% 67%
Failure 31% 31% 31%
not known 2% 2% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 IP Firm’s Size  
End Result of IVA Big Firms Small Firms Total 
Success 40% 60% 100%
Failure 40% 60% 100%
not known 33% 67% 100%
Total 40% 60% 100%
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Interview with:  Mr P… G….., Coopers & Lybrand, 
Charnwood Court, New Walk, Leicester, LE11 6TE 
and 
Mr Emin Akcaoglu, Banking Centre, Loughborough University 
 
27 May 1998 
 
EA We’ve realised that IVAs are more successful or success if more likely, if the debtor is 
co-operative.  Although there are some cases where the debtor is not co-operative the 
result is a success.  However, as I said before the tendency is the opposite, if they’re 
co-operative the likelihood of success is higher.  Can you comment on this?  Or, if I ask 
you why they can be non-co-operative - what kind of reasons can you give me for this? 
PG The experience that we had of failed IVAs, I would say is not necessarily due to non-
co-operation - it’s usually due to business issues, in other words, the business just has 
not performed as they expected it to, or their income has dropped.  I can only really 
think of one particular IVA where the debtor is, what I would class as, non-co-
operative, and with that one we really - if you like - had our concerns that that person 
may be non-co-operative at the start, we made sure that the arrangement itself provided 
all the protections that we could build into it, to ensure that that did not expose the 
creditors.  In other words, making sure that there was a charge over the property that 
was involved and effectively making sure that most of the assets that she was 
promising to put into the arrangement were put in pretty much in advance.  So, the non-
co-operation didn’t have a huge bearing on the success of the IVA itself.  But I have to 
say, in my experience, that non-co-operation hasn’t been the main problem.  If there 
has been non-co-operation it has followed, or has been as a result of failure to reach the 
result that they were expecting. 
EA Some of the IPs told me that - in indirect cases - they agreed that the result that they 
have got - and they said that one of the reasons can be the priorities of debtors before 
the start of an IVA - do you think that is logical - for example, they say that initially 
before accepting an IVA route they are ready to accept anything about, let’s say, the 
payment procedure - they say that I can pay £500 per month, more than that I’m ready 
to do anything for that, but when the IVA starts, after that point in time, they think that 
their priorities are different. 
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PG Yes, there’s no doubt that the relationship between the nominee and the debtor is 
different from the relationship between the supervisor and the debtor, simply because 
the relationship before the IVA is more one-off, the debtor requiring help.  Whereas 
afterwards, the debtor is, if you like, being requested to perform their obligations.  We 
haven’t had a major dispute with a debtor after the IVA - the only one I can think of 
was relating to something which was supposedly said before the IVA but in fact wasn’t 
a problem and we have the documentation to prove that it wasn’t ?brought?.  No, I 
can’t think of, although the relationship is different, I can’t think of any specific ones 
where there became such a breakdown in the relationship, or they wouldn’t co-operate 
with what we were asking them to do that it caused a real problem.  I think that it’s a 
question of making sure that balancing the costs of the Review process through the 
IVA with making sure that you’ve retained a decent relationship with the debtor so that 
they will adhere to your reasonable requests to increase the contribution.  I think that if 
you only do it by a paper process you’re only going to get one answer which is I can’t 
afford to pay any more. 
EA If we talk about the creditors meeting, do you think that those meetings are really 
important in terms of the result of an IVA?  Which kind of relationship are there that 
we can expect - are there many who violate agreements between the debtor and every 
single individual creditor?  Or is there ???? regular agreement between the debtor and 
the creditors altogether? 
PG Its 90%, 99% is multi-lateral agreements.  There are very few occasions where there is 
an agreement different with one particular creditor, if it is its purely for trading reasons, 
that that particular creditor is essential.  The law stipulates that you’ve got to make sure 
any such arrangement like that is transparent to all the creditors, so that everybody 
knows about it.  So everybody gets the chance, if you like, to approve or disapprove of 
one particular creditor being treated differently from the others.  We’re usually able to 
persuade the debtor that it’s not necessary to treat any creditors differently.  In the odd 
case they’ll want to, but it’s very rarely that one creditor is different from the others, as 
opposed to a particular class of creditors. 
EA What about the attituide of the Inland Revenue or Customs - these kinds of 
governmental organisations - I get the impression that they just dictate a settled 
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modification at the meeting to the debtor.  Can we say that ... 
PG Sorry, I’ve perhaps misunderstood what you’re driving at there.  Are you talking about 
situations where one creditor puts forward a shopping list of modifications about a 
particular ... 
EA Yes.  Take it or leave it approach. 
PG Yes, even with the Inland Revenue, they have this shopping list that they say, they 
seem to have become a little bit more helpful, because in recent letters they’ve said on 
the face of the letter, whilst they want all these modifications if they cause a problem 
and my vote would effectively reject the arrangement then I’ve no problem with you 
adjourning the meeting and talking to me about it.  So they have raised the shutters a 
little bit to that extent.  It is quite frustrating though when Customs and the Revenue 
put forward this long list of modifications because some of them don’t clearly apply to 
the situation that you’re in and there’s the odd one that totally changes the whole 
structure of the arrangement. 
EA Do you that that those modifications are really important and vital to the result of the 
IVA? 
PG No, because quite a few of them are designed purely to ensure that the Customs or the 
Revenue is properly treated in the future which may be a good indicator of whether the 
debtors business is performing properly in the future, but it’s very much weighted in 
favour of that particular creditor.  You could almost argue that putting those 
modifications in might be unfairly prejudicial to other creditors.  Why should an IVA 
fail just because a VAT return is late.  I personally don’t see that as any particularly 
valid excuse to fail an IVA, because if you look at it outside of bankruptcy, just 
because a return is late, outside a PA’s role, just because a return is late the Revenue or 
Customs wouldn’t have any authority to bankrupt a debtor solely on that basis.  ???? 
chasing their debt. 
EA If we classify modifications, let’s say, under three major points like contingency 
modifications, modifications like windfall or gains or a second group non-contingency 
or non-contingency modifications, modifications about property, modifications about 
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future income stream, and if you say that the third group can be administrative 
modifications.  Which group or modifications can be really important for the result 
rather than the others? 
PG When you say “important” 
EA If it would be a factor on the result of the IVA. 
PG Well the contingency modifications aren’t really a problem because we tend to have 
built them into most of our proposals anyway, so there’s already a windfall clause 
there.  So, I would tend to say that that would not be a problem for an IVA - they’re 
already there. 
Again, skipping on to the administrative ones, that’s rarely a problem because most of 
what you use there, modifications come up with, again are either already in the 
proposals that we drafted or in the standard conditions that we have, or they’re just 
clarifying something.  We had one that said we’d estimated a certain fee level, and one 
of the modifications was “the supervisor shall have no more than that over the term of 
the IVA”.  And we just said, do you mind if we say we’ll have no more than that, 
unless creditors approve it, if the majority of creditors approve it, and they said no.  We 
don’t have a problem with those type of modifications.  Generally administrative ones, 
no, they’re pretty easy to deal with. 
The non-contingent ones is probably the bigger problem because what you have is, the 
way we try to do the IVAs is to try to get the debtor to put his best offer forward right 
at the start, and try not to have the creditors meeting as some sort of a bargaining 
process or negotiating place.  So, if you like, we’ve tried as best we can to go through 
that process of making sure the debtor is giving as much as they can decently afford, 
without them not wanting to get up for work in the morning!  Sometimes, when we get 
to the meeting and some of the tougher creditors shall we say, are after a bit more here 
and a bit more there, it’s quite a prospective process, because we’ve already have been 
through that to a large extent.  There are occasions when it’s right, because perhaps the 
debtor has not been as forthcoming with us as they will be in the heat of the creditors 
meeting.  But, generally they’re the one’s that cause the problems, the non-contingent 
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ones, where the creditor is trying to get a bit more. 
EA If we go back to the creditors meeting again.  From the viewpoint of the creditors, to 
use their votes by person there, or by using proxy - can these differences effect the 
result of the meeting.  In terms of modifications essentially. 
PG Yes it can.  I’ll say that where you’ve got a professional there.  A professional IP 
representing a creditor - I’m thinking more in terms of me representing creditors at 
other meetings, what I would try to do is make the voluntary arrangement more certain, 
and less open to variation due to circumstances, like the Supervisor’s fees going 
through the roof, or there being no real default clause that said, if they’re three months 
behind on their contributions then either there’s another creditor’s meeting to discuss it 
or it’s a failure.  If there’s no actual trigger there it’s a far too loose an IVA, so from 
that point of view, it’s very helpful to have an IP actually representing a creditor at a 
meeting.  They can make it much more robust.  From the point of view of sitting at the 
top table with the debtor on proposals that we’ve prepared, again I don’t know if 
probably IP’s being there, but they will try to make it slightly more robust where they 
think it needs it.  The times when its unhelpful is when there is perhaps a particularly 
aggressive proxy holder who is seeing a dark side to the debtor that isn’t really there.  
Some of them may be misjudged - an honest debtor is somebody who is trying to avoid 
their creditors or being particularly silly rather than just somebody who honestly got it 
wrong.  Sometimes that’s a problem where you’ve got an insolvency practitioner as a 
proxy holder, a professional proxy holder shall we say.  Where you’ve got somebody 
who’s just come along to represent themselves, they fall into two categories - there are 
one’s who just sit there and say nothing, and just nod and vote in the right places and 
don’t really seem to understand the process properly despite our efforts to make the 
documentation as ?? as possible.  They’re a bit in awe of the process sometimes.  But 
then, there’s a second category of people representing themselves who are actually 
very helpful in terms of being able to put the debtors problems in perspective for 
everybody else if they know them a bit better, they would be able to say, either you’ve 
made promises over a period of months that you’ve not kept to, or sorry to hear about 
your problems Mr Debtor and I hope this works for you, and I don’t hold it against you.  
They’re quite useful to have around, because they can give you the real perspective on 
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what’s happened before basically. 
EA Our results shows that if the difference between dividend of IVA and bankruptcy is 
around 10p the likelihood of success is higher than the case of the difference around 
20p.  So if, the dividend is the difference is smaller, around 10p, the success will be 
more likely.  If the dividend difference is around 20p again the likelihood in general is 
success, but lesser than the first indication.  What can be the reason for that? 
PG I wasn’t aware of that.  No, it surprises me, but if I try to think of the reasons for that 
might be, it might be that creditors think that the 20p extra dividend is actually unlikely 
to happen in reality.  I wonder also whether your statistics tell you whether the 
difference in the results between different practitioners.  Is this across the board? 
EA Yes 
PG From my perspective I know that different practitioners present the information in 
different ways.  Some of them, for instance, won’t present a realistic estimate of how 
much an IVA is going to cost.  Some of them don’t even put an estimate of the costs in.  
You are really coming up with alot of guesswork to work out what the dividends are.  
So, if that’s covering the statistics you’ve got, then I find it difficult to comment.  I can 
only think that the creditors were thinking - the extra 20p just isn’t going to happen or 
its income stream is that the guy’s not going to be able to afford it, if he can afford it 
why has he got into this mess?  That’s the only thing I can suggest. 
EA Do you think that it can be related to those modifications especially non-contingent 
modifications?  Do you think that in the case of ??? difference, many or too many non-
contingent modifications so at the initial stage, at the beginning of an IVA the 
guesswork shows that the dividend in IVA will be much higher so you’re putting many 
modifications not contingent  ?? at that time will this process discourage debtors, so 
instead of success the case becomes a failure? 
PG Are you suggesting failure after the meeting rather than the rejection of the ...  You’re 
talking about failure after the meeting, rather than rejecting the proposals themselves. 
EA No, what I’m saying is that, they’re accepting the IVA proposal, so IVA starts because 
when you look at the proposals the benefits to the creditors will be really high, the 
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projection shows that there will be quite high dividends, however, to be able to do that 
the proposal needs to be modified alot by putting non-contingent modifications.  
Although it’s accepted at the initial stage, because those modifications are not 
reflecting the reality although the guess is that at the beginning ... 
PG I think that some of those are just too unrealistic.  There needs to be a better process of 
modifying an arrangement through the course of it.  Because there isn’t really any 
structure in place, it is evolving in some sets of proposals but the law is still pretty 
unclear as to say what majority you would need at a variation.  There are different 
views.  There ought to be a procedure that becomes automatic in certain circumstances 
perhaps.  For instance, maybe just where the supervisor considers that there is a 
variation that would be worthwhile continuing, because you may be two or three years 
into a voluntary arrangement and there is something going wrong which is technically 
default, and if somebody has stuck in a modification that says three months default and 
it shall be bankruptcy, supervisors don’t have the discretion to call the meeting of 
creditors which might actually be in our interests.  That’s definitely something which to 
be honest it doesn’t help when those modifications are put forward, without the 
proposer of the modifications attending the meeting.  Because if they attended or 
they’ve maybe faxed even modificate a few days in advance of the meeting, instead of 
the evening before as tend to do, then you can go back to them and say, look instead of 
just three months arrears in bankruptcy can we say three months arrears in bankruptcy 
unless the supervisor considers the issue ?culminating? to vary.  And they very often 
agree.  But because they don’t turn up to the meeting or they faxed it very late, they 
don’t always get the chance to suggest that amendment to their modifications. 
EA Can we say that there are two basic types of IVAs:  asset-based IVAs and income 
stream IVAs and this result 20p can be a problem can be seen in terms of especially 
asset-based IVAs because at the initial stage the professionals or let’s say, valuation 
professionals are not valuing the asset really.  Because of that ... 
PG I don’t know.  I couldn’t answer that one.  That’s not been the case with any of ours 
that I can think of.  The only asset-based one that failed was where to some extent 
actually obtaining the asset was out of the control of the debtor and he didn’t manage to 
achieve it - so it failed.  It wasn’t an evaluation issue.  There was another one, that I’ve 
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been involved in, where the dividend is going to be much lower because the valuations 
was over-stated at the start, but I wouldn’t put that down to - that particular case was 
very difficult to value because it was a particularly specialised piece of property, it 
wasn’t a straightforward “96 Suburbia Avenue” - so there were mitigated 
circumstances for the valuer. 
EA Some IPs think that income-stream IVAs are reflecting the future dividends better than 
the others because you can estimate this kind of income, he, the debtor, or she, will 
debt in the future.  Do you agree with this? 
PG No I don’t.  I would have expected an asset-based one to be far more secure.  Because 
if you’ve got an asset you ought , within a reasonable range, know how much you are 
going to achieve in realisations, and because it’s a straightforward realisation process 
you ought to know roughly how much it’s going to cost to do it.  The only problems 
arise is when you’re second or third in line after chargeholders have wrapped-up more 
interest by the time it’s been sold.  Maybe that’s the reason that that becomes a 
problem.  In my experience the income stream IVAs we’ve had - the best one’s have 
been the one’s that have had the flexibility to cope with say seasonal fluctuations or 
problems arising through the course of the IVA, as invariably will be if you’ve 
managed to persuade them to present a decent income contribution at the start.  The 
problems arise when the business performance “falls off a cliff” and they are made 
unemployed by that.  Some of those you can’t do anything about.   
EA Only a few questions left now. 
The result shows that if a debtor goes to an IVA after a bankruptcy order the likelihood 
of choosing a bigger IP firm is higher.  What is the reason for that?  If it’s correct. 
PG I would think one of the reasons would be that the Official Receiver would be referring 
the debtor to a particular - a number of practitioners who may be on a rota.  That’s 
probably the obvious one.  The second one is perhaps because the debtor perceives that 
a larger firm will have a bigger influence with creditors, the Official Receiver, and the 
Judge.  They’re the things that spring to mind immediately, I don’t know if they’re the 
right reasons.  It may also be that, perhaps I’m being unkind to the smaller 
practitioners, but it may be that the smaller practitioners don’t particularly want the 
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extra paperwork and hassle that goes with a larger bankruptcy order.  I know the Courts 
will look at a bankrupts IVA slightly more stringently than a proposal for a non-
bankrupt.  Their guidelines for instance would also require the bankrupt to attend 
whereas that doesn’t always need to happen - when he’s not a bankrupt. 
EA If IPs are ... 
 END OF TAPE 
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Interview with:  Mr S…. S….. Griffin Credit Services, Birmingham, 
and 
Mr Emin Akcaoglu and Mr Keith Pond, Banking Centre, Loughborough 
University 
 
28 July 1998 
 
SS I think you said earlier what we have done is we have utilised the questionnaire survey 
to understand certain points about the IVA trends for 1994 and 1995 and there are some 
points which are more significant than the others in terms of the critical success factors 
of IVAs.  The first one that I’m going to ask about is the debtors co-operation issue.  
What we have realised that, if debtors are co-operative through the IVA process, the 
result is generally, or more than likely, a success.  So what we wonder is that when we 
say debtor’ co-operation, what do you understand, and what reasons are behind that for 
being co-operative or not co-operative. 
SS OK.  To me a debtor who is being co-operative is one who is maintaining payments, as 
agreed, and in instances where he can’t maintain those payments, or wishes for a 
review, contacts the IVA practitioner immediately and says so. 
EA If he is not co-operative what is the reason? 
SS Perhaps he was too optimistic when entering into the Proposals, perhaps he was 
coerced into entering into the Proposal by modifications being sought by the creditors.  
Or, lastly more cynically perhaps he was just using the process to get out of his 
obligations, he doesn’t perhaps perceive that there can be any enforcement that can be 
taken against him, other than being made bankrupt.  He may have resigned himself to 
the fact that he has decided if that’s what’s going to happen, then it’s going to happen. 
EA I’ll ask you another question which can also be related to this point to a certain extent.  
What we have realised that, we have looked at the differences between IVA dividends 
and bankruptcy dividends, and the picture seems to us that if the dividend difference is 
around 10p, 20p but not more than that - the cases are more successful than those cases 
which have that difference around 20p in the pound, more than 20p.  What is the 
explanation for this.  We thought a certain point about modifications again in terms of 
the initial stages of an IVA because when you are talking about the bankruptcy 
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dividend, it’s always an estimation.  Or if you’re thinking about an IVA dividend it’s 
also an estimation.  So do you have an explanation for that. 
SS No, could it be anything to do with including his property in the bankruptcy whereas it 
might be excluded in an IVA?  Could that have something to do with it.  I don’t know. 
KP One of the main advantages of the IVA is you can exclude assets.  everyone’s 
agreeable with that? 
SS So whereas in a bankruptcy, you’d be less likely to exclude something like a 
matrimonial home, in an IVA you might be able to negotiate that. 
KP OK I think that might be something outside S…'s experience.  It’s something that the 
Insolvency Practitioners have certainly had more of a say on that. 
EA Perhaps the major point which could be in your interest is about this.  We have found 
that if the creditor had a contact with creditors before the ?inter-model? 
SS With other creditors? 
EA Yes, with other creditors, that is the likelihood for pursuing the concertina ... Do you 
have any idea or explanation for this? 
SS What do you mean by concertina practice? 
KP That’s the High Court Order that allows - if it’s a straightforward IVA that the 
Insolvency Practitioner can go the Court and say, look, we’re applying for an Interim 
Order, we’ve got creditor approval, co-operation, I don’t have to go through the 
rigmarole of the Nominees Report, before we get to the Creditors Meeting, I just want 
you give ??? the Interim Order and I have a Creditors Meeting because this is a 
straightforward case, no complications, no-one’s disagreeing. 
SS So what you’re saying is dialogue between the creditors prior to that being proposed.  I 
personally don’t like the idea of IVA practitioner’s being able to informally approach 
creditors and try an attempt to gain an idea of what their reactions are going to be.  I 
prefer them to formalise it.  An in fact, one of the things I was going to show you was 
I’ve got, I’ll talk to you about later, but there seems to me to be two ways to look at it.  
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i) is from the Court’s point of view it seems sensible that somebody’s approached the 
major creditors to get an idea of where they are going to be coming from, so that when 
the Interim Order is actually sought, they can say well I’ve already spoken to Midland 
Bank who wrote 50% - and they’re quite happy with that.  But it also seems to me to be 
a way open to abuse where you can actually find out how low some creditors might - so 
somebody might come up to them and say how would you feel if the dividend was 
around 4p in the pound.  But in fact the dividend might be alot higher, so without 
having to go through the formal process they’re actually approaching creditors.  So I 
would probably want them to formalise it before they spoke to them. 
EA An IP told me that if the debtor goes to creditors before the ?inter-model? it could be a 
problem for himself because the creditors can think in another way, by petitioning for 
bankruptcy over the debtor. 
SS It may pre-empt that action, I would certainly say if somebody was making an informal 
approach then I don’t think we would do it, but certainly some unscrupulous creditors 
might actually take that as being forewarned and actually go in.  Because there’s no 
formalisation of the process there, so they might decide, well we’ll make an application 
for a Charging Order or do the petition as you said there.  So there’s a danger both 
sides really.  I’m not particularly happy with it because it seems to me somebody’s 
sounding out my views without going through a formal process and it could backfire on 
the debtor as you say there. 
EA Another issue, is about IP firm size and source as an introduction to the IVAs.  What 
we’ve seen in our results is that if IPs are introduced to debtors by a professional such 
as a solicitor the likelihood of a choice of a big - smaller IP firm is higher than another 
option such as that if an IP is introduced by a family member or Yellow Pages or 
anything like that, the likelihood is more to choose a bigger IP firm. 
SS Is that a fact, that surprises me, I would have thought that solicitors would probably 
point them towards the way of the larger firms, but what you’re saying is that if a 
professional advisor is advising a debtor he’s more likely to point the debtor towards a 
smaller practitioner. 
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EA There’s only one exception in that case in our sample study.  It’s about the accountants.  
If an accountant are introducing they prefer big firms, but solicitor’s or bank’s are 
generally introducing smaller firms. 
SS I’m surprised banks are introducing more of them. 
KP I’m wondering if behind that there’s some idea on say a creditors point of view, 
whether big firms are going to be more expensive than small firms.  Do you have a 
view on that? 
SS My own view would be that I think that the larger the firm the more I can rest assured 
that they will not be the sort of Maverick type.  Having spoken to some of the partners 
within KPMG and the accountants that we’ve used they were quite forthright in saying 
that there would be a certain number of people that they would turn away if there was 
any doubt in their mind as to whether that person was trying to con them or wouldn’t 
be able to sustain an IVA, they would turn him away.  And there seems to be a logic in 
that that they would.  Whereas I wonder whether a small firm that relies on that for his 
day-do-day bread-and-butter would turn even somebody that was using the rules a little 
bit, whether they would turn them away, so that’s my prejudice against them, so I’d 
probably be like the accountant recommending the larger firm probably.  It certainly 
has more impact when you see the old Shaws and stuff like that coming through and 
you get a partner of KPMG that’s the IVA practitioner, it gives me a certain degree of 
confidence.  So it’s a bias there. 
KP Well, I think there you have your rationale for why they’re doing this job. 
EA Some IPs were talking about personal connections on this issue. 
SS That’s right.  I think if you go along to a solicitor, then he probably knows a smaller 
firm that he plays golf with rather than the big firm where he’s less likely to know 
personally people within that firm. 
EA Some IPs said that because accountants are initially trained in bigger firms, so they 
have contacts with  
SS Loyalty. 
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EA Yes, although even though they are running their own small company’s.  Another thing 
is entry-route to an IVA.  Obviously there are three routes to an IVA and one of them is 
after a bankruptcy order.  What it seems is that if a debtor follows the entry route 
namely, enters an IVA after a Bankruptcy Order the likelihood of a choice of a big firm 
IP firm, is really higher than choosing a smaller firm.  What do you think is the reason 
for this? 
SS I’m just trying to remember now, what I said in that paper.  This is where the guy has 
actually been made bankrupt but somebody somewhere along the line thinks well 
there’s no need for him to go ... it might be.  I don’t know who it is, is it the Official 
Receiver? 
KP Well they’d be the Trustees the first choice and any fee paying cases they tend to shift 
off to whoever’s on the Court Roll. 
SS And the question is if why after, if you take that third route into IVAs is the choice for 
a large firm of accountants even greater?  That was the question wasn’t it?  I don’t 
know. 
EA These are the basic things we would like to ask and there are some things about the 
Creditors Meeting and modifications issue perhaps.  I told you something about the 
dividend difference issue, so what we thought is that, because if  
TAPE TURNED OVER AT THIS POINT. 
EA If you’re putting too much pressure on the debtor, by putting lots of modifications in 
the IVA, obviously your estimation for the difference between the IVA and a possible 
bankruptcy can be higher at the initial stage but at the same time you are discouraging 
the debtor to co-operate perhaps, because he can say yes, I’ve got the time now, I can 
choose bankruptcy if I’m not able to continue in this process, etc, etc.  So at this stage 
perhaps we should consider the Creditors Meeting because as we know even though 
those meetings some creditors are voting by proxy and some are voting by attendance, 
and obviously the result of these two types of voting can influence the process of the 
meeting.  What we think is that there must be some creditors who are just sending their 
shopping list, as their modification lists like Inland Revenue list for modifications or 
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Customs and Excise or they can go their and negotiate.  Initially we can expect that that 
meeting should be a negotiation process so that would be an agreement multi-lateral 
agreement between the creditors and the debtor.  What’s your view about that?  If they 
are voting, the creditors, by proxy, could the process of a meeting be different from if 
they are voting by person, and do you think that that meetings are creating a multi-
lateral agreement between the debtor and the creditors or bringing lots of many bi-
lateral agreements between the debtor and every single individual creditor? 
KP What is your view of the process in the Creditors - what actually happens in the 
Creditors Meeting? 
SS I’m quite happy with that process and I think the Supervisor that’s representing the 
debtor should be strong enough to stand his corner and represent the debtor properly, 
so if the view is that if he’s been coerced into too many modifications he should be able 
to respond to each of those requests for a modification and explain why it’s not feasible 
to go with that modification.  I certainly don’t agree with the shopping list approach 
which is adopted heavy-handedly by the Inland Revenue, mainly because they know 
that they’re going to be at the front so that if the guy does get made bankrupt, because 
they’re taking a very, I believe, a very selfish view, so they’re saying well the chance is 
that we will recover a fair proportion of our debts anyway even if he goes down the 
bankruptcy route so we’re going to insist on this, that and the other.  I wonder whether 
there shouldn’t be some sort of controls over that actually, to stop people doing that 
because the whole idea of a Meting of Creditors is yes, you have power by the actual 
value of the debt but I think there needs to be some sort of “pulling-in” of - because it’s 
almost like, it seems to me, that the to use an analogy, the creditors are being unleashed 
on this debtor and his Insolvency Practitioner is sitting in the corner and it’s the larger 
dogs that are baying away to him while the other one’s are having to take their turn at 
the back.  And I think that’s a bit unfair so, whilst the logic of it is sound in a way, that 
the largest creditor should have that I think it doesn’t create an environment where 
everybody’s views are represented.  So I do think there needs to be some control, 
which I don’t think there is at the moment, because that is the control, isn’t it, that the 
people with the largest debts, by value, ... 
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KP Typically, the Inland Revenue won’t attend. 
SS So - the shopping list - I don’t agree with that, if that’s what you’re asking.  I don’t see 
how else.  To be honest, I’ll probably go as far as to say, that if you want to have the 
vote and you want to have modifications you should be attending.  I must be radical, I 
think that’s what I would say.  To prevent all that, let’s have people actually attending 
and sounding ...  Because if you submit a shopping list, the point I made earlier about 
the Insolvency Practitioner being able to respond to you, I think that on the face of it is 
unreasonable, can we look at that again in a bit more detail as to exactly what you’re 
proposing.  That option is taken away from you, from the Insolvency Practitioner, who 
will say that 75% of the debt is owed to Inland Revenue, four of the creditors have 
attended but the whole thing is being swayed, or held to ransom almost, by this one 
creditor who is not even there!  I would say they can only ask for modifications if they 
attend.  There you are, how’s that! 
KP Put that in the next Review of the Insolvency ??? 
EA If I ask you perhaps a last question, I think you have also seen that in the Report that 
there are three major kinds of modifications, administrative, non-contingent, and 
contingent.  Obviously, non-contingent ones are more critical than the others, because 
you’re talking about the debtor’s income or co-operative, whatever.  Do you think that 
those modifications, we talked about the same issue before, but I want to just 
understand your view about that in a certain extent.  Do you think that those 
modifications can really be effective on the co-operation of the debtor.  If you are 
putting to much, I think the Inland Revenue does it in many cases which can 
discourage. 
SS Are you talking about the non-contingent ones? 
EA Yes, like the debtor’s income stream or ????? house.  If you’re asking him to increase 
the amount of contribution to the IVA obviously you are just pushing him. 
SS Yes, I suppose that comes down to how much faith the creditors have got in the 
Insolvency Practitioner that is representing him.  I would only push at that point where 
I felt that looking at his income and outgoings, that really he could legitimately afford 
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more, so I am really questioning the Insolvency Practitioner’s homework there, rather 
than putting the debtor on the spot.  So if I’m asking that he should contribute not £200 
but £300 to him, I really trying to quiz the Insolvency Practitioner to see if he’s 
actually looked properly at his income rather than the debtor himself.  Because I would 
expect the debtor to volunteer less than what he could afford. 
 END OF INTERVIEW 
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ADMINISTRATION ORDER 
 
(1) An administration order is a court order placing a company that is, or is likely to 
become, insolvent under the control of administrator following a petition by the 
company, its directors or a creditor. The purpose of the order is to preserve the 
company's business allow a reorganisation or ensure the most advantageous 
realisation of its assets whilst protecting it from action by its creditors. 
 
(2) The administration of the insolvent estate of a deceased debtor. 
 
(3) County court process permitting an individual with modest debts to pay 
off instalments. No insolvency practitioner is involved. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE RECEIVER 
 
An insolvency practitioner appointed by the holder of a floating charge covering the 
whole, or substantially the whole, of a company's property. He can carry on the 
company's business and sell the business and other assets comprised in the charge to 
repay the secured and preferential creditors. Sometimes abbreviated to receiver. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE RECEIVERSHIP 
 
The term applied when a person is appointed as an administrative receiver. 
Commonly abbreviated to receivership. 
 
ADMINISTRATOR 
 
An insolvency practitioner appointed by the court under an administration order to 
achieve the purposes set out in the order. The administrator will need to produce a 
plan for approval by the creditors to achieve this. 
 
AGRICULTURAL RECEIVERSHIP 
 
A special remedy to take control of the assets of a farmer under the Agricultural 
Credits Act 1928. 
 
ASSOCIATES 
 
Associates of individuals include family members, relatives, partners and their 
relatives,employees, employers, trustees in certain trust relationships, and companies 
which the individual controls. Associates of companies include other companies 
under common control (see also connected persons). 
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BANKRUPT 
 
Bankruptcy is the process of dealing with the estate of a bankrupt. 
 
BOND 
 
Insurance cover needed by a person who acts as an insolvency practitioner. 
 
BREAK-UP SALE 
 
Dismantling of a business. Trading ceases and the assets are sold off piecemeal. 
Insolvency practitioners prefer to sell as a going concern if possible. 
 
CHARGE 
 
The appropriation of real or personal property for the discharge of a debt without 
giving the creditor any property in, or possession of, the subject of security. 
 
CHARGING ORDER 
 
Court order placing restrictions on the disposal of certain assets, such as property or 
securities, given after judgement and gives priority of payment over other creditors. 
 
COMPANY DIRECTORS DISQUALIFICATIONS ACT (1986) 
 
Consolidation Act on the disqualification of directors. 
 
COMPANY VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT (CVA) 
 
A voluntary agreement for a company is a procedure whereby a plan of reorganisation 
or composition in satisfaction of debts, is put forward to creditors and shareholders. 
There is limited involvement by the court and the scheme is under the control of a 
supervisor. 
 
COMPOSITION 
 
An agreement between debtor and his creditors whereby the compounding creditors 
agree with the debtor between themselves to accept from the debtor payment of less 
than the amounts due to them in full satisfaction of their claim. 
 
COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION 
 
A compulsory liquidation of the company is a liquidation ordered by the court. This is 
usually as a result of a petition presented to the court by a creditor and is the only 
method by which a creditor can bring about a liquidation of its debtor company. 
 
CONNECTED PERSONS 
 
Directors or shadow directors and their associates, and associates of the company. 
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CORK REPORT 
 
Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, upon 
which the Insolvency Act 1986 is substantially based (command paper 8555,1982). 
 
COURT-APPOINTED RECEIVER 
 
A person, not necessarily a licensed insolvency practitioner, appointed to take charge 
of assets usually where they are subject to some legal dispute. Not strictly and 
insolvency process, the procedure may be used other than for a limited company, e.g. 
to settle a partnership dispute. 
 
CREDITORS' COMMITTEE 
 
A creditors' committee is formed to represent the interests of all creditors in 
supervising the activities of an administrator or trustee in bankruptcy, or receiving 
reports from an administrative receiver. 
 
CREDITORS' VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION (CVL) 
 
Relates to an insolvent company. It is commenced by resolution of the shareholders, 
but is under the effective control of creditors, who can choose the liquidator. 
 
DEBENTURE 
 
A document stating the terms of a loan, usually to a company. Debentures may be 
secured on part or all of a company's assets, or they may be unsecured. Often also 
referred to as a floating charge, and the lender is often referred to as the debenture 
holder. 
 
DEED OF ARRANGEMENT 
 
Archaic (1914) method for an individual (not a company) to come to terms with 
creditors short of formal bankruptcy, now almost completely replaced by Voluntary 
arrangements. 
 
DISQUALIFICATION OF DIRECTORS 
 
A director found to have conducted the affairs of an insolvent company in an "unfit" 
manner may be disqualified, on application to the court by the DTI, from holding any 
management position in a company for between 2 and 15 years. 
 
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTION 
 
An extortionate credit transaction is a transaction by which credit is provided on 
terms that are exorbitant or grossly unfair compared with the risk accepted by the 
creditor. Such a transaction may be challenged by an administrator, a liquidator or a 
trustee in bankruptcy. 
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FIXED CHARGE 
 
A fixed charge is a form of security granted over specific assets, preventing the debtor 
dealing with those assets without the consent of the secured creditor. It gives the 
secured creditor a first claim on the proceeds of sale, and the creditor can usually 
appoint a receiver to realise the assets in the event of default. 
 
FLOATING CHARGE 
 
A floating charge is a form of security granted to a creditor over general assets of a 
company which may change from time to time in the normal course of business 
(e.g.stock). The company can continue to use the assets in its business until an event 
of default occurs and the charge crystallises. If this happens, the secured creditor can 
realise the assets to recover his debt, usually by appointing an administrative receiver, 
and obtain the net proceeds of sale subject to the prior claims of the preferential 
creditors. 
 
FRAUDULENT TRADING 
 
Where a company has carried on business with intent to defraud creditors, or for any 
fraudulent purpose. It is a criminal offence and those involved can be made personally 
liable for the company's liabilities. 
 
GOING CONCERN 
 
Basis on which insolvency practitioners prefer to sell a business. Effectively it means 
the business continues, jobs are saved, and a higher price is obtained. 
 
GUARANTEE 
 
A legal commitment to repay a debt if the original borrower fails to do so. Directors 
may give guarantees to banks in return for the bank giving finance to their companies. 
 
INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT 
 
A voluntary arrangement for an individual is a procedure whereby a scheme of 
arrangement of his affairs or composition in satisfaction of his debts is put forward to 
creditors. Such a scheme requires the approval of the court and is under the control of 
a supervisor. 
 
INSOLVENCY 
 
Defined alternatively as having insufficient assets to meet all debts as and when they 
are due. If a creditor can establish either test, he will be able to present a winding-up 
petition. 
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INSOLVENCY ACT 1986 
 
Primary legislation governing insolvency law and practice. Nevertheless, many other 
statues and statutory instruments are also relevant. 
 
INSOLVENT LIQUIDATION 
 
A company goes into insolvent liquidation if it goes into liquidation at a time when 
assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the 
expenses of liquidation. 
 
INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONER (IP) 
 
Person licensed by one of the chartered accountancy bodies, the Law Societies, The 
Insolvency Practitioners Association or the Department of Trade. The only person 
who may act as office holder in an insolvency proceeding. 
 
INSOLVENCY RULES 
 
The Insolvency Rules 1986, as amended, provide the detailed working procedures for 
the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
 
INTERIM ORDER 
 
An individual who intends to propose a voluntary arrangement to his creditors may 
apply to the court for an interim order which, if granted, precludes bankruptcy and 
other legal proceedings whilst the order is in force. 
 
INVESTORS' COMPENSATION SCHEME 
 
A statutory scheme operated by the SIB (Securities and Investments Board) to give 
individual investors up to £48,000 protection if an authorised investment business 
collapses. 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
1. Recognition of a debt by a court. 
 
2. Decision given by a court at the conclusion of a trial. 
 
LAW PROPERTY ACT 1925 
 
Governs transactions in law and property. Contains statutory powers of receivers 
appointed under a fixed charge. 
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LPA RECEIVER 
 
Law of Property Act 1925 receiver: a person (not necessarily an insolvency 
practitioner) appointed to take charge of a mortgaged property by a lender whose loan 
is in default, usually with a view to sale or to collect rental income for the lender. 
Common in the case of failure of a property developer, whose borrowings will largely 
be secured on specific properties. 
 
LIEN 
 
Right to retain possession of assets or documents until settlement of a debt. 
 
LIQUIDATION 
 
Liquidation is the process whereby a company has its assets realised and distributed 
to satisfy, insofar as it is able, its liabilities and to repay its shareholders. The term 
winding-up is also used. Liquidation is a terminal process and is followed by the 
dissolution of the company. 
 
LIQUIDATION COMMITTEE 
 
Committee of creditors who receive information from the liquidator and sanction 
some of his actions. 
 
LIQUIDATOR 
 
Insolvency practitioner appointed to wind-up a company. 
 
MAREVA INJUNCTION 
 
Court order preventing the disposal of assets. 
 
MEMBERS' VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION (MVL) 
 
A solvent liquidation where the shareholders appoint the liquidator to realise assets 
and settle all the company's debts in full within 12 months. 
 
MISFEASANCE 
 
Breach of duty in relation to the funds or property of a company by its directors or 
managers. 
 
MORTGAGE 
 
A transfer of an interest in land or other property by way of security, 
redeemable upon performing the condition of paying a given sum of money. 
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NOMINEE 
 
Insolvency practitioner appointed to consider proposals of a debtor in an individual or 
corporate voluntary arrangement. 
 
OFFICE HOLDER 
 
A liquidator, provisional liquidator, administrator , administrative receiver, supervisor 
of a voluntary arrangement, or trustee in bankruptcy. 
 
OFFICIAL RECEIVER (OR) 
 
Officer of the court, civil servant, member of the Department of Trade Insolvency 
Service, deals with bankruptcies and compulsory liquidations. 
 
ONEROUS PROPERTY 
 
The term onerous property in the context of a liquidation or bankruptcy, applies to 
unprofitable contracts and to property that is unsaleable or not easily saleable or that 
might give rise to a continuing liability. Such property can be disclaimed by a 
liquidator or a trustee in bankruptcy. 
 
PETITION 
 
A written application to the court for relief or remedy. 
 
POLICYHOLDERS PROTECTION ACT 1975 
 
An act which established Policyholders Protection Board to provide compensation to 
the public in the event of the liquidation of an insurance company. The Board will 
make payment in full of liabilities under certain policies of compulsory insurance and 
90 per cent of liability to provide policyholders under other general and investment 
type policies.  Compensation is restricted to individual policyholders or partnerships; 
corporate policyholders are not protected. 
 
PREFERENCE 
 
A payment or other transaction in the six month to two year period preceding a 
liquidation, administration or bankruptcy, which places a creditor or a person 
connected with the insolvent, respectively, in a better position than they would have 
been otherwise. A liquidator, administrator or trustee in bankruptcy may recover any 
sums which are found to be preferences. 
 
PREFERENTIAL CREDITOR 
 
Defined in Schedule 6 of The Insolvency Act 1986. Has priority when funds are 
distributed by a liquidator, administrative receiver or trustee in bankruptcy. 
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PROOF OF DEBT 
 
Document submitted by a creditor to the insolvency practitioner giving evidence of 
the amount of the debt. 
 
PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATOR 
 
An insolvency practitioner appointed to safeguard a company's assets after 
presentation of a winding-up petition but before a winding-up order is made. 
 
PROXY 
 
Document whereby a creditor authorises another person to represent him at a meeting 
of creditors. The proxy may be a general proxy, giving the proxyholder a discretion as 
to how he votes, or a special proxy requiring him to vote as directed by the creditor. A 
body corporate can only be represented by a proxy. 
 
PROXYHOLDER 
 
Person who attends a meeting on behalf of someone else. 
 
RECEIVER 
 
Is often used to describe an administrative receiver, who may be appointed by a 
secured creditor holding a floating charge over a company's assets.  More accurately, 
a receiver is the person appointed by a secured creditor holding a fixed charge over 
specific assets of a company in order to take control of those assets for the benefit of 
the secured creditor. 
 
RECEIVERSHIP 
 
he general term applied when a person is a appointed as a receiver or administrative 
receiver. 
 
RECOGNISED PROFESSIONAL BODY (RPB) 
 
An organisation approved by the Secretary of State as being able to authorise its 
members to act as insolvency practitioners. 
 
RESERVATION OF TITLE (OR RETENTION OF TITLE) 
 
A provision under a contract for the supply of goods which purports to reserve 
ownership of the goods with the supplier until the goods have been paid for. A 
complex and continually evolving area of law. 
 
SECURED CREDITOR 
 
A creditor with specific rights over some or all his debtor's assets in the event of 
insolvency. In essence he gets paid first. 
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SECURITY 
 
A charge or mortgage over assets taken to secure payment of a debt. If the debt is not 
paid, the lender has a right to sell the charged assets. Security documents can be very 
complex. The commonest example is a mortgage over a property. 
 
SHADOW DIRECTOR 
 
A person who is not formally appointed as a director, but in accordance with whose 
directors or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to act. However, a 
person is not a shadow director merely because the directors act on advice given by 
him in a professional capacity. 
 
SPECIAL MANAGER 
 
A special manager is a person appointed by the Court in a compulsory liquidation or 
bankruptcy to assist the liquidator, official receiver or trustee in managing the 
insolvent's business. He does not need to be an insolvency practitioner. 
 
STATUTORY DEMAND 
 
A formal notice requiring payment of a debt exceeding £750 within 21 days, in 
default of which bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings may be commenced without 
further notice. 
 
SUPERVISOR 
 
The insolvency practitioner appointed by creditors to supervise the way in which an 
approved voluntary arrangement is put into effect. 
 
TRANSACTION AT AN UNDERVALUE 
 
A transaction at an undervalue can describe either a gift or a transaction in which the 
consideration received is significantly less than that given.  In certain circumstances 
such a transaction can be challenged by an administrator, a liquidator or a trustee in 
bankruptcy. 
 
TRUSTEE 
 
Quite apart from its common usage (e.g. under the Trustee Act 1925) this is a term 
used for a variety of insolvency appointments, including the insolvency practitioner 
appointed in an English bankruptcy; a Scottish sequestration; a deed of arrangement; 
a Scottish trust deed and an administration order (of the affairs of a deceased debtor). 
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UNSECURED CREDITOR 
 
Strictly, any creditor who does not hold security. More commonly used to refer to any 
ordinary creditor who has no preferential rights, although, in fact preferential 
creditors will almost always also be unsecured. In any event, the last in the queue, 
ahead only of the shareholders. 
 
VAT BAD DEBT RELIEF 
 
The relief obtained in respect of the VAT element of an unpaid debt. Previously 
available only when the debtor became insolvent, relief is now available on any debt 
unpaid for more than 6 months. 
 
VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION 
 
See creditors' voluntary liquidation and members' voluntary liquidation. 
 
WINDING-UP 
 
See liquidation. 
 
WINDING-UP ORDER 
 
Order made by the court for a company to be placed in compulsory liquidation. 
 
WINDING-UP PETITION 
 
A winding-up petition is a petition presented to the court seeking an order that a 
company be put into compulsory liquidation. 
 
WRONGFUL TRADING 
 
Applied to companies in liquidation where a director allowed the company to 
continue trading in circumstances where he should have concluded that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into solvent liquidation. The 
directors involved may be made personally liable to make a contribution to the 
company's assets. 
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